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ABSTRACT

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) represents an exciting
and revolutionary development in the field of international law generally and
international criminal law specifically. Unfortunately there are many ways in which
academics, the media and political decision-makers misinterpret its intent and its
nature. This thesis considers these traps and embarks upon an analysis of
international criminal law by considering the content o f the Statute and how it
proceeds to establish an International Criminal Court, capable of bringing those
most serious perpetrators to account The subject matter of the ICC reveals a
Court with a very limited jurisdiction, over a very limited category of international
crimes, in a specific context The backbone of the Court is a novel concept called
“complementarity.* The concept is worth exploring in detail, for it reveals a Statute
that introduces a new vocabulary of how an international court is capable of
functioning, yet at the same time being respectful of the primary right of States to
prosecute international crimes themselves. Yet the concept is even more
intriguing, for it establishes the Court as an institution that neither centralizes
international criminal judicial authority, nor establishes a hierarchy of international
criminal law. It actually reinforces the decentralized nature of international law.
The ICC is required to presume that States are acting in full propriety in the
manner in which they dispose of suspected international criminals, unless there is
evidence to the contrary. Prosecutorial and judicial discretionary power is
restricted and supervised by the disparate personalities within the international
legal system. This approach has profound implications for truth and reconciliation
commissions (TRCs) and amnesties associated with them. The whole notion of
complementarity rests on a unique view of international law as being decentralized
and exercised through consensus, negotiation, equality, deliberation and
communication, rather than through the establishment o f hierarchies of law and
institutions or imposition and command. This is a reflexive vision, supported by
contemporary international legal practice - especially the proliferation of 'regional
arrangements.* It is not a well-recognized system however. Opposition to the
Rome Statute is mired in the expectation of seeing the familiar patterns of the
centralized and hierarchical domestic legal systems, projected into the
international. Both Indian and American arguments reflect a lack of imagination
and a lack o f vision to break free from the chains of traditional legal thought.

ix
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Chapter

1

Chapter One: The State of the Field
Introduction
On 22 April 2002 a ceremony took place in the New York headquarters of the
United Nations.1 Ten States deposited their ratifications to a m ultilateral treaty
called the Rome Statute, thereby authorizing the creation of the International
Criminal C ourt2 In accordance with the Rome Statute’s requirement of a minimum
of sixty ratifications, the treaty entered into force on 1 July 2002.3 The treaty
authorizes the establishment of a permanent global court, to bring to account
individuals for specific international crimes.4

1 Secretary General of the United Nations, The Secretary General Off the Cuff, ‘Rome,
Italy, 11 April 2002 - Press conference with President Carlo Ciampi following ratification
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’ (11 April 2002), online:
United Nations <http://www0.un.org/News/ossg/sgcuff.htm>(date accessed: 25 April
2002).

2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9,
reprinted in William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court,
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 167-247Jhereinafter the Rome
Statute). Other documents associated with the Statute and the ICC include: Report of
the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum, Finalized
Draft Text of the Elements o f Crimes, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/lNF/3/Add.2, reprinted in
Schabas, ibid. at 248-292 [hereinafter the Elements o f Cranes]; and Report o f the
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum, Finalized Draft
Text of the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.3,
reprinted in Schabas, ibid. at 293-382 [hereinafter the ICC Rules o f Procedure and
Evidence).
3 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 126. By 1 July 2002, there were 76 States Parties
to the Rome Statute that had ratified. (Source: ‘Multilateral treaties deposited with the
Secretary-GeneralTREATY
l-XVIII,*
UN
Treaty
Database
Online:
<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/treaty10.as
p> (date accessed: 5 July 2002).
4 For current information regarding the Advance Team’s efforts in setting up the Court, see
their web site at < http://www.un.org/law/icc/>. The first meeting of the Assembly of
States Parties will be held from 3 to 10 September at UN Headquarters. See: PCNICC,
Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, PCNICC
Doc. No. PCNICC/2002/2 (24 July 2002), online at the ICC web site mentioned in the
previous sentence.
1
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Despite the optimism following ratification, numerous States remain resolute in
their opposition to the Statute, including: the Peoples’ Republic of China, India,
Pakistan, Indonesia and Japan.5 The representatives o f more than two-thirds of
the global population have not accepted the Statute or the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court

The United States reluctantly signed the Rome

Statute in 2000, but on 6 May 2002, withdrew its signature. It considered the
Statute seriously flawed. This action paved the way for the final enactment on 3
August 2002 of the anti-ICC legislation known as American Servicemembers’
Protection Act o f 2002* This Act actively attempts to undermine the membership
of those States that have ratified the Rome Statute and prevents any form of
cooperation by the United States with the Court.

The United States is now

negotiating bilateral treaties in order to provide exemption for “covered allied
persons” and “covered United States persons” by States Parties to the Rome
Statute7

5 Supra note 3.
6 American Servicemembers' Protection Act o f 2002, 2002 H.R. 4775 § 2001-2015
annexed to Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2002, 2002 H.R. 4775
[hereinafter ASPA]. The text of ASPA was obtained from the web site of the Washington
Working
Group
on
the
International
Criminal
Court
<http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/ASPA-HR4775.html> (date accessed:
18 August
2002). It should also be available at the US Federal Legislative Library web site
<http://thomas.loc.govA>, although that web site was not non-functional at the time of
writing. The Act was signed by President Bush on 3 August 2002 (see: “U.S.:'Hague
Invasion Act1Becomes Law: White House 'Stops at Nothing’ in Campaign Against War
Crimes Court” Human Rights Watch (3 August 2002), online: Human Rights Watch
<http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/aspa080302.htm> (date accessed:
17 August
2002). The House of Representatives and Senate passed the harmonized Act on 23 and
24 July, respectively.
7 The terms ‘covered allied persons” and “covered United States persons” are those used
in ASPA at § 2015. On 12 July 2002, the Security Council agreed to a resolution
exempting American personnel from the jurisdiction of the Court for one year, which
ended the American threat to terminate U.N. peacekeeping operations (Edith M.
Lederer, ‘U.N. Reaches Deal on War Crimes Court” Associated Press (12 July 2002)).
The text of the relevant Security Council Resolution (Resolution 1422 (2002), SC Res.
1422 2002, UN Doc S/RES/1422 (12 July 2002), online United Nations web site
<http://Www.un.org> (date accessed: 18 August 2002)) is contained in Security Council,
Press Release SC/7450, ‘Security Council Requests International Criminal Court Not to
Bring Cases Against Peacekeeping Personnel from States not Party to Statute:
Unanimously Adopts Resolution 1422 (2002); Request is for 12 Months, with Annual
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Despite such hullabaloo, the Rome Statute represents a significant development in
international criminal law, if not international law generally.

Controversy and

limited participation are not necessarily indicators of certain failure; they are
however indicators that the Court has a long way to go in order to achieve
legitimacy in the eyes o f some of the planet's most influential and populous States.

Exploration of a New Legal Field
The International Criminal Court is an entirely new court Its jurisdiction represents
the frontier of a pioneering field of law - “international criminal law.” A quick survey
of university legal courses reveals that international criminal law is rapidly
becoming a widely taught subject at law schools.8 A number of American
universities maintain regular internships at some of the main international courts
and tribunals.9 The topic is far-reaching. There are broad implications for human
rights, extradition law, administrative law, public international law, criminal law and
the laws of war (“international humanitarian law”).

Sometimes the separation

between law and politics (international relations) is not always clear. One might
argue that law strives to lim it the exercise of absolute power, whereas politics
strives to justify the exercise of absolute power.10 At other times the field may
Renewals
Intended”
(12
July
2002),
online:
United
Nations
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7450.doc.htm>.
This
negotiated
settlement only amounted to a temporary reprieve. The passage of ASPA has re
established the American antagonism to the ICC.
8 Including the University of Edinburgh, the University of Glasgow, Rutgers, and McGill.
The McGill course syllabus is online:
McGill Law School <
http://www.law.mcgiH.ca/>(date accessed: 24 April 2002).
9 Including Harvard and Northwestern, from the author’s own experience as an intern at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2000 and 2001) and at The
International Court of Justice (1999).
10 Consider Anthony Carty, “Why Theory? - The Implications for International Law
Teaching,” in Philip Allott, Tony Carty, Martti Koskenniemi and Colin Warbrick, eds.
Theory and International Law: An Introduction (London: The British Institute of
International and Comparative Law, 1991) at 83. Professor Carty explains why it is that
international lawyers and international relations academics do not generally get along.
The roots rest in the disillusionment in the aftermath of World Wlar I. Refer generally to
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal
Argument (Helsinki: Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 1989) - one of the central themes of mis
book is that legal realists represent apologists, while legal idealists represent Utopians.
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appear to lack coherence. Frequently the quality o f secondary analysis is wanting.
Such traits should not be surprising in a new area o f law that develops by the day.
The aim of this thesis is to examine the manner in which the International Criminal
Court is designed to operate, as specified in the Rome Statute. Rather than simply
re-describing the Rome Statute, a contextual approach w ill be adopted.

The

provisions contained in the Rome Statute w ill be examined within the context of the
emergent international criminal legal system, drawing heavily upon the two ad hoc
international criminal tribunals (the ICTY and ICTR). The goal w ill be to gain a
greater appreciation for the emergent legal field and present a framework in which
to understand its complexity.

Sources
Where possible, reliance is made on primary sources including the Rome Statute
itself, various documents relating to the Statute (such as the travaux preparatoires)
and related documents concerning the ad hoc tribunals.11 Academic literature on
international (criminal) law falls largely into the following categories: legal realism
{l’6tatisme), legal positivism (absolute or universal human rights); universalism;
and parallelism (sometimes referred to as “dualism”).12 Like any categorization,
this one probably does not do justice to the variety of outlooks present13 They

Ronald Dworkin describes the approach using human rights as "trumps’” designed to
counter and limit administrative discretion by recourse to realist ’policies.” (R. Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) at xi as cited in
Martii Koskenniemi, “The Effects of Rights on Political Culture,’ in Philip Alston et at,
ed., The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 101.
11 In this respect access to the Internet has been crucial. It has provided a means of
obtaining recent documents in a timely and cost-effective manner.
12 Sandra L. Bunn-Livingstone, Juricultural Pluralism vis-d-vis Treaty Law (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002) at 72-74.
13 For a comprehensive discussion on the historical development of various perspectives
in international law (and the sovereignty of States), see: Luzius Wildhaber,
Wechseispiel Zwischen Innen Und Aussen:
Schweizer Landesrecht,
Rectsvergieichung, VOIkenecht (Basel un Frankfurt am Main: Helbing & Lichtenhahn,
1996) at19-49. Note that Martti Koskenniemi reduces these categories even further to
two - the legal realist v. the legal idealist (what he calls “apologist v. utopian”).
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may not always be distinct at times. Nevertheless the categorization is convenient
for the purposes of this thesis.

Conceptual Bases of Existent International Criminal Law Literature
Presuppositions
The conceptual bases of the existing literature need to be considered before
embarking on any extended analysis. Certain presuppositions tend to colour the
analysis from the start potentially distorting how one perceives the International
Criminal Court and international criminal jurisdiction. Bias exists in many forms
permeating not only thinking but also the use of language and terminology.
Certain terms used in certain ways, represent indicators of a certain outlook. It
may be inappropriate to use such terms to describe the International Criminal
C ourt The language may restrict our ability to depart from established concepts
and to examine new innovations in international law.

Nowhere is this more

evident, than in the confusion arising from the use of ambiguous terminology in the
Statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals, where one refers to “primacy” and “concurrent
jurisdiction.” There are four main schools of thought that must be considered.
Unfortunately each school has deficiencies, which render each an inappropriate
filter through which to examine the International Criminal Court and its jurisdiction.
Such deficiencies arise due to inherent bias.
Legal Realism
Traditional international law would normally propose two doctrines that direct the
behaviour of States in international law:

obligation and consent

The two

doctrines exist in tension.14 Adherents to classical international law would argue

14For Koskenniemi, the objective/subjective has to be a false dichotomy. The two have to
coexist. Like electromagnetic poles in physics, they cannot exist independently for the
relative relationship to one, defines the other. They have an inherent duality. Left
without mediation or balance, one will “devour” the other - hence the need for what he
calls “mediation.” Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of
International Legal Argument, supra note 10 at 464. To the Taoists, this is the
embodiment of the ying and the yang; these forces of opposition (lightness and
darkness; physical reality and spirituality; male and female; and life and death) need to
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that States are the sole holders of legal personality in the international domain.
Since they are absolutely sovereign, their freedom of action is limitless. Anarchy
of a sort occurs, as States attempt to optimize their self-interest - often called
"legal realism.”15 There is a hint o f classical liberalism in this approach and an
analogue to the self-regulating, firee-market economy. Proponents would include
Oppenheim and Hedley Bull.16 The State is omnipotent. Its consent is essential to
the legitimacy o f any international legal rule. There is no place for morality. The
conduct of States is perceived as being entirely objective, amoral and "clinical.”
Legal Positivism
Legal positivists would hold that international law is a set of rules that describe
what behaviour is and ought to be. Hans Kelsen visualized law as a system of
hierarchical norms, adhered to, voluntarily and through coercion - but also through
the centralization of both enforcement and legislative authority.17 Coercion and
centralization are crucial elements to positivism. Austin felt that international law
was not quite law as it lacked the enforcement capability of punishing offending
States; while, Hart felt that the lack of a central authority did not deprive
international law of its legal character, although it did make it defective.18

In the

be in balance for a harmonious universe to exist; see Patricia Ebrey, Chinese
Civilization: A Sourcebook, 2d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1993), pp. 77-79.
15Sandra L. Bunn-Livingstone, supra note 12 at 72-74.
16See generally: Lassa Oppenheim, A Treatise on International Law (London: Longmans,
Green & co., 1905-06) and Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1977). In Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations:
The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 1940-41 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1942) at 56-79, Kelsen suggests that this nihilist argument is the
weakest counter to the legalistic argument that war is forbidden in principle.
Oppenheim’s approach denies the legal order in total, as it is incompatible with absolute
state sovereignty. For Kelsen *a more serious” argument is that war is moraNy forbidden
and that it is a sanction for wrongful State behaviour. The problem is that the victor is
not always right and a war of aggression may not necessarily be motivated by wrongful
behaviour on the part of the victim-State. For Kelsen though, the "most striking
objection” is to consider war as neither a sanction nor a delict. In that case who decides
what is a ‘just war?"
17Hans Kelsen, ibid. at 45-55.
11Ibid.
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absence o f the utopian dream of centralized legislative authority (a world
government), Kelsen saw a centralized judiciary as vital:

it being capable of

determining when an individual State committed the ultimate transgression, and
therefore when use of the ultimate coercive action was appropriate - "the just
war.”19 Legal positivists emphasize the expression of legal centralism - possibly
analogizing international law to domestic law.20 Thus for Kelsen, the “just war” was
the international analogue of the domestic criminal prosecution.
Since positivism not only dictates what law is, but what it ought to be, it is intolerant
of legal diversity or “juricultural pluralism.*21 There is only one interpretation. Yet
the intolerance is also directed toward legal discourse, for positivism also denies
that there is any other theoretical approach to understanding international law:22
That international theory o f law of the past hundred years seems
both curiously repetitive and practically inconsequential follows
from its dogmatic insistence on the conceptual primacy of
‘international society1to international law. For neither ‘rules’ nor
‘behaviour’ offer a fully transparent wherewithal to reach the
meaning o f social events or actions (law or not-law, sanction or
violence?). Interpretative assumptions are needed - assumptions
which cannot, however, be validated by further reference to
empirical facts because it is through them that lawyers invest the
facts o f State practice with legal meaning.
"Uncompromising” supporters o f absolute inviolate human rights may fit into this
category too.23 Positivism engenders certainty but also rigidity and inflexibility.

19Ibid. at 45 and 52.
20Bunn-Livingstone, supra note 12 at 67.
21Ibid. at 68.
22Martti Koskenniemi, "Theory: Implications for the Practitioner,* in Philip Allot and others,
ed., Theory and International Law: An Introduction, supra note 10 at 11.
23 Martti Koskenniemi suggests that "rights” as a concept emerged in support of
liberalism’s efforts to constrain government and politics against realists bent on applying
social utility and clinically “objective" policies. Thus "rights” became a "trump” (in Ronald
Dworkin’s words) to counter and limit administrative policies based in legal realism. See:
Martii Koskenniemi, “The Effects of Rights on Political Culture, " in Philip Alston and
others, supra note 10 at 101.
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Yet for a State to impose an obligation upon itself, through consent, is to restrict its
freedom of action.

Obligation is the antithesis of consent

How can a folly

sovereign State bind itself to adhere to an obligation? Malcolm Shaw describes
this incongruity as the “paradox o f dualism .'24 The international legal system is
founded upon this contradiction. In public international law, the limits upon what
powers the State may exercise are defined in the United Nations Charter - to
which all member States of the United Nations must comply.25

One might

compound the paradox by considering customary law. How can a State be bound
to adhere to international norms or treaties to which it did not freely consent? This
is not an easy question to answer, but the fact remains that such obligations have
been deemed to exist by some international criminal legal experts and tribunals.26
Universalism
For the universalist, an emphasis is placed on the obligation of the State to
international norms, conventional or customary. There is no absolute sovereignty
o f the State. World Federalists represent an extreme position, advocating a global

24 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 3d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994) at 185.
25 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7 at Article 2.
Substitute State for Members. See also Statute o f the International Court o f Justice,
Annex to Charter of the United Nations, Ibid. <http://www.icj-cij.org/>(date accessed: 16
March 2002) [hereinafter the ICJ StatuteJ at Article 36. The ICJ Statute requires the
precondition of State Consent to its jurisdiction over a specific case (or generally).
26 For example in the investigation following the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999, Louise
Arbour (and her office), the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, concluded that the United States and France were bound by the
Protocols of the Geneva Conventions even though they had not ratified them. It was felt
they were so widely applied that they now constitute customary law. Of course this was
not a judicial decision and therefore its precedential value is not much. Would the ICTY
judges have decided differently? See, International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, Office of the Prosecutor, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (The Hague: 13 June 2000), online: <htto:/^ww.un.org/»cty/> (date
accessed: 6 June 2001) and Michael Cottier, “Did NATO Forces Commit War Crimes
During the Kosovo Conflict? Reflections on the Prosecutor’s Report of 13 June 2000,' in
Fischer, Horst, KreB, Claus and LOder .Sascha Rolf, ed. International and National
Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law: Current Developments (Berlin Vertag:
Amo Spitz, GmbH, 2001).
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court capable of imposing its jurisdiction over the State.27 Advocates o f natural
justice represent a less extreme position, but argue that all secular law is
subordinate to some higher law - sometimes divine, sometimes philosophical.
Examples might include S t Augustine and Grotius; Bentham; or the Islamic
scholars who explained the Koran - the Ijma.“

Liberal notions of the right to

property or economic prosperity may also fall under this category.29
There are two problems with this approach. F irst efforts are made to analogize
the international legal system (and courts) to their domestic counterparts.30 This is

27 For example one need only visit the web site of the World Federalist Association and
read John B. Anderson, "...Without Global Law there Can be no Justice" and the WFA
Statement
of
Goals
and
Beliefs
(16
November
2001),
online:
<http://www.wfa.org/about/> (date accessed: 10 January 2002). Note the date on this
document was incorrectly listed as 16 November 2002. Also see: Interview with William
Pace by Diplomatie judiciaire, “[undated], online:
Diplomatic judidaire
<http://www.dipiomatiejudiciaire.com/UK/ICCUK3.htm> (date accessed: 12 July 2002).
28 See generally, Thomas Aquinas, The Treatise on Law: Being Summa theoiogiae, /-//;
QQ. 90 through 97] (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993). Charles
Montesqieu, The Spirit o f the Laws, trans. A.Cohler et al. (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: Printed for E. Wilson and W. Pickering,
1823). For a survey of Islamic law, consider. N.J. Coulson, A History o f Islamic Law
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1978). Also consider the arguments put
forward for universal legal principles independent of jurisdiction in Konrad zweigert and
Hein KOtz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). One
might add to this list the contemporary focus on globalization: see Bonaventura de
Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the
Paradigmatic Transition (New York:
Routledge, 1995) and William Twining,
Globalization and Legal Theory (London: Butterwortns, 2000).
29 A variant of natural justice even exists, called the "liberal theory of international law:"
where the legitimacy of a legal rule or State behaviour rests upon a legitimate
democratic regime with a free economy - see William W. Burke-White, "Reframing
Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis of Amnesty
Legislation’ (2001) 42 Harv. Int’l L.J. 467 [echoing Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Liberal
Theory of International Law,” (2000) 94 Am. Soc. Int’TL. Proc. 240].
30 Consider for example: Stephen Edwards, ‘Israel Feels Chid from War Court: Standoff
Looms over Jenin Probe Amid Fear Findings Could be Used Against Israeli Soldiers,"
National
Post (27
April 2002),
online:
National
Post Online
<http://nationalpost.com/>(date accessed: 27 April 2002)[also on cover page of paper].
In this article Stephen Edwards described the Court as a "supranational war crimes
tribunal." While the author was neutral with respect to the Court, his outlook is a popular
assumption that Court is like a domestic court asserting its primacy of law and
jurisdiction over all others. The Court might exercise primacy over an individual, but it
does not exercise primacy over a domestic court system.
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reminiscent o f the positivists. The analogy is only superficial.31 The domestic legal
system exists within a hierarchical system of government that asserts its dominion
over its population. The international legal system exists decentralized and within
a system that lacks a legislature. It merely exercises its authority only when a
State has deferred a case to it or consented to its jurisdiction.

There is no

international institution with dominion over States, let alone individuals.

The

boundary between the judiciary and the executive (not to mention the legislature)
is far more indistinct than in the domestic system:32
It is clear that the legislative, executive and judicial division of
powers which is largely followed in most municipal systems does
not apply to the international setting...Among the principle organs
o f the United Nations the divisions between judicial, executive and
legislative functions are not clear cut...There is however, no
legislature...in the United Nations system and, more generally, no
Padiament in the world community. That is to say, there exists no
corporate organ formally empowered to enact laws directly binding
on international legal subjects.
Thus the comparison of the two jurisdictions may amount to a denial of the sui
generis character of international (criminal) law.

It is comparing ‘ apples to

oranges.”

31 For example the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc tribunals may reflect a
mixed civil law, common law character but that is where the comparison ends. See
William Schabas, ‘Common law, « C ivil Law» et droit penal international: Tango (le
dernier?) e La Haye," 13 R.Q.D.1.1 (2000) at 287-307.
32Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1, ICTY, Appeal Chamber, Decision, 5 October 1994, online:
ICTY web site <http://Www7un.org/icty/tadic/appeaydecision-e/51002> (date accessed 7
December 2001) at Paragraph 43. [A parallel reference also exists: International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: Decision n Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic
(Establishment of the International Tribunal) [October 2, 1995] 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996)+]
Contrast the approach taken here in discussing this Decision to that of Christopher
Greenwood, which almost exclusively focuses on the Decision from the point of view of
international humanitarian law: Christopher Greenwood, “International Humanitarian
Law and the Tadic Case’ (1996) 7 E.J.I.L. 265. For a discussion of the indistinctiveness
between judiciary and executive in Canada and the United Kingdom, see B. Archibald,
"The Politics of Prosecutorial Discretion: Institutional Structures and the Tensions
between Punitive and Restorative Paradigms of Justice" (1998) 3 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 69
at 73.
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The second criticism with the approach of universalists is that their arguments are
predicated upon the assumption that there are universal international legal norms.
By assuming that there exist binding norms, universalists could be regarded as
being supranationalists, holding that States be bound by these norms.

The

position is in opposition to legal realism, although it may be closely related to
positivism. Universalists would advance that the International Criminal Court must
be authoritative, not compromise, and apply the “law.''33 They believe in a universal
natural justice. Some military manuals of law refer to natural justice.34
Yet can it be said that there really are universal norms or even rules? When one
refers to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols,35 they are
considered by some to be universal in scope and application and therefore
customary law, binding on all nations whether ratified or not.36

Yet the British

33 Louise Arbour, "The Responsibility to Protect: A Step Forward in Human Rights
Protection: A Discussion of the Report of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty” (The Dalhousie University Chapter of the Canadian Lawyers’
Association for International Human Rights (CLAIHR), Kings College, Halifax, Nova
Scotia: 27 March 2002) [unpublished].
34 For example: Canadian Armed Forces, Military Justice at the Summary Trial Level V.
20 9/01, CFP B-GG-005-027/AF-011 (Ottawa: Office of the Judge Advocate General,
2001) [draft], online: DNET/JAG < http://www.dnd.ca/jag/>(date accessed: 15
November 2001) at 1-10. This may be reflective of a higher level of influence from the
Quebec civil law in Canadian military legal system. This could be the subject of forther
research.
35 Convention (I) for the Amelioration o f the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, (1949) 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, (1950)
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners of War, (1950) 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection o f C'tvtiian Persons in Time of
War, (1950) 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter the Geneva Conventions of 1949]; and
Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection o f Victims o f International Armed Conflicts, (1979) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter the First Protocol]; and Protocol Additional II to the 1949 Geneva
conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts, (1979) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter the Second Protocol].
36 Consider. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Office of the
Prosecutor, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia, supra note 27 at
Paragraph 42. In the Report it was suggested that France and the United States were
both bound by the Protocols since they were now customary law, even though neither
had ratified them. Note that this Report is not a judgement from the Tribunal. It could
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government expressed reservations to the First Protocol: to apply exclusively to
conventional weapons; not to apply where the defence of m ilitary necessity is
advanced; not to include the commission of criminal or terrorist acts; to allow for
the use of medical aircraft for other purposes that are military in nature; and that
under certain circumstances, the nature of the offences may deprive the offenders
of protection under the Protocol - including a response in kind.37 Similarly the
French government expressed reservations including its inability to guarantee the
protection of installations containing dangerous forces and that the gendarmerie
nationale was an integral part of the French armed forces.38 The existence of
reservations and the diversity of interpretation vis-d-vis international human rights
treaties tend to undermine the proposition that there are universal legal norms.39
In contrast the Rome Statute prohibits reservations.40 By such prohibition, the
Rome Statute represents an effort by the negotiators to make it into a statement of
universal norms.

however have a degree of authority in that the Office of the Prosecutor is representative
of the Secretary-General.
37 Schedule to the Geneva Conventions Act (First Protocol) Order 1998 (U.K.), S.l.
1998/1754.
38 CICR, “Adhesion de la France au Protocole I du 8 juin 1977,' 842 R.I.C.R. 549, online:
ICRC < http://Www.iac.org/ >(date accessed: 5 May 2002).
39 Sandra L. Bunn-Livingstone, supra note 12. Consider also: Alison Dundes Renteln,
International Human Rights:
Universalism versus Relativism (London:
Sage
Publications, 1990) at 46-87; and Jerome J. Shestack, “The Jurisprudence of Human
Rights* in Theodor Meron, ed., Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy
Issues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) at 69-105. Shestack, Renteln and BunnLivingstone argue that there are universal legal norms, but that the way in which they
are implemented differs due to cultural relativism and pluralism. The norms are not
absolute but relative. For a discussion of the problem of reservations also consider
Hugh M. Kindred, ed. International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 6<h
ed., vol. 1 (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1999) [temporary edition] at 21-22 with specific
reference to the Reservations to the Convention on Genocide Case, Adv. Op. [1951]
I.C.J. Rep. 15 and how the issue appears to be unsettled still.
40 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 120 - although Article 124 allows for a transitional
provision where the State Party may decline to accept jurisdiction of the Court for seven
years. The Elements of Crimes also aims to restrict diverse interpretations of the crimes
described in the Rome Statute.
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Ironically while universalist-proponents of the International Criminal Court see the
body as a supranational entity, upholding international human rights, it is this same
vision of the Court that some of its opponents seize upon.41 American opponents
see the Court as a body that would indict American military personnel serving
abroad and as a tool for challenging American foreign policy.42 Such an outlook is
illogical, for an overriding precondition in the Rome Statute to its jurisdiction being
admissible, is that there must be evidence of an unwillingness or inability to initiate
domestic legal process or an abuse of process or lack of good faith.43 There are
numerous other safeguards to avoid the situation of a supranational court
asserting primacy, as Phillippe Kirsch, one of the key negotiators, observed upon
publication of the Statute:44
...This Statute contains numerous checks and balances which will
ensure that the Court operates in a credible and responsible
manner, consistent with its role in the upholding the rule of law.
This Court is not a threat to any State which is committed to the
security and well-h{e\ing of individual human beings. The court will
serve the objectives o f such States by contributing to long-term
stability.

41 Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin, Jr., “The International Criminal Court vs. The
American People,* 1249 The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder Executive Summary (5
February 1999) at 2. The Heritage Foundation is very much a voice piece of the Bush
administration. Other opponents have a position opposite to that of the American
government in that they feel that it is not supranational enough: see Dilip Lahiri,
'Explanation of Vote by Mr. Dilip Lahiri, Head of Delegation of India, On the Adoption of
the Statute of the International Court” (17 July 1998), online: Web site of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court < http://www.un.org/law/icc/>(date accessed:
14 May 2002).
42 Madeline Morris, ‘High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States,*
(2001) 64 L. & Contemp. Probs. 14, especially at 37-43. Compare Michael Scharf, ‘The
ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party states: A Critique of the U.S.
Position,” (2001) 64 L. & Contemp. Probs. 67 at 77. Scharf dissects Madeline Moms’
article.
43 Thus the context is important. Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17 and especially
Article 17(2). See chapter three also.
44 Philippe Kirsch, ‘Ceremony for the Opening of Signature on the Treaty on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court ‘II Campidoglio,’ Rome, July 18, 1998’
in M. Cherif Bassiouni, compilation, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Documentary History (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1998) at xix.
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These checks and balances are frequently called complementarity,4S It appears as
though opponents to the Rome Statute do not take into account these safeguards
or, alternatively, feel that they are inadequate. The supranationalist has much in
common with the positivist
Parallelist
Parallelists are capable o f accommodating the proliferation of international courts
and tribunals. Different jurisdictions are regarded as operating in parallel to one
another.46 Parallel lines never intersect

There is a hint of federalism in this

approach. There is no supreme court in the international legal realm that can
impose its w ill upon all jurisdictions, as there is in a federal domestic legal system.
Each jurisdiction operates independently of the other, reminiscent of the federal
division of powers.

Intrusions and overlap are unwelcome and regarded as a

potential excessive exercise of power - ultra vires. Each jurisdiction is a discrete
and self-contained unit There is a minimum of interaction, if any at all.
The parallelist outlook holds that State consent takes priority over State obligation
in certain areas. States remain the sole personalities in the international legal
system and all international law flows from them. A sort o f anarchy results from
their interaction, and in the process, order becomes established. The approach is
embodied by the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ); only States have
legal personality before it and its jurisdiction is only possible with their consent.
While each Member State of the United Nations is obliged to comply with a
decision of this Court, should a State Party fail to comply, the other State may
defer the matter to the Security Council.47 The Security Council may then make
45This will be explained in more detail in chapter three.
46 Stephen M. Schwebel, Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations (General
Assembly, New York, 27 October 1998), online at ICJ web site: < http7Awww.iq-cq.org/ >
(date accessed: 20 January 2002). Malcolm Shaw would call this dualism, however
parallelism is preferred since it implies more than two entities involved in the relationship
(i.e. multiple jurisdictions).
47 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26 at Article 94.
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recommendations or decide upon measures to give effect to the judgement.48 The
Security Council in turn is composed o f fifteen States with five States having
permanent seats (with vetoes). These five represent the hegemonic order of the
victorious States of World W ar II (1945).49 Thus the deferral contingency is a
bulwark to maintaining State sovereignty and consent as primary ingredients in the
formulation of international legal rules. It is at this point that concurrent jurisdiction
of the Security Council and the International Criminal Court exists in matters
concerning crimes of aggression that are also acts of aggression. For a parallelist
the Charter specifically authorizes the Security Council to have the primary
exercise of jurisdiction in such matters;50 for the universalist the reverse holds true.
In reality neither holds true, exactly.
Yet there is interaction between international courts and tribunals. Parallelism is
not entirely appropriate as different international legal jurisdictions cross one
another in terms of their scope.

Parallelists deny any workable form of

complementary relationship between the international and domestic jurisdictions.
They see each court as supreme, in its respective domain.

There exists

disjunction.
Reflexive Law
There may be a means of transcending some of the difficulties posed by the
limitations of the dominant schools of thought

Gunter Teubner describes a

4SIbid. at Article 94(2).
49 Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-1996. Third
Edition. Volume I: The Court and the United Nations (Netherlands: Kluwer Law
International, 1997) at 19 to 25. Rosenne is critical of this structure as it is not reflective
of the current power structure of States. Most notably the United Kingdom is a shadow
of what it was in 1945. It would seem logical for India to have a permanent seat given its
position as a nuclear power, a major regional entity and the feet that it contains nearly
one quarter of the world's population, mis may be a source of some of Mr. Lahiri’s
vocal opposition to the role of the Security Council and certain members being allowed
to participate in referrals to the Court, who might not necessarily be States Parties to the
Rome Statute, (supra note 42)
30Charter o f the United Nations, supra note 26 at Chapter VII.
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concept which he calls “reflexive law.” 51 He considers there to be three stages in
legal evolution:52
1) A formal law stage, where the focus is “on establishing basic rules by which
private parties orient their affairs and resolve disputes;”
2) A substantive law stage, where “purposive, goal-oriented intervention”
results in the emergence of a regulatory regime; and
3) A reflexive law, where other institutions are involved and the goal is to
influence behaviour by means other than regulation.
With the increasing complexity of interactions within societies, it has been argued
that substantive law is inadequate for it is: uneconomical; forever expanding,
creating

the

danger of unharmonized

legislation; allowing

an

unwieldy

administrative bureaucracy to emerge; and making law generally inaccessible to
all but the “experts,” or in the words of noted legal historian S.F.C. Milsom:53
...So long as the legislature casts those entitlements /to allocation]
in terms o f definite rules and rights, o f course, there is no problem
about judicial control. But one of the pressures behind the whole
shift is that which has pushed law itself off principles and into
details. Complexity defies specification. There are too many
For a discussion of reflexive law see: Gunther Teubner, 'Substantive and Reflexive
Elements in Modem Law,” (1983) 17 Law & Socy Rev. 239; and Eric. W. Orts,
“Reflexive Environmental Law” (1995) 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1227 at 1255.
52Teubner, ibid. S.F.C. Milsom probably subscribes to Teubner’s reflexive law approach.
He believes that through globalization the relationship in modem society has changed
from man and man as equals, to manager and managed. This vertical relation is
reminiscent of the western medieval world in that there are those with ‘power to allocate
and those with some entitlement to allocation.” While this may be similar to the
“dependent structures of which the feudal unit was a simple model” his extension to
include the role of discretionary power of administrators is intriguing (if not Weberian).
Milsom has probably identified the second, substantive law stage (or the regulatory
State). Whether this is an indication of “history running backwards, remains to be seen.
Given that the ICC is in many respects a court of high office (or chivalry), one cannot
wonder if there is something in this. See: S.F.C. Milsom, Studies in the History o f the
Common Law (London: The Hambledon Press 1985) at 221.
53S.F.C. Milsom, ibid.
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details, too many possible factors; and in the end you have to leave
Hto somebody’s discretion...Perhaps even in so central a citadel it
would be wiser and more just to accept guidelines for a discretion
rather than a capricious multitude of rules, and to concentrate the
law upon ensuring that the discretion is property exercised.
Moving beyond Milsom, reflexive law promotes decentralization and voluntary
compliance by those interested groups.54
Advocates of reflexive law typically envision the municipal model o f a legal system
where there is a form of domestic monism - a centralization of judicial authority,
law making and enforcement in the apparatus of the State. In international law
generally and international crim inal law specifically, there is a decentralization of
judicial authority, law making and enforcement Therefore from the outset one
must exercise a certain degree of caution in applying reflexive law to the
international legal system, since it has largely been theorized in the domestic legal
environment.
Legal theorists who propose the idea of reflexive law tend to associate the concept
with the Hegelian idea of an evolutionary process.55 Thinkers such as Nonet and
Selznick would present a three-stage model of legal development: repressive,
autonomous and responsive law.56

For Habermas stages would include

“rationality structures," preconventional, conventional and post-conventional.57

To some degree this may be the system envisioned in the Rome Statute, where there is
not only the authority invested in officials of the Court but also various participative roles
enshrined for States, the Security Council and NGOs, not to mention checks on the
exercise of discretionary powers by Court officials. This was discussed at an interview
between Professors B. Archibald and H. Kindred (17 August 2002). This will be the
subject of chapters three and four with a practical case study in chapter five.
55 For example consider Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick (USA); and JQrgen
Habermas, Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner (Germany). These are mentioned in
Gunther Teubner, supra note 52 at 242: Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law and
Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (New York: Hamer, 1978); Jurgen
Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, Theorie der GesseKschalt Oder Sozialtechnologie Was leistet die Systemforschung? (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971).
56Teubner, ibid. at 243.
57 Ibid. at 244 citing Habermas generally.
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Gunter Teubner would identify these stages as formal law, substantive or
regulatory law and finally reflexive law.58
There is difficulty with an evolutionary model when applied to international
(criminal) law. Can it be said that it has evolved and if so, from what? Is it still
evolving? Is it really “primitive?* These are very difficult questions that are well
beyond the scope of this thesis.

The concept of a Hegelian continuum is

debatable, in that the Rome Statute may amount to an increasing degree of
regulation (and therefore an increase in “substantive* legal character), but as w ill
be shown, it does not amount to “so central a citadel’ of legal or judicial authority.
The Rome Statute is designed to operate in a complementary relationship with the
domestic courts, the traditional approach to prosecuting international crimes.
Input

Output

Input

Unidirectional

Output

Reflexive/Recursive

Figure 1 - Block Diagrams of “Two* Cases of Legal Systems
Approaches: Unidirectional (Formal or Substantive) and Reflexive

If one sets aside the evolutionary questions concerning international law, there are
two systems approaches possible for the realization of legal norms.

Figure 1

captures the essence of Teubner’s arguments about domestic law, when applied
to international law. In the left-hand diagram, a stimulus or challenge confronts the
legal system, labelled as an input. The legal system reacts and responds in some
form, for instance the creation of legislation. The output is a function of the input
but the input is independent of the output. The relation between input and output
58Teubner, supra note 56 and Orts, supra note 52.
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is one-sided or unidirectional. It is disjunctive. For Teubner this is typical of both
formal and substantive law.59
In the reflexive system (the right-hand diagram), the output is a function of the
input but the input is also a function of the output The relation is bi-directional and
folly conjunctive. Output and input are mutually dependent upon one another. A
feedback loop exists. The feedback is accomplished by emphasizing procedure
over purpose and deliberative communication from multiple sources constantly
monitoring the output. The regulative, imperial and monist approach gives way to
law by deliberation and consensus.
There are some weaknesses to the outline above.

Some critics o f this post

modern approach have questioned whether formal law has ever existed.60 Surely
all law is reflexive to some degree. Statutes and legislation are amended and
revised. International conventions are negotiated along with additional protocols.
Even demagogues “fine tune” their legal rules in order to meet challenges to their
despotic regime. Rather than considering two independent forms, perhaps the
unidirectional case is simply a specific and extreme case of reflexive law where the
level of feedback is negligible o r inadequate. Thus the reflexive model is a general
model. Different approaches to stim uli, within a legal system, can be differentiated
by the degree of reflexivity, where the variable is the amount of feedback.
A problem arises with respect to the inherent stability of a feedback system. In any
system incorporating a feedback loop, it is possible that feedback is continually
returned to the input An ever-increasing accumulation of feedback, augmented
every time a feedback loop may occur. The magnitude of the feedback becomes
so great that the system eventually becomes so unstable that it fails. This is what
59Teubner, ibid. at 240 using example of excessive welfare regulation which tends to stifle
individual initiative and ingenuity, exacerbating the underlying social problems that the
regulation was intended to address in the first place.
60Teubner, ibid. citing Duncan Kennedy, ‘Legal Formality” (1973) 2 J.L.S. 351.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20
happens when a microphone is placed next to the amplified speaker and a
horrible, deafening tone results (damaging the speakers).
Teubner rightly points out the problem in the reflexive legal model. There exists a
presumption that all monitoring is provided at an equal level. It does not take into
account those that do not participate or those who participate more actively than
others. There is a danger that certain interest groups may co-opt the apparatus to
portray a false image o f reality and thereby distort the system inputs to promote
outputs in their favour.61 He calls this ‘asymmetric” feedback. Teubner suggests
the creation of autonomous organizations, which attenuate and filter input and
restore symmetry before the feedback is returned to the decision-makers.62 By so
doing stability is achieved. Though this approach achieves stability, by its very
nature, the filtering process is, regulatory and relatively non-reflexive.

Thus a

necessary tension exists between regulation and reflexivity in order to ensure
system stability63

Plan of the Thesis
The four schools of thought do not entirely capture the reality of the international
criminal legal jurisdiction or the Rome Statute.

They do however represent

predominant academic opinions, which have a very significant influence on
61 One might consider the co-opting of the World Conference Against Racism in
September 2001 by anti-American and anti-Israeli interests (including a long list of
NGOs) as a situation in which the UN reflexive system became unstable. Despite
attempts to calm the conference down and moderate its tone, it vociferously attacked
both the United States and Israel over the Palestinian issue. The European Union and
the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (Mary Robinson) also voiced similar
concerns. In the end, the United States and Israel withdrew from the Conference. See:
‘S. Africa Trying to Revive U.N. Racism Meeting” CNN (4 September 2001), online:
CNN <http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/africaa)9/03/racism.conference/ > (date
accessed:
23 August 2002); and World Conference Against Racism
<http://www.un.org/WCAfR/pr.htm> (date accessed: 23 August 2002).
62 Teubner, supra note 52 at 276 suggests independent citizen action committees in the
realm of consumer protection (such as the German Verbraucherzentrale and StUtungWarentest) as models of such autonomous bodies providing such filtration and
correcting of the feedback so that it does not result in a runaway loop.
63 This should evoke memories of Koskenniemi’s false dichotomy and duality concept
(Koskenniemi, supra note 10 at 464).
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decision-makers. While this thesis w ill not reject these opinions outright, it w ill
reconsider them to assess some of the contradictions evident in the literature and
in statements o f policy from decision-makers. Reflexive law provides an additional
means of understanding how law operates, although it must be considered with
extreme caution since it is rooted in a conceptualization of domestic law. It is not a
dominant school of thought, but it does provide an extra “tool” for analytical
reasoning.
Through an awareness o f these outlooks, analytical “traps'' may be avoided. The
approach adopted is contextual and rooted in practical experience - perhaps even
“empirical.”

It represents another manner of perceiving the complexity of the

international criminal legal system. The aim is to employ mediating strategies to
view opposing schools of thought concurrently, through: “mediating definition,
recourse to procedure; and contextualization.”64 Attention to the precise use of
language, focus on the procedures of the various courts, and the contextual
relationships between the courts (domestic and international), represent the
underlying approach to the thesis.

In this manner a new appreciation for the

Rome Statute, the ICC and the international criminal legal system may be
achieved.
There are six chapters in total. In chapter two, the first substantive chapter, the
traditional relationship between States, in their joint efforts to deal with international
crimes, is examined.

An exploration of the nature of international and

transnational organized crime reveals that the traditional approach sometimes
fails, especially where the apparatus of the State becomes co-opted for criminal
activity.

It is here that the subject matter of the International Criminal Court

becomes evident - high crimes of public office. The Court's jurisdiction is actually
quite narrow and incomplete. The core crimes are specific and uncommon crimes,
64Martti Koskenniemi, “Theory: Implications for the Practitioner,’ in Philip Allot and others,
supra note 10 at 47.
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committed in a certain context Though its jurisdiction may be narrow, chapter two
reveals why the Court is necessary.
Complementarity, the cornerstone of the Rome Statute, is considered in chapter
three. It defines the relationship between the Court and domestic courts. It is an
important concept but is poorly understood as an abstraction. The dimensions of
complementarity reveal the concept as a function of conjunctivity - the degree of
cooperation and mutual recognition between international and domestic courts.
There is a vocabulary that has been developed in the Rome Statute to describe
the approach and attention is paid to it. The Court does not assert its jurisdiction
over “subject” States. Instead there exists a deferential system, with numerous
safeguards to ensure that complementarity is achieved. A secondary system of
safeguards can be identified in the regulation of judicial and prosecutorial
discretionary powers. Chapter four examines such regulation, revealing insight
into the nature of the international legal system and comparing how the regulation
works in the ICC in comparison to the ICTY and ICJ.
In chapter five, truth and reconciliation commissions with limited amnesties are
examined in the framework of the Rome Statute. Using the ICTY as a comparator,
one can see just how the entire system of complementarity, through the
consideration o f issues of admissibility, operates in the ICC. The result is that not
only are amnesties more tolerated within the framework of the ICC, so are quasi
judicial TRCs. The approach is far less supranational than the manner in which
the ICTY treats them.
In chapter six, this difference between the ICC and ICTY approaches is pursued in
slightly more detail.

The nature of the Rome Statute's approach, to the

prosecution o f international crimes where States are unwilling or unable, is quite
different to that of the ICTY; the ICC's jurisdiction is “asserted" in a highly reflexive
in manner.

It has to be in order to respect its overriding doctrine of

complementarity which in turn reinforces the decentralized and disparate nature of
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the international legal system. This is an approach that is not particularly unique
within contemporary international law - for instance, it exists through the
proliferation o f international organizations; especially what are called “regional
arrangements.” Opposition to the Rome Statute centres on a rejection o f this view
of contemporary international law. It is not because it is ineffective, but because
legal and political thinkers expect to see the structures of their domestic legal
system mirrored in the international.

Thus they expect to see some form of

centralization and hierarchy - whether an ICC asserting its primary jurisdiction
over individuals or a Security Council overseeing and checking an ICC subordinate
to it.
Ultimately the real test for the future of the ICC is two-fold: to either encourage
States to bring individuals accused of international crimes to account or in very
unusual instances to assist the State by acting where it and its judicial system
have gone awry; and to prove that complementarity can work - namely that the
ICC can function within a decentralized international legal system without the
recourse to judicial centralization or supranationalism in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
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Chapter 2

Chapter Two: Subject Matter of the ICC
Introduction
It is quite common for an analysis of the Rome Statute o f the International Criminal
Court to involve a discussion o f the subject matter o f the Court.65 Invariably such
analysis becomes very doctrinaire, simply ending up in the reading of those
relevant provisions of the Statute and the Elements o f Crimes that describe the socalled “core crimes.’’66 Such an approach lacks context One cannot abstract the
crimes from their context otherwise one falls into the trap of seeing their
prohibition as absolute, transcendent legal obligations that bind the State.

The

difficulty is that at times, the State is either unwilling or incapable of prosecuting
international crimes, particularly when its apparatus has been co-opted by criminal
elements. The role of the individual, capable of orchestrating the core crimes in
the context specified by the Rome Statute, is the critical element in understanding
the subject matter of the Court and its purpose.
The goal o f this chapter is to examine the subject matter o f the International
Criminal C ourt Rather than simply examining the crimes as specified in the Rome
Statute, this chapter w ill consider their contextual relationship to the State.
Transnational crimes and international crimes w ill be explored in some detail. The
traditional, inter-State approach to combating such crimes w ill be investigated.

65For example see William Schabas, supra note 2 at 21-53; Herman von Hebei and Darryl
Robinson, “Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court" in Roy S. Lee, ed. The
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute - Issues, Negotiations,
Results (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 41-78; or Leila Nadya Sadat,
The International Criminal Court and the Transformation o f International Law: Justice for
the New MMIennium (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2002) at 129259
66Elements o f Crimes, supra note 2.
24
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Ultimately the traditional approach must be inadequate somehow, to give rise to
the need for the International Criminal C ourt
The traditional approach is premised upon a State that functions responsibly and in
conformity with the international legal norms to which it has consented to adhere.
It is when the State acts irresponsibly that international crimes may be committed
with impunity by public or private individuals. The reasons why a State might go
“awry” include the corruption of public officials or the lack of control by the State
over “criminal activity" in its jurisdiction. There are many threats to the State in this
regard:

transnational corporations; covert intelligence activities; aggression by

another State; terrorism; mercenarism; the existence of the extra-juridical State
("the shadow state"); rogue State governments; the presence of rebel forces; and
even rogue non-governmental organizations (including corporations). The threats
have become even greater in an era o f government deregulation, privatization,
globalization and the "black" economy. The Rome Statute does not even pretend
to address all of these threats - but it addresses a few. Its jurisdiction is actually
quite narrow. What it does, is try to bring to account those individuals, alleged to
have committed the core crimes described, when the State is unwilling or
incapable of so doing. The persons who are "capable” of committing these core
crimes, in the context described in the Statute, are necessarily public officials (de
facto or de jure). Persons on the "margin” of the de jure State would still fell under
this ambit, since they have links to the State and are public officials in a cte facto
sense. The International Criminal Court is therefore a court that brings those to
account who commit the core crimes, under the banner of the State or an entity
that is state-like.

Transnational Organized Crimes
"Transnational" is simply an adjective describing something that ‘extends beyond
national bounds or frontiers."67 All transnational crime is organized in some
67The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nded., s.v. "transnational."
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manner; its capability to operate across State boundaries, in multiple jurisdictions,
necessarily implies a highly organized, concerted and well-planned activity. It is
hardly spontaneous. The perpetrators of transnational organized crime are very
adept at employing the latest in technological innovation - including computers,
telecommunications, accounting processes, the media and transportation.68 It is
the epitome in "free enterprise,” driven entirely by the motive o f profit, regardless of
how it is obtained.
A multilateral approach has been adopted to tackle this category of crime. The
United Nations fo r instance, has introduced the Palermo Convention and its
Protocols as one means of facilitating multilateral cooperation by States and their
law enforcement agencies.69 The titles of the four documents associated with the
Convention reveal some (but not all) of the issues associated with transnational
organized crime:70
•

United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (12
December 2000)-,

68 United Nations Office for Drug Prevention and Crime Control, “Summary of the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime and Protocols Thereto” (undated),
online UNDCP web site <http7/Www.undcp.org/palermo/convmain.html>(date accessed:
30 April 2002) at Paragraph 2.
69 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25,
Annex I. 55 U N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 44, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001)
[hereinafter The Palermo Convention). For the draft Convention and Protocols see: Ad
hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime on the work of Hs First to Eleventh Sessions, UN GAOR, 55*1 Sess., Annexes,
Agenda Item 105, UN Doc. A/55/383 (2000), at 25 [hereinafter The Palermo
Convention].
The Convention includes:
United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (12 December 2000), 40 I.L.M. 335 (Annex 1); Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime(12 December 2000), 40
I.L.M. 353 (Annex 2); Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime(12 December 2000), 40 I.L.M. 377 (Annex 3); and
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of an Trafficking in Firearms and their Parts and
Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime(12 December 2000), 40 I.L.M. 384 (Annex 4).
70 The Palermo Convention, Ibid. at Annexes 1,2, 3 and 4.
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•

Protocol against the Smuggling o f Migrants by Land, A ir and Sea,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (12 December 2000);

•

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, supplementing Protocol against the Smuggling o f
Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (12 December 2000);
and

•

Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing o f and Trafficking in Firearms and
their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (12 December
2000).

The Convention requires States Parties to criminalize the laundering of proceeds
from a crime, and to criminalize the corruption of public officials.71
This last obligation demonstrates an important characteristic of transnational
organized crime; it tends to co-opt the apparatus of the State through the
corruption o f public officials. When public officials are corrupted, they no longer
work in the interests of the State and therefore compromise its integrity. When the
integrity of a State to function as a rational entity is compromised; adherence to
international norms and legal obligations is no longer certain.

The State can

become capable of violating those obligations and thus capable of committing
international crimes. Thus not only is transnational organized crime a threat to the
State but it may be a threat to all States and their coexistence.72 It is a threat to
the international legal order.
71Palermo Convention, ibid. at Article 6. Ibid. at Article 8.
72 See: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Transnational Criminal Activity (1998) 10
Backgrounder Series (Ottawa: CSIS, 1998). The Canadian Security Intelligence
Service has defined transnational crime as being a product exclusively of organized
criminal syndicates (at 1). It lists 18 groups of this nature operating in Canada ranging
from the Sun Yee On triad to Russian vory v zakone. The Russian Interior Ministry
(MVD) estimates that such criminal organizations control 25 to 40 per cent of Russia’s
gross national product (GNP) and 50 to 80 per cent of Russian banks (at 4). CSIS
identifies four foundation activities: narcotics trafficking, illegal arms dealing, money
laundering and the export of Russian natural resources (at 4). CSIS is therefore of the
opinion that transnational crime is a cause of the destabilization of states through the
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While the example the spousal murderer who is fleeing a national jurisdiction may
represent a transnational crime, it is of a wholly different class to the type
discussed above; it may be better termed a domestic crime, which has developed
extra-territorial aspects, due to the flight of the suspect from the jurisdiction where
the act occurred.

International Crime
Unfortunately there are divergent views on what makes a transnational crime differ
from an international crime. In R. v. Finta, it was argued that the international
crime must have a greater egregious character than a domestic crime.73 Professor
Bassiouni suggests that international crimes must be: “a threat to the peace and
security of mankind’ or involve a ’significant international interest;’ and be
‘shocking” or ‘egregious’ conduct by the standards of ‘commonly shared values of
the world community.”74

Professor Bassiouni suggests a list of 22 categories of

criminal activity that could be considered as international crimes, including the core
crimes of the Rome Statute, but also: mercenarism, drug offences, trafficking in
obscene publications, theft of national treasures, bribery of public officials and

corruption of public officials and threats to the economic security of the nation. Thus
rather than attack transnational crime, the Rome Statute aims to attack those who have
been likely corrupted by elements of transnational crime in order to commit international
criminal acts. Not only is this a ‘catch-up game,’ but the Rome Statute only addresses
symptoms of an overall underlying problem confronting States. This CSIS paper is
based upon Fourth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal
Justice Systems, UN Doc. A.CONF. 169/15/Add.1 (4 April 1995) cited in Gerhard O.W.
Mueller, Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts,” in Phil Williams and Dimitri
Vlassis, eds., Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses
(London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2001) at 14. One might also consider
Letizi Paoli, ‘Criminal Fraternities or Criminal Enterprises,” ibid. at 88-108 - this is the
origin of my use of the term "the ultimate in free enterprise.”
73 Jordan Paust, M.Cherif Bassiouni, Sharon A.Williams, Michael Scharf, Jimmy Gurufe
and Bruce Zagaris, International Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (Durham, North
Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1996) at 19, referring to R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R.
701, online: ICRC CD-ROM: Droit international humanitaire-lntemational Humanitarian
Law, 30 December 1998, Version 5, (Geneva: International Committee of the Red
Cross. 1998).
74 Paust, ibid., citing M.C. Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal Code and Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Tribunal 36,45 (1987).
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counterfeiting.75 Some critics suggest that the list is far too encompassing.76
Paust and Bassiouni rightly point out that there are difficulties with this list;
foremost is the difference in nature of the criminal act carried out by an individual
and that which is carried out by an individual in her capacity, as an agent of the
State.77 Crimes that require ‘state action’ are deeply political in nature and have
the fewest penal characteristics. Crimes which have the least political content
such as drug trafficking, have a greater penal and enforcement character.78
While this may be true, it still does not answer the question of what exactly is an
international crime. Some of the acts on Professor Bassiouni’s list, in a certain
context, have the capability of undermining the integrity of the State - for example
an organized, wide-ranging effort to destabilize the State’s monetary policy through
the wide-scale counterfeiting of its currency. Yet if it is an isolated act of one
person photocopying several thousands of dollars in an ad hoc manner, the
character of the crime is quite different. It is therefore submitted that Professor
Bassiouni’s list is encompasses too much, as it does not take into account the
context of the crime and its impact upon the integrity o f the State to function within
the international community.

Perhaps the term ‘ international crime” would be

better described as a ‘contextual international crime’ or ‘a crime directed at
undermining the integrity of the State.”

But are all such contextual crimes

international crimes? No.

73 Ibid. at 11 citing Bassiouni, Iinternational Crimes: Digest/Index o f International
Instalments 1815-1985 (New York: Oceana, 1986).
76Kristin Henrard, “The Viability of National Amnesties in View of Increasing Recognition of
Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law (1999) 8 MSU-DCL J. Int’l L. 595
at 608.
77Paust et at, supra note 74 at 12.
78Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30
There is a second element necessary in defining an international crime.

The

prohibited act also must be recognized at international law (conventional or
customary) as an international crime:79
An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a
State o f an international obligation so essential for the protection of
fundamental interests of the international community that its breach
is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes
an international crime.
Thus, egregiousness (or gravity), the degree o f organization and the requirement
that the act be prohibited by international law - these are the elements that
establish whether an act achieves the status of an international crime. But there
still remains one element to consider - the type o f individual involved.

Individual Accountability v. State Accountability
It is at this point that individual accountability and State accountability may be
separated. The matter of States carrying out international crimes or delicts against
other States is well within the realm of public international law. It could amount to
aggression. Traditionally such acts are remedied by: bringing the matter to the
attention of the Security Council (Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter)-,
submitting the issue to international arbitration or adjudication; or acting in self

ILC, Report o f the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-eighth
Session, 6 May - 26 July 1996, UNGAOR, 51** Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/51/10
(1996) at Article 19(2). International delicts were also defined at Article 19(4) as any
other internationally wrongful act which did not meet the definition at Article 19(2). ft
should be noted that James Crawford concluded that Article 19 did not reflect current
international law, in that the Article 19 provisions were for too general and for too
encompassing. Instead, the International Law Commission opted for specific crimes as
representing international crimes: genocide, aggression, apartheid, forcible denial of
self-determination and other wrongs which "shock the conscience of mankind.” See:
James Crawford, ILC, Fourth Report on State Responsibly, UNGAOR, 53rt Sess., UN
Doc. A/CN.4/517 (31 March 2000) at Paragraph 46 and 47. Thus an international crime
is one of those specified, or some other serious breach of international rules. It should
be noted however that in the context of international crimes, one now refers to crimes
committed by individuals rather than by a State.
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defence.80 Approaches to conflict resolution rely upon the assumption that the
States are willing to resolve conflict States gone awry may not be interested in
resolving conflict but rather in promoting it
International criminal law operates to bind States to norms through the liability of
those individuals who represent the State in an official capacity (cfe jure or de
facto):81
International law is assumed to be a system of binding norms,
regulating the mutual behaviour o f states, that is, of the individuals
who represent states, then the state cannot be assumed to be
sovereign.
The traditional approach to holding such individuals accountable has been through
domestic State law.82

For Kelsen, international law regulated the relations

between States, whereas domestic municipal law regulated relations between
individuals.83 International law specified a “material element” while domestic law
not only specified material elements but addressed the personal element too.84
For Kelsen, international law required domestic law for its implementation and
ultimately directed the development of domestic law. While this may have had an
impact on sovereignty, the effect was not direct. Although Kelsen described the
relationship between the two as “supplemental,”85 ”[o]nly in conjunction with the
national legal orders does international law form a significant whole.”86
80 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26 at Chapter VI (“Pacific Settlement of
Disputes”), Articles 33-38; and at Chapter VII (“Action with Respect to Threats to the
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”), Articles 39-51.
81 Hans Kelsen, supra note 16 at 79.
82Ibid. at 80.
83Ibid. at 82.
84Ibid. at 84.
83 Ibid. at 84-88. Hence what he means by “states cannot be assumed to be sovereign,”
for they are obligated to comply with international norms as are their agents within the
State itself. Thus international law has an impact on the citizen within the State. The
term “direct effect” has been imported from European Union law. Unlike international
law, European Union law does have primacy over the Member States of the European
Union. The European Union legal order is enmeshed within the legal orders of each
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Where the organs of a State have been co-opted by criminal influence - namely
through the subversion of public officials, the individual is liable through the
‘ principle o f responsibility based on fault” for her failure to uphold her duty to the
State to adhere to its international legal obligations.87 Certain indicators are
suggestive o f the commission of an international crime in this context - ‘for private
or personal use;”88 ‘not justified by military necessity;”89 ‘ not in the furtherance of a
political objective;”90 the euphemism for negligence o f ‘ being in a position that he
should have known;”91 and ‘superior responsibility.”92

Liability flows from

international law, through the executive (and all organs of State) to the individual:93

Member State. See: Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, The ABC o f Community Law (Brussels:
Director-General for Education and Culture, European Commission, 2000) at 95-99.
Also see Luzius Wildhaber, supra note 13 at 50-59 and especially his remarks
concerning the European Court of Human Rights and how States are bound by
conventional law to apply the principles found in the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 at
223, Eur. T.S. 5 [hereinafter European Convention on Human RightsJ, online: OSCE <
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Htm1/005.htm>(date accessed: 20 Februrary
2002), even if the Treaty has not been ratified (he draws upon the United Kingdom in
particular, but before the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c.
42 [hereinafter the UK Human Rights Act] which was the ratifying Act that has been in
effect since 2 October 2000).
86 Kelsen, supra note 16 at 89. Could Kelsen have identified complementarity back in
1942, though not necessarily by the label we attach to it today? Some authors would
disagree with this outlook as being that of Kelsen, for they tend to focus on his outlooks
on the domestic legal scene and apply them to the international rather than his outlooks
on the international: see Fernando R. Tes6n, A Philosophy of International Law
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998) at 5.
87Kelsen, supra note 16 at 102.
88 Elements o f Crimes, supra note 2 at Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) footnote 47 when referring to
pillage.
89Ibid. at Article 8(2)(b)(a)(iv) referring to the war crime of destruction and appropriation of
property.
90 Promotion of National Unity and Recondiiation Act, 1995 (South Africa), Act 95-34 (26
July 1995) at Article 20.
91 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 33
92 Ibid.
93 Kelsen, supra note 16 at 99. This has probably been true for some time in international
la w -a t least since Kelsen was writing in 1942.
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An international delict can be committed only by those individuals
whose duty it is to fulfill the international obligations o f a state;
these are certain organs o f the state, ordinarily the executive.
Thus the corruption of public officials may be a serious problem caused by
transnational crime, but it is the breach of public duty by officials, which leads to
the commission of international crimes or crimes against the community of States.
Organs of the State need not always belong to the executive. Again it must be
noted that such crimes represent a subset of all possible international crimes - for
example environmental pollution might not necessarily fit into the subset94

Traditional Approach - Inter-State Cooperation
Traditionally there are a number o f principles upon which States rely in order to
assert their extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction over individuals. These include:95
1. Territorial Principle - where the offence was committed within the State’s
jurisdiction (and typically the offender has fled the jurisdiction);
2. Nationality Principle - where the accused is a national of the State (akin to
“flag state jurisdiction");
3. Protective Principle - where the State asserts its jurisdiction over individuals
involved in activities beyond its borders affecting its physical security,
currency and official marks;
4. Representational Principle (or Agreement Principle) - where the State acts
on behalf of another State as is required by international legal instruments

94 ILC, Report o f the International Law Commission on the Work o f its Forty-eighth
Session, 6 May - 26 July 1996, supra note 80 at Article 19(3)(d). This does not mean
that it is not a crime. It is just not of the class of crimes being discussed.
95 Maurice Fkxy, in Rosalyn Higgins and Maurice Flory, eds., Terrorism and International
Law (London and New York: Routledge, 1997) at 31. This text is dated, describing the
state of the law only to 1992. Nevertheless it is still useful. Note that the ICC will rely
primarily upon the Territorial Principle and the Nationality Principle (Rome Statute, supra
note 2 at Article 12).
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(such as the requirement that the United Kingdom extradite Augusto
Pinochet to Spain or NATO Status of Forces Agreements);96
5. Universality Principle - where certain grave acts in of themselves warrant
the exercise of jurisdiction (such as piracy, genocide, and crimes against
humanity);97 and
6. Passive Personality Principle - where a State asserts its jurisdiction on the
basis of the nationality of the victim.
A number o f these bases of extra-territorial jurisdiction are controversial and not
well accepted internationally.

Rosalyn Higgins suggests that the Passive

96 Sometimes this may be known as the ‘Agreement Principle;" see; Hugh M. Kindred, ed.
supra note 40 at 14.
97 Some States have implemented universal jurisdiction over certain international crimes
simply by their nature rather than any connection to those States. Consider Belgium's
indictment of 18 June 2001 of Ariel Sharon for war crimes, crimes of genocide and
crimes against humanity, allegedly committed during Israeli incursions into Lebanon in
1982. This is in accordance with the Loi relative d la repression des infractions graves
aux conventions intemationales de Gendve du 12 aout 1949 et aux pmtocoles I et II du
8 juin 1977, additionnels d ces conventions, 16 June 1993, online: Diplomatie judidaire
< http://www.dipk>matiejudiciaire.com>(date accessed; 26 May 2002)[hereinafter the
1993 to/]. See; Stephanie Maupas, “La campagne beige d’A riel Sharon’ (Brussels:
Diplomatie judidaire, 31 January 2002) and Stephanie Maupas, "Les revers de la
competence universelle" (Brussels: Diplomatie judidaire, 8 July 2001) online:
Diplomatie judidaire < http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com>(date accessed: 2 February
2002). The implications of such acts are felt well beyond the Belgian borders.
Reciprocal extradition treaties exist that bind other States indirectly to the 1993 tor. A
decision on 26 June 2002 bv the Belgian oourd’appel undermined the applicability of the
1993 tor and argued that Sharon could not be indicted. Israel has suggested that it
should not apply in any event as Sharon was investigated by an Israel Parliamentary
Inquiry and dismissed as defence minister. The 26 June decision is being appealed, as
the present decision undermines the tor. See: Ian Black, ‘Judges Decide Belgian War
Crimes Law Cannot be Used to Try Sharon,’ The Guardian (27 June 2002), online: The
Guardian Unlimited < http://www.guardian.co.Uk/israel/Story/0,2763,744717,00.html>
(date accessed: 27 June 2002). There is no indication that the Inquiry was in bad faith.
Thus, as we shall see, the Belgian cour d'appel probably decided correctly, for if the
decision had been otherwise it would have violated the principle of complementarity on a
state-to-state basis. Lousie Arbour supports this approach over the system of
complementarity in Rome Statute (see supra note 34). It may not be entirely compatible
with the concept of complementarity and therefore it is submitted that the resulting
harmonization of domestic laws to implement the Rome Statute will bring this whole
issue of extradition and extra-territorial prosecution of universal crimes under control. It
is also submitted that the era of universal jurisdiction has passed and is no longer
necessary in light of the presence of the International Criminal Court.
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Personality Principle can be ambiguous and uncertain, despite it first being
described in the Lotus case.98 Universality is limited to a specific set o f offences
erga omnes (to all) including slavery, piracy, some war crimes but not terrorism.99
Ultimately the main means of asserting extra-territorial jurisdiction is through
international cooperation of the judiciary and police enforcement agencies; and the
harmonization of extradition and deportation regulations.100 The State may either
prosecute or extradite (aut dedere autjudicaire).
Yet such tactics do not always work. In the case o f terrorism for example, the Irish
government refused to extradite suspected Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorists.
There was a high probability that the United Kingdom would violate their human
rights by sending them to face certain torture at the notorious Maze Prison in
B elfast101 In other cases extradition is often precluded for reason of the “political
offence” bar - where the crime the individual is alleged to have committed - was
political in nature and not criminal.102 Who determines what constitutes a political
bar and for what reason (or motivation)? Such a question is vital, for it is at the
root of why the traditional inter-State mechanisms of combating international and
transnational crime are inadequate. How can the nationality principle apply when
the nationality of an individual is in question (for instance refugees or sans
papiers)?

Assertion of the protective principle can easily involve the violation of

99 Higgins, in Higgins and Flory, supra note 96 at 24 citing The Lotus Case PCIJ Reports
1927, Series A, No.10; 4 ILR 5 & 153.
99 Ibid. Kristina Miskowiak describes universalism by means of the misleading label of
“inherent jurisdiction” of the ICC. See Kristina Miskowiak, The International Criminal
Court: Consent, Complementarity and Cooperation (Copenhagen: DJ0F Publishing,
2000) at 20.
100Consider David Schiff, in Higgins and Flory, supra note 96 at 125 and 185-200 (for the
Schengen system of cooperation in the European Union) and Paust et al., supra note 74
at 497-706.
101 Leonard Leigh, in Higgins and Flory, supra note 96 at 176. The European Court of
Human Rights had apparently recognized the danger of torture and the Irish government
was simply echoing their concerns. Consider the Irish cases Leigh mentions: Finucane
v. MacMahon et al.; Clarke v. McMahon [1990] 1 I.R. 228; and Carson v. McMahon
[1990] 1 I.R. 239.
102Maurice Flory, in Higgins and Flory, supra note 96 at 30.
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another State’s sovereignty.103 In the case of universal crimes, do all States
accept such acts as being truly universal?104 The traditional approach to extra
territorial jurisdiction relies upon the integrity of the State and its public officials in
the exercise of their discretionary powers. Discretionary power could be exercised
as a shield to avoid prosecution (domestic and inter-State) and to perpetuate
impunity. It is when officials and the apparatus of the State have been co-opted by
criminal elements that this system falters. Therefore there exists a constraint on
the subject matter falling within the ICC’s jurisdiction.
The State, Gone Awry
Conniption o f Public O fficials

The corruption of public officials undoubtedly compromises their independence in
the performance of their duties of State, in favour of their benefactor.

Their

benefactor could be: any of a variety of domestic groups, transnational organized
criminal elements, the intelligence services of foreign powers or transnational
corporations. Inducements might include gifts, money or even political support.
The international community has tried to legislate guidelines for States to
cooperate and stop the corruption of public officials, including: the European
103 For example, consider State sponsored assassinations (such as the purported
MOSSAD killing of Canadian engineer Gerald Bull for his work on the Iraqi Super Gun in
1990 in Brussels); and the violation of the territorial integrity of other States to abduct
sought-after individuals (such as MOSSAD’s abduction of Adolf Eichmann from
Argentina or Mordechi Vannunu from Italy). See John Pike, ‘Mossad: The Institute for
Intelligence and Special Tasks” (9 May 2002), online: Federation of American Scientists
< http://www.fas.org/irp/worid/israel/mossad/>(date accessed: 18 May 2002). Consider
also the diverse involvement of several States in the abduction of Abdullah OcaIan by
Greek intelligence agents from Kenya on behalf of Turkey in 1999 (see: Abdullan
Ocalan, “Statement by Abdullah Ocalan (PKK) on his Abduction from Kenya” (26
November
1999),
online:
Arm
the
Spirit
<http:/Awww.hartfordhwp.com/archives/51/162.html>(date accessed: 26 May 2002). States involved included
Israel, Turkey, Greece, Kenya and the United States.
104 Consider the arguments presented in chapter one regarding the question of whether
there really are universal or absolute international norms. Consider the arguments
regarding diversity of interpretation and reservations to some of the ”key” international
human rights instruments; in Sandra L. Bunn-Livingstone, supra note 12. Also one
might wonder about Belgium asserting the extra-territorial scope of its laws to its former
colonies, such as Rwanda or the Democratic Republic of the Congo - is this not a return
to some sort of imperialism? Interview with K. Knop and Ian Rennie (10 May 2002).
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Union;105 the Organization of American States;106 the Organization for Economic
and Cooperative Development (OECD);107 the United States;108 and Canada.100
Yet such legislation is directed only at "legitimate business’ and not at activities
carried out by illegitim ate businesses or intelligence organizations. How can one
regulate criminal activity, which by definition operates outside of the law? In theory
intelligence activities are supervised by various systems of government, but there
is always the potential for abuse under the guise of national security. There are
also great lacunae within the domestic implementing legislation (where applicable),
including: the "unexplored" issues of foreign investment; State responsibility; the
threat of destroying the reputation of public officials by claiming that they are
corrupt in order to hinder anti-corruption initiatives; relationships between money
laundering and political parties; the issue of payments to family, friends and frontcompanies of political officials; and hidden transactions, bank accounts and
numbered companies.110
The Rogue State
An extreme situation may arise where a regime in control of a State is corrupt from
the outset of assuming the reins o f power (either lawfully or not). Such regimes
often make no effort to hide their corruption. Examples might include Pinochet in
Chile, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Noriega in Panama or Suharto in Indonesia.

Not

,os Convention drawn up on the basis o f Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European Union
on the Tight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials
of Member States o f the European Union, Official Journal C 195 , 25 June 1997, 0002 001at Articles 2(1) and 3(1) respectively, online: Eur-Lex < http://europa.eu.int >(date
accessed: 6 May 2002).
106 Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, 29
March 1996,351.L.M. 724.
107 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Done at Paris, Dec. 18, 1997,18 December 1997,371.L.M. 1.
108International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, (United States) Pub. L. No.
105-366,112 Stat. 3302.
109Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, 1998, S.C. 1998, c. 34.
110Alejandro Posadas, "Combating Corruption under International Law” (2000) 10 Duke J.
Comp. & Inti L. 345 at 413.
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only is the apparatus of State co-opted for a dictator’s own personal gain but its
apparatus is used to maintain her hold on power - including the commission of
international crimes.111 Ultimately this represents an extreme condition of the
corruption of public officials.
The Shadow State
Corruption of public officials knows no borders and occurs equally in the developed
world as it does in the lesser-developed one.112 It has been suggested that in
certain countries, there exists a fagade of State legitimacy behind of which, exists
an extra-juridical or “shadow State,” founded upon: corruption, bribery, influence
peddling, violence and a culture of “kleptocracy.”113 Such a proposition raises
questions: if the de jure State is not actually the de facto State, how can the State
operate in a responsible manner in conformity with its international commitments?
If it does not, who is held individually accountable? The State? The legal realists’
argument that the “shadow State” engenders more stability than the legitimate
State, poses a problem o f whether it is “just” to attack the apparatus o f illegitimacy
Consider for example the case of Iraq, where Saddam Hussein used chemical
weapons in his war with Iran during the 1980s. The use of chemical weapons is
contrary to international law (the Hague Rules, infra note 153). See Patrick E. Taylor,
“Officer Says U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas” The New York Times (18
August 2002), online: The New York Times <http://Www.nytimes.com/> (date accessed:
18 August 2002). Kelsen, supra note 16 at 4, was of the opinion that if we limit our
definition of a lawful regime to one which is a liberal democracy, excluding totalitarian or
autocratic regimes such as in the Soviet Union (in 1942), then we would be making a
political judgement of a system of social organization. Such judgements are not
scientific. Kelsen’s approach has dominated traditional inter-State relations, largely
because the nature of such autocratic regimes did not threaten international peace and
security. Only in the 1990s have such regimes, especially through international and
transnational criminal activity, threatened international peace and security. Therefore
the international community is not condemning the regime per se, but its carrying out of
international criminal activity.
112Posadas, supra note 111. hie provides several historical examples including that of the
Prince Consort of the Netherlands and the Prime Minister of Japan who were found in
the 1970s to have been taking bribes from Lockheed Martin. Other examples might
include those allegations surrounding the German businessman Karlheinz Schreiber
and allegations of corruption of politicians in Germany and Canada; see: John Hooper,
“Schreiber The Man Who Would Topple Kings,” The Guardian (14 January 2000),
online: The Guardian <http://Www.guardian.co.uk/ >(date accessed: 20 May 2002).
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at the cost of destabilization.114 Yet is not the apparatus of illegitimacy already a
form o f destabilization?
What happens when corporations back up such illicit or legitimate regimes, in
return for business concessions? The problem has arisen in a number of African
States (the Congo, Nigeria, Angola, Uganda, Kenya and Sierra Leone).115 In the
case o f Sierra Leone, one need only consider the support of a number of
Canadian mining corporations in providing the government with weapons and the
employment of Private Military Companies to help bolster the teetering113 William Reno, “Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa,* (2000) J.I.A.
53:2 at 433.
114Ibid. It would be a myth to suggest that all “shadow States" exist uniquely in the lesserdeveloped world. In the United States an extra-executive exists beyond the normal
controls imposed upon government in the form of “think-tanks,” advisory groups or even
consultancy and press relations firms.
Consider the RAND corporation
(http://www.rand.org/nsrd/cmepp/about.html is the URL to their web site) or the “Carlyle
Group.” (see: Oliver Burkeman and Julian Borger, “The ex-presidents' dub’ The
Guardian
(31
October
2001),
online:
News
from
Reality
<http://www.hereinreality.com/cartyle.html>(date accessed: 11 July 2002). While the
United States is probably far from being a “shadow State,” there may be some potential.
Consider the American Defense Department’s Office of Strategic Influence which was
set up in November 2001 to chum out propaganda to influence dedsion-makers
(primarily allied) and sway public opinion in support of American policy. See: Gerry J.
Gilmore, “Strategic Influence Office ‘Closed Down,’ says Rumsfeld” American Forces
Information
Service
News
Articles
(26
February
2002),
online:
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/n02262002_200202263.html>
(date
accessed: 15 May 2002). Consider Jessica Hodgson, “Pentagon Steps Up
Propaganda
Efforts,”
The
Guardian
(19
February
2002),
online:
<http://media.guardian.co.Uk/attack/story/0,1301,652789,00.html>(date accessed: 15
May 2002). Symptomatic is the emergence of shadowy figures such as Otto Reich
(John Patrick Leary, “Public Diplomacy? Contra Warrior Otto Reich Returns to the State
Department,” Counterpunch (12 March 2002), online:
Counterpunch <
http://www.counterpunch.org/ottoreich1 html>(date accessed: 16 May 2002)) and
stresses on international relations with Cuba (Countil on Hemispheric Affairs, Press
Release, ‘Cuban Bio-Terror Fact or State Department Fabrication?’ (9 May 2002),
online: Countil on Hemispheric Affairs <http7/www.coha.org/>(date accessed: 14 May
2002) [authored by Winter Casey, Alex Volberding and Larry Bims]) or and possible
complicity in an aggression on Venezuela (Ed Vulfiamy, “Venezuela coup Linked to
Bush Team,” The Observer (21 April 2002), online:
The Observer
<http://www.observer.co.uk/>(date accessed: 21 April 2002); and Duncan Campbell,
“American Navy 'Helped Venezuelan Coup,” The Guardian (5 May 2002), online: The
Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/>(date accessed: 5 May 2002)).
115 Reno, supra note 114. One could add to this list the rebels of Afghanistan who were
supported by both Pakistan and the United States against the Soviet Union. These
same rebels would eventually form the nucleus of the Taliban and Al Quaeda.
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government’s hold on power.116 If a government is unwilling and incapable of
prosecuting offences against the State or other States because it is simply a front
of legitimacy for a wholly corrupt shadow State, the entire traditional system of
individual criminal accountability enforced by States falters.117
Ultimately the individuals running the de facto government are individually
responsible for their acts. In order to avoid the widespread disruption of a society,
a reconciliation policy is usually necessary to gradually reform such regimes. It
probably has to be carried out in concert with re-education, the introduction of
widespread judicial reform, the enmeshment of the society into international legal
expectations, the use of limited amnesties and the re-establishment of a
centralized State.118

116Three small "junior” mining firms approached the Sierra Leonean government to obtain
mining concessions: Rex Diamond (headquartered in Toronto); AmCAM Minerals
(headquartered in Toronto); and Diamond Works (based in London but also Canadian).
These companies were not just involved in mining but also supplied arms to the
government in an effort to bolster it and protect their mining interests. Rex Diamond
purchased $US 3.8 million worth of military helicopter parts from Russia (that proved
defective). AmCAM owns a South African security firm, ArmSec International (SL).
Diamond Works is reputed to have links and possibly have been a customer of the
South African "private military company,” Executive Outcomes. In 1995 the Sierra
Leonean government granted Diamond Works a 25-year mining concession in the Kono
district - it is widely believed that Diamond Works in return contracted Executive
Outcomes to intervene against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Backed by
mercenaries from Executive Outcomes, Nigerian and Guinean military forces, the
government eventually managed to wrestle control from the Liberian backed RUF of the
lucrative diamond producing areas. ‘Mercenaries grab gems” Weekly Matt and
Guardian (9 May 1997), online: < http://sn.apc.org/wmail/issues> (date accessed 27
October 2001). Executive Outcomes has a very dose relationship with Sandlines,
which in turn has very strong ties to elements of the British Ministry of Defence. INS
Resource Information Center, ‘Questions and Answers Series: Siena Leone - Political,
Military and Human Rights Chronology 1991-1997” Doc No. QA/SLE/98.001
(Washington: United States Department of Justice, April 1998).
117There exists an argument that to assert the impropriety of such shadow States or hold
countries to the same standards as western States amounts to a form of moral
imperialism. While the argument may be appealing from the point of view of the entire
structure of the international legal system (and States in particular) being eurocentric,
the logical culmination of such an argument is to deny the entire structure of the
international legal system. It is an argument of an extreme legal realist. It is therefore
rejected.
1,8 Consider Philip C. Aka, ‘ Nigeria: The Need for an Effective Policy of Ethnic
Recondliation in the New Century” (2000) 14 Temple Intl. & Comp. L.J. 327 at 328.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41
Rebels - Pretenders to the Organs o f State
While the “shadow State* problem raises serious issues, so does the status of
rebel forces. Rebels, like those in control of the ‘shadow State,” are not public
officials. Nevertheless they are in a position to commit international crimes. For
example an enemy commander in an international armed conflict might order her
troops to employ the use of hoilow-point bullets against other forces, as an explicit
plan to terrorize them - a war crime.119 The rebel commander may have sufficient
resources at her disposal to carry out such crimes in their appropriate context.
The commander could be considered to be a de facto public official, claiming to
occupy the office of an organ of State.

Therefore, she too is individually

accountable, like those running the ‘shadow State.”120
Terrorism
A serious difficulty arises with the terrorist No international definition of terrorism
has been successfully concluded in international law.

The legal approach is

complex and requires coordination and harmonization of approaches in multiple
jurisdictions.121 Most States prefer to deal with terrorists on an individual case by

Enmeshment into the international judicial system of legal expectation is probably the
most important aspect, however the threat of an international criminal court becoming
involved could also act as deterrence. In the case of Nigeria, Royal Dutch Shell is the
company that influences the government and opponents of the government have
targeted its infrastructure. Re-education may sound rather Maoist. It is advanced
however since attitudes cannot be changed overnight. To think that they can is to adopt
the stance of a revolutionary. Re-education is ultimately a part of reconciliation. See
chapter five.
119Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 8(2Xxix).
120 Convention (III) Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra
note 36 at Article 4. Note that treatment in accordance with the Convention does not
necessarily mean the recognition of the legitimacy of their claim to the State.
121 This is the approach adopted by the United Nations in a series of treaties aimed at
suppressing terrorist activity. See <http://untreaty.un.org/EnglishAersumen.htm#4>.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 14 December 1973;
International Convention against the Taking o f Hostages, New York, 17 December 1979;
International Convention tor the Suppression o f Terrorist Bombings, New York, 15
December 1997; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing o f
Terrorism, New York, 9 December 1999; Convention on Offences and Certain Other
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case basis, partly for fear of provoking reprisals, and partly because there may be
some sense of sympathy with their cause, although not always their m eans.122
Thus in the European context there exists a two-pronged approach, dealing with
terrorism as both a criminal and political phenomenon.123 Few are willing to
elevate a terrorist act to the peacetime analogue of a war crime (such as an
indiscriminate attack).124

Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Tokyo, 14 September 1963; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, 16 December 1970,
Convention for the Suppression o f Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Montreal, 23 September 197V, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, Vienna, 3 March 1980, Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Montreal, 24 February 1980, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Rome, 10 March 1980, Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf,
Rome, 10 March 1980, Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose
o f Detection, Montreal, 1 March 1991. Although dated, for an overview, see: Paust et
al., supra note 74 at 1175-1224. Article 2(1) of the last Convention listed does contain a
definition, but it is not explicitly for terrorists but for bombers:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person
unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive
or other lethal device in, into or against a place ofpublic use, a State or government
facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility:
(a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system,
where such destruction results in o ris likely to result in major economic loss.
122Flory, in Higgins and Flory, supra note 96 at 34.
123 Ibid. This is different to the legal realist approach of denying all but the criminal aspect
- "we will not deal with terrorists” - an approach often flouted during the Regan and
Thatcher years. It is an approach making some resurgence. For example see: United
States
Department
of
State
Counterterrorism
Office
Web
Site
<http://www.state.goWs/ct/> (date accessed: 25 August 2002). On that site, official
policy regarding terrorists represents a return to the 1980s:
First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals;
Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes;
Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force
them to change their behavior and
Fourth, bolster the counterterrorism capabilities o f those countries that work
with the U.S. and require assistance.
124 The comparison is attributed to A.P. Schmidt, proposed to the United Nations Crime
Branch in 1992 in an internal report. Report alluded to in: United Nations Office for
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The desire of the State to retain some discretionary power over terrorist offences is
well established. To suggest that it be part of the subject matter of the ICC is
controversial. Not surprisingly the offence does not appear in the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal C ourt125

Y e t its omission represents a certain

consistency in the subject matter felling within the Court’s jurisdiction. The terrorist
offence has the dual character of a crim inal act but also of a political one. Thus
the nature of the terrorist offence exceeds the narrow ambit of criminal jurisdiction
allocated in the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court
Mercenarism
Mercenaries sim ilarly pose difficulties to the allocation of individual criminal
responsibility in public office for the commission of international crimes.
Mercenaries owe allegiance to their employer, which is not necessarily the State.
They are members of a private army.126 Other employers could include private
companies, the ‘ shadow State" or even organized transnational criminal groups.127
Drug Control and Crime Prevention Web Site <http:/AMWW.undcp.org/> (date accessed:
20 May 2002) [report unavailable and possibly classified].
123See comments by William Schabas, supra note 2 at 28.
126 In this sense they are no different from the medieval armies raised by feudal lords.
There is however the missing link of fealty that a soldier owes to his lord and the lord to
the King. Instead loyalty goes to the highest bidder. For an interesting account,
focusing on the international legal history and view of mercenarism, particularly in the
wake of their definition in the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions,
see: Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, ‘Mercenaries in the Law of Armed Conflicts," in Antonio
Cassese, ed. The New Humanitarian Law o f Armed Conflict (Napoli, Italy: Editorials
Sdentifica, s.r.l., 1979) at 113. GeneraNy a combatant must have an alien character and
be paid an unusually large amount of money in comparison to domestic armed forces for
the definition to apply. Foreigners fighting for ideological reasons are excluded (see
115). Members of Al Quaeda therefore cannot be described as mercenaries in the legal
sense.
127 Consider the employment of Executive Outcomes and Sandline in Sierra Leone.
Sandline, ‘Company Profile,” online:
Sandline International Homepage <
http://www.sandline.com/>(date accessed: 5 May 2002). While Sandlines, a Private
Military Company, may be the archetype of a mercenary company, it is not alone.
Bounty hunters have been active in the Balkans and the American practice of placing
cash rewards for the apprehension of individuals such as Milosevic or Osama Bin Laden
encourages the practice. Some analysis have even advocated the use of bounty
hunters including an American Judge Advocate General Officer (using his rank, an
indication of authority): Major Christopher M. Supemor, ‘International Bounty Hunters
for War Criminals: Privatizing the Enforcement of Justice" (2001) 50 A.F.L. Rev. 215.
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Mercenaries are well known to have destabilized (or propped up) States in Africa,
South America and possibly the Balkans.128 The link between the individual and
the State can be tenuous.129 It is for this reason that the Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions do not accord the same privileges to captured mercenaries as they
do to combatants.130 Furthermore there exists the International Convention against
the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training o f Mercenaries o f 1989, which
criminalizes mercenarism and any form of support to the "industry.''131 It does not
represent a particularly universal statement of norms, demonstrated by the fact
that only 23 States have ratified it.132 Leading Private M ilitary Companies such as
Sandline International claim only to be employed by: internationally recognized
States; the United Nations; "genuine, internationally recognized and supported
liberation movements;" and to adhere to international humanitarian law.133
Sandline adheres to strict confidentiality rules - which Sandline describes as
"absolute.”134 Lack of transparency is a characteristic element of the covert and
Also consider ‘U.S. Will Hunt Masterminds of Rwanda Genocide,” Reuters (12 June
2002), online: Yahoo <http://story.news.yahoo.com/>(date accessed 12 June 2002).
According to this Reuters report, 15 suspects will be targeted. Already previous rewards
have netted the arrest of 22 suspects to date. The bounties are intended to result in the
capture of those individuals who have fled Rwanda and are harboured in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
128Sandline International for instance has been active in Angola, Papua-New Guinea, and
Sierra Leone. For more information, review their press releases, online: Sandline
International Homepage < http://www.sandline.com/site/index.html>(date accessed: 5
May 2002).
129Often such links are hidden or obfuscated. There is a lack of transparency.
130See also ICRC, Commentaries (Geneva: ICRC, 1998), ICRC CD-ROM, supra note 74
at Article 47 of Protocol I. This commentary provides a history of the criminalization of
mercenarism and explains how the provisions denying status of combatant are "timid”
against the harsh censure of the ‘ profession’ by the General Assembly and the Security
Council in the late 1960s.
131 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, 4 December 1989, GAOR U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 online UNTS Official
Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/44/49),
p. 306< http://www.un.org/ >(date accessed: 5 May 2002)
132 "Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General" (2 May 2002), online:
<http7/untreaty.un.org/ >(date accessed: 5 May 2002).
133Sandline, ‘Company Profile,” supra note 117.
134Ibid.
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murky world of transnational organized crime, the corruption of public officials,
arms sales, drug trafficking, money laundering and even the undermining of
legitimate State government

Despite the image of respectability and even

acceptance by some western governments of groups such as Sandline,
mercenarism generally remains at the boundary of transnational organized
crime.135

One could possibly add to this the role of covert intelligence

operations.136 Thus like terrorism, the dual categorization of mercenarism as both
a transnational and international crime and yet sometimes politically tolerated, has
resulted in its exclusion from the Rome Statute and its continuation as a matter of
purely domestic concern.

The executive reserves the right to exercise its

prerogative.
While transnational organized crime, corporations, mercenaries and possibly
unchecked covert intelligence, tend to undermine the strength of the legitimate
135 Consider “UN Interview with UK Shadow Defence Secretary” (9 October 2000)
reproduced in ‘Comment by Sandline International,’ ibid. The interviewee was Ian
Duncan-Smith, now the leader of the British Conservative Party, who was in favour of
the employment of mercenaries. It is interesting to note an apparent divergence of
opinion between the UK Ministry of Defence and tne Foreign and Commonwealth Office
with regard to the legitimacy of the employment of mercenaries. This may reflect an
institutional divergence within the UK government between the legal realist and the
international legalist. Also see: Chris Talbot, ”Carve-up of Diamond and Mineral Rights
Exposed, as Britain Continues Recolonisation of Sierra Leone” World Socialist Web Site
(26 June 2000), online: < http://www.wsws.org/>(date accessed: 5 May 2002) which
contains a detailed outline of the ‘Arms for Diamonds” scandal where the British
government broke an arms embargo and participated with Sandline in an intervention in
Sierra Leone to prop up a faltering government. For a more detailed examination of the
inter-relationship between other mercenary groups (that are more transparent than
Sandline) and organized crime; consider the following article which describes activities in
Balkans involving Albania “freedom fighters,” the multi-billion dollar drug trade and
organized criminal elements: Michel Chossudovsky, ‘ Kosovo ‘Freedom Fighters’
Financed by Organized Crime” World Socialist Web Site (10 April 1999). online: <
http://www.wsws.org/ >(date accessed: 5 May 2002). The use of mercenaries was also
being entertained by the academic community, particularly in the International Politics
Department at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (from the author’s own experience
in 2000-2001).
136 The role of the CIA or KGB in destabilization of regimes and the promotion of such
activities is well documented. Consider the American support for the Nicaragua contras
and the circumstances that led not only to the ICJ case but to the prosecution of
individuals such as Oliver North and Elliot Abrams. This area represents where the law
and public accountability hits the barrier of national security and state secrecy - the
traditional reserve of the political realist.
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State, in being willing and capable of prosecuting those accused of international
crimes, there are other influences that weaken the resolve of the State. One is the
prevalent trend toward deregulation of government. Advocates of reflexive law
may argue that government is too regulating and hindering free enterprise.
Habermas might describe a loosening, of the tight grip of the State, as a
"deliberative democracy.”137

Yet deregulation may actually facilitate criminal

activity; crime is after all, the ultimate in free enterprise - what one author
describes as "criminogenic asymmetries.”138
A picture now emerges of a situation where transnational organized crime tends to
undermine the ability of the State to function properly by co-opting its apparatus for
criminal enterprise. In the process the ability of public officials to steer the State
into compliance with its international legal obligations may be compromised. If
certain internationally prohibited acts are committed, the acts are sufficiently
egregious, they are organized and deliberate and the complicity of officials of
States (de ju re or de facto) is involved, an international crime occurs. Traditionally
the bases o f extra-territorial jurisdiction were applied to deal with such influences
causing the State to go awry. That system falters in the face of the corruption of

137 One might consider the views of JQrgen Habermas to be consistent with Teubner.
Habermas believes that the Nation-State has come to an end due to the influence of,
multinational corporations, multicultural fragmentation and differentiation, globalization
and the extemalization of State sovereignty. (See: "The European Nation-State: On
the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship” in JQrgen Habermas, The Inclusion
o f the Other, ed. By Ciaran Cronin and Pablo de Greiff (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The MIT Press, 1996) at 105-127. Habermas sees the communication between the
different groups of society as a means of validating different views on what should be
law. Thoughtful and rational actions are the cornerstones of his "deliberative
democracy” rather than a mechanistic approach. (William Rehg, "Preface” in JQrgen
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory on Law
and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996) at ix. and xvii.
138 Nikos Passas, "Globalization and Transnational Crime: Effects of Criminogenic
Asymmetries,” in Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis, eds., supra note 73 at 22-56.
Contrast with R. Randal Rainey and William Rehg, "The Marketplace of Ideas, the
Public Interest, and Federal Regulation of the Electronic Media: lmplications, of
Habermas’ Theory of Democracy” (1996) 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1923. Rainey and Rehg
suggest that reflexive law may help to augment a democracy by achieving a truly
Habermasian "deliberative democracy."
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public officials, the rise o f the "shadow State," activities carried out by rebels,
security services (a form o f aggression), terrorists and mercenaries. Since the
nature of international crime may ultimately lead to the destruction of States, the
effect is parasitic.

Subject Matter of the ICC
Overview
By looking at the subject matter of the International Criminal Court, it becomes
evident that its focus is the weakest link in the sequence of events that lead to the
State going awry and the commission of serious international crimes.

The

weakest link is the public official (de facto o r de jure). According to the Rome
Statute, generally persons can only be held criminally responsible and liable for
punishment if they committed the material elements of the crime with intent and
knowledge (actus reus and subjective mens rea).139 Persons may have intent
where, in relation to their conduct they mean to engage in that conduct; or in
relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is
aware that it w ill be arrived at in the ordinary course of events following the a c t140
Wilful ignorance is no excuse: “knowledge” is taken to mean awareness that a
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events
following the a c t141 Individuals may be held accountable for crimes if committed
as an individual, jointly or with another person (even if the others were
acquitted).142 They may be held accountable if they gave orders, solicited or
induced the commission of crimes (realized or attempted).143 Assisting (aiding and
abetting) in the commission of the crime and contributing to the commission in any

139Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 30(1).
130Ibid. at Article 30(2).
141Ibid. at Article 30(3).
142Ibid. at Article 25(3)(a).
143Ibid. at Article 25(3)(b).
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other way are also grounds for individual criminal accountability.144 In the case of
genocide, incitement is also a criminal a c t145

Persons under eighteen are

excluded on the grounds that they are children.146 O fficial capacity, immunities and
special procedural rules have no relevance in the jurisdiction of the C ourt147
Superior Responsibility
Military commanders (or their non-military equivalent) are criminally liable for their
failure to exercise proper control over their forces where they knew or should have
known that their forces were about to commit any of the core crimes of the Statute
and failed to take measures to prevent the crimes or submit the matter to
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

In any other

superior/subordinate relationship, the superior is criminally liable if they failed to
exercise proper control over their subordinates where the superior knew or was
wilfully ignorant that their subordinates were committing or about to commit such
crimes; the crimes concerned activities that were within the responsibility and
control of the superior; or that the superior failed to take all necessary measures
within their power to prevent, repress or submit the matter to competent authorities
for investigation and prosecution.148
Core Crimes
The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the four most serious types of
international crimes committed by individuals:

the crime of genocide; crimes

against humanity; war crimes and the crime of aggression.149 There are other
crimes over which it has jurisdiction but these are not considered to be within the

144Ibid. at Article 25(3Xc) and (d).
145Ibid. at Article 25(3)(e).
146Ibid. at Article 26.
147Ibid. at Article 27.
141Ibid. at Article 28.
149Ibid. at Article 5.
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core of its subject matter.150 The Court w ill not exercise its jurisdiction with respect
to the crime o f aggression until the Statute is amended seven years from its entry
into force (1 July 2009) at the first Review Conference - and then only in
accordance with the Charter o f the United N ations'5'
Genocide
Article 6 of the Rome Statute contains a description of the crime of genocide,
supplemented by Article 6 of the Elements o f Crimes. The crime of genocide
includes acts that are intended to destroy, in whole or in part: national, ethnical,
racial and religious groups.152 This may include the prevention of births within the
group and the forcible transfer of children from one group to another.153 "Public’'
officials (de jure or de facto) are the only persons with organizational capability to
realize such crimes.
Crimes Against Humanity
Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity.

The Article

contains a list of various acts, which on their own would be heinous crimes.154
However the context o f each act is important to pass the threshold into an
international criminal a c t

The act must have been "committed as part of a

widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
lso William Schabas, ibid. at 52. He notes these as "offences against the administration of
justice,’ citing Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 70 and the ICC Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, ibid., at Rules 162-169 and 172. These would indude such crimes as
perjury, bearing false witness, forgery, influenting witnesses, contempt of court, and
activities related to bribery.
ISI Rome Statute supra note 2 at Article 5(2), 121 and 123. Also Charter o f the United
Nations, supra note 26. The core crime of aggression is not actually defined yet;
therefore it is not further discussed here. It w il be discussed at length in chapter six
however.
112Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 6.
153Ibid. at Article 6(d) and (e).
154 Ibid. at Article 7(1). Acts might include: murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation or forcible transfer, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of fundamental
liberties, torture, rape, sexual slavery, force pregnancy/sterilization, persecution,
enforced disappearances, apartheid, and other inhumane acts that intentionally cause
great suffering or serious injury to mental or physical health.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50
knowledge o f the attack.”155 The categories are not necessarily distinct; for
example, crimes of genocide could also be crimes against humanity and war
crimes.
Attacks directed against any civilian population, involve the carrying out of these
enumerated crimes ‘pursuant to or in the furtherance of a State or organizational
policy to commit such attacks.*158 Like the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity are not average "spontaneous” crimes - but crimes carried out on a wide
scale and that are invariably well planned and systematic.157 The only person(s)
capable of such crimes are those in public office (de jure or de facto).
War Crimes
Article 8 of the Rome Statute sets forth the Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes.
Like the other two core crimes already mentioned, war crimes are of concern
“when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission
of such crimes.”158 While there is a lengthy list of offences applicable, they can be
summarized as offences occurring in certain types of conflict. In times of armed
conflict of an

international character159, the

offences

relate to

serious

contraventions of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols,'60 the Hague Rules,'6'

155Ibid.
156Ibid. at Article 7(2)(a).
157 If one can ever call a crime “average.” See Elements of Crimes, supra note 2 at Article
7(2).
158Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 8(1).
159Ibid. at Article 8(2Xa) and (b).
160All four Geneva Conventions, supra note 36.
161 The Hague Rules refer to a series of conventions and declarations made initially in
1907 and updated since regarding how warfare is conducted (Convention (IV)
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907,
hereinafter the Hague Rules] online: ICRC CD-ROM, supra note 74. The Hague Rules
rave been added to since 1907 and contain a large number of additional and related
reaties concerning the limits on the use of force in armed conflict. See also: Adam
Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of Wars, 3d. ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000) or for a history, see: Frangoise Bugnion, 'Droit de Gertove et
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and the Hague Convention for the Protection o f Cultural Property.'62 In times of
armed conflict not of an international character, Article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949 would apply and any offence directed to
non-combatants or those members of the armed forces that are hors de combat by
sickness, wounds or detention, would be prohibited.163 In instances of “internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence”
none of these offences would apply, since there is no war.164 There may still be a
crime, but not necessarily a war crime - perhaps a crime under national military or
domestic law.

A Narrow Jurisdiction - Targeting High “Public” Officials
The “egregious” character o f an international crime is sim ilar to the Rome Statute’s
requirements o f “committed with intent to destroy,”165 “committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack,’ 166 or “committed as part of a plan or policy or as

droit de La Haye’ (2001) 844 I.R.R.C. 901, online: ICRC <http:/Avww.icrc.org/>(date
accessed: 30 May 2002). The principle behind the Hague Rules is that the exercise of
warfare is not without its limitations. Everything from the use of the white flag of truce, to
the prohibition of dum-dum bullets and chemical weapons is considered in these rules.
Also: “Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
the Regulations Annexed Thereto of 18 October 1907,” in Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, The Hague Conventions and Declarations o f 1899 and 1907 (New
York, Oxford University Press, 1915) at 100.
162 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The
Hague, 14 May 1954, online: ICRC CD-ROM, supra note 74. [Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 UNTS
240]
163 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 8(2)(c). Offences include: violence to life and
person; outrages committed upon personal dignity; hostage taking; summary
executions; indiscriminate attacks; serious violations of the Geneva Conventions;
perfidy; intentional targeting of cultural and religious monuments; pillage; rape; sexual
slavery; conscription of children under fifteen; and declaring no quarter. See also Article
8(2He).
164 Rome Statute, ibid. indicates that Article 8(2)(c) does not apply in cases of internal
disturbances or tensions (indicated at Article 8(2Kd)) but also that Article 8(2)(e),
comprising an assortment of crimes such as attacks directed at UN personnel, would not
apply in cases of internal disturbances or tensions (indicated at Article 8(2)(f)).
163Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 6 in reference to Genocide as an international crime.
166Ibid. at Article 7(1) in reference to Crimes Against Humanity as an international crime.
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part of a large-scale commission o f such crimes.''167 All instances of war crimes
are not necessarily within the jurisdiction of the Court, for they may not have
sufficient “egregious” character to m erit classification as international crimes under
the Rome Statute. Crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity however may
be sufficiently egregious in their own right to merit classification as international
crimes, without qualification (other than definition). This is reflected in Article 1 of
the Statute: “...[the Court] shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes o f international concern, referred to in this
Statute.”166

Those

committing

such

egregious acts

require significant

organizational and institutional resources. Such resources generally exist only in
the organs of State (or bodies capable of usurping the State).169 The individual
accountability of those capable o f mustering such resources to perpetrate
international crime becomes the issue.
The label o f “international crime” is uncertain or unclear. It does not necessarily
include transnational organized crime or terrorist acts - although it may under
certain circumstances.

While international crimes are generally defined by

conventional and customary international law, the compliance by a State is
dependent upon the role of those individuals who occupy public office (or claim to).
Their public duty is derived from their association with the organs of State, which in
turn has agreed to comply with the relevant international laws. It is when this office
167Ibid. at Article 8(1) in reference to War Crimes as an international crime.
,6SIbid. at Article 1 [emphasis added].
169 The Al Quaeda terrorist network probably fits into this statement. What is significant
about such groups is that they do have sufficient influence, power and wealth to co-opt
an entire State such as Afghanistan or Yemen to participate in their enterprises. They
also have sufficient resources to carry out significant atrocities such as the indiscriminate
attack on the World Trade Center or the destruction of cultural property and systematic
abuse of human rights (war crimes and crimes against humanity). There are
suggestions that Al Quaeda may even have the ability to precipitate a thermonuclear
war (“U.S. Breaks Taboo with South Asian Peace Mission,” Reuters (12 June 2002),
online: Yahoo News < http://in.news.yahoo.com/>(date accessed 12 June 2002)). In a
sense this is a manifestation of the ‘shadow State” problem. Thus transnational
organized crime and international crime may not always be distinct from one another
(CSIS, supra note 73).
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is compromised, that the State begins to fail in compliance.

Failure could be

motivated by blissful ignorance, blatant negligence or corruption. The agents of
the State could be senior officials, supervisors, members of the executive, or
superior commanders in the field. One need only examine the indictments made
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the form er Yugoslavia or the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, to realize that the occupations o f those indicted for
international crimes included medical doctors, clerics, teachers, military personnel,
police officials, and local politicians - those individuals in privileged positions of
responsibility within the State. The core crimes of the International Criminal Court
are defined: crimes of genocide; crimes against humanity; and war crimes - but in
the context the co-opting o f the apparatus of State to achieve a threshold level of
egregiousness by the individual agent of the State. Thus the core crimes are
offences carried out under the banner of the State.

This is a very narrow

conception of the Court’s subject matter and jurisdiction. In the words of M. Cherif
Bassiouni: “The ICC w ill not be a panacea for all the ills of humankind."170

Conclusion
"Transnational crime" is a difficult concept to define, as is "international crime."
The two are related. The egregiousness of the a ct its prohibition by international
legal instrument and the fact that the only persons capable of carrying out such
crimes are necessarily high officials of public office (either de jure or de facto), are
important elements to international crime. The corruption of public officials, the
emergence of the extra-judicial State, the presence of rebels, the status of
terrorists and the role of mercenaries represent ways in which these high officials
can become corruption - frequently by transnational organized crime. Reflexive
law and the withdrawal o f the State from certain regulatory involvement may
exacerbate this cooption. Nevertheless, the subject matter of the Court is quite narrow.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Preface," in Otto Triffterer, ed., Commentary on the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden:
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999) at XXI.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54
The Court targets those individuals in high public office that carry out those
international crimes, as specified in the Rome Statute.
This line of reasoning raises some serious issues. Perhaps the most intriguing is
what happens when an agent of the State performs her duties well, but has been
beguiled by those corrupt officials elsewhere in the system of government?
Provided that her performance was solely in the bona fide aim of furthering the
interests of the State and that she derived no personal benefit from the situation,
might these pose some degree of mitigation? Could her acts really be considered
as illicit acts to the same degree as those who attempted to further interests other
than the State?

A further complication arises in the instance of an entire

population that has been mobilized by their political leaders to carry out
international crimes - for instance the hundreds of thousands of Rwandese that
participated in the genocide in 1994.

Surely by remaining silent or how ever

remotely participating, they were complicit - but not necessarily to the same
degree as their leaders.

A line could be drawn with regard to whether they

achieved a personal gain or simply acted in the furtherance of the political
objective in good faith (if that is possible for such crimes). It is here that the realm
of the truth and reconciliation commission, limited amnesties and restorative justice
might apply. This w ill be addressed in chapter five. Just exactly who can draw this
difference is answered by considering where discretionary power to prosecute (or
not) lies. How this power may be exercised in a jurisdiction ‘‘shared'' by domestic
and international criminal courts is a major issue. Should an international court
impose its w ill on a State? Does this not violate the principle of State sovereignty?
Should another State impose its laws on the other, also violating State
sovereignty? The answers to these questions lie in the next three chapters, which
concern complementarity and the limitations on the exercise of discretionary
powers by the international courts (and their judiciary), the international executive
and the international legislature.
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Chapter 3

Chapter Three: Complementarity: The Tension Between the ICC and the
Domestic Jurisdiction
Introduction
The Rome Statute is a constitution and therefore outlines how the International
Criminal Court interacts with the international community (or at least the States
P arties).171 One of the great achievements o f the Statute is that it has created a
vocabulary to describe this interaction. In the language of the Statute words such
as “complementary,” “issue of admissibility” and “deferral” replace concepts that
presuppose the traditional inter-State abstraction of the international legal order.
Traditional labels include: “primacy,” “concurrent of jurisdiction,” “State consent” or
“State obligation.’

The new labels represent a specific use of language with

specific meaning.

Immanent to them is the conception of a novel form of

interaction between international courts and domestic legal systems. They
represent the culmination of decades of legal drafting by diplomats, government
functionaries and legal experts. This is why it is necessary to be aware of the
traditional approaches to international criminal law, so that one can avoid potential
traps cloaked in terminology. It is also why rather than adopt any one of those
frameworks described in the first chapter a contextual approach is necessary to
determine empirically what exactly the ICC is all about.
In this chapter an exploration o f the use of language within the context of the
Rome Statute is carried out in the general context of international criminal law.
The precise meaning of language is of great importance.

The focus is the

relationship between the International Criminal Court and the domestic legal
171 Philip Allot, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford; Oxford University Press,
1990) at 133. Professor Allot considers that the constitution of a society represents the
abstraction of how that society views itself.
55
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jurisdiction. A referential point is discemable through comparisons to the ad hoc
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda
(ICTR). To this end, the key terms used by the two ad hoc tribunals, is salient ‘primacy,’ ‘concurrent jurisdiction” and “ne bis in idem.”

‘Complementarity” is

frequently used by academics to describe the relationship between the two
jurisdictions (domestic criminal and international criminal). The meaning of this
word is explored briefly but the focus w ill be on its root adjective, ‘complementary.’
Complementary is a function of ‘conjunction.”

A mathematical metaphor is

gradually employed to visualize complementarity as a general solution to the
relationship between the two jurisdictions. The dynamic metaphor of a calculus
equation is appropriate. Calculus is the study of change and therefore reflects the
vibrant nature of complementarity.172 One must keep in mind that the approach is
not intended to propose a theory, but rather to gain a unique perspective, amongst
the multitude of possible visualizations.173 Once the complementary relationship
172 The use of metaphor is often helpful where words may not capture the essence of a
concept; consider the facetious article: Philip Allot, ‘ New International Law: The First
Lecture of the Academic Year 20-,’ in Allot, Carty, Koskenniemi and Wart)rick, supra
note 10 at 113. The goal is to capture the ‘poetry of law” and its changing mood.
Sandra Bunn-Livingstone uses the metaphor of a cell and the analogy to stoichiometry
in an effort to capture the reality of diverse interpretations of and reservations to treaty
law in her book: Sandra L. Bunn-Livingstone, supra note 12 at 64-65. The use of
metaphor is therefore one approach to trying to describe a system whose description
may be constrained by the limits of our language.
173 In this respect this approach is more in line with imaginative post-modernism (William
Twining, supra note 29 at 195) and the use of contextualization and plurality (Anthony
Carty, “Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law*
(1991) 2 E.J.I.L. 66 at 67 and Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The
Structure of International Legal Argument, supra note 10 at 132). The post-modernist
would advance the theory that aK theory is impossible. Naturally there is a paradox in
the previous proposition. The post-modernist would however advocate the use of
differing views on a subject matter. One might contrast this approach to G.W. Leibniz's
original intended use of differential calculus as a universal language for use in aH
subjects - a typical outlook of the 17*1Century with regard to science and the search for
universal laws of nature. For a description of this approach see: C. Henry Edwards and
David E. Penney, Calculus with Analytic Geometry: Early Transcendentals, 5"* ed.
(Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997) at 213. One might also consider
Sir Isaac Newton (at 99) who independently developed integral calculus around the
same time. Integration and differentiation are opposite functions, but together comprise
the duality of calculus - the study of change or dynamism. Liebniz and Newton (and
others including Rene Descartes) reflect the general trend of their era to advance a
universal natural law founded in reason.
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can be expressed, then it is but a small step to understanding the Rome Statute
terms o f “admissibility" and “deference.” Thus, first a literal approach to define
complementarity is used, followed by a purposive approach, through the
description of the procedures contained in the Rome Statute, designed to achieve
complementarity.

The provision of a comprehensive summary of how the

relationship between the International Criminal Court (and ad hoc international
criminal tribunals) and the domestic legal system is designed to operate, is the
goal. If a procedure has been established for the operation of an international
criminal court, then the framework for the implementation of the procedure
comprises an international criminal legal system.174 Crucial to the procedure is the
relationship with the domestic courts. Complementarity embodies this relationship.

Terminology of the International Criminal Legal System
Old Terms
“Primacy0
“Primacy," in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes appears immediately after mention of
the term “concurrent jurisdiction" and under the overall heading of “concurrent

1 Since the Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty, it could be defined as conventional law
and therefore is representative of a primary source of international law as described in
the ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Article 38(1)(a). Contrast this fact with the statutes of
the two ad hoc tribunals (infra note 167) where they are based upon the Chapter VII
action of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Bruce Broomhall differentiates between the two approaches - describing the “executive"
approach of the tribunals and the “consensual” approach of the Rome Statute (Bruce
Broomhall, ‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence: Article 51,' in Otto Triffterer, ed., supra
note 171 at 686). Ultimately States are not as eager to allow the Security Council to
have a wide discretionary power as to the interpretation of the extension of their consent
from the Charter to the creation of international courts and tribunals. This is why they
prefer the treaty approach encapsulated in the creation of the Rome Statute to that of
the tribunals. This indudes the States that participated in the Rome Conference in July
of 1998 - a much larger set of States than those that would ratify the Statute. States
want some degree of control over the discretionary exercise of power by the Security
Council. The nature of the exercise of such power may be legislative in nature, in that it
prescribes obligations upon States (rather than enforces them which is an executive
action). What is important is that such power has been exercised and that States want
more involvement. It is this increased involvement in the Rome Statute that Broomhall
describes as a “higher degree of sophistication than achieved before.” (Broomhall, ibid.)
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jurisdiction.”175 The Rules o f Procedure and Evidence Of each tribunal uses the
heading “Primacy o f the Tribunal.”176 Neither term independently describes the
jurisdiction accurately.

Neither tribunal has the power to ‘assert jurisdiction”

directly over natural persons of a State;177 otherwise a supranational court would
exist.178 Yet there exists primacy in a sense, but not deriving from the tribunals per
175 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, SC Res. 955 (1994), 1994, UN Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) (8 November 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute) at Articles 8. Statute
of the International Tribunal, SC Res. 827 (1993), 1993, UN Doc. S/RES.827 (1993X25
May 1993) last amended by UN Doc. S/RES 1411 (2002) (17 May 2002) [hereinafter
ICTY Statute] at Article 9. For an up to date version see their respective websites:
<http://www.ictr.org/> and <http://www.un.org/icty> Henceforth discussion will be limited
to the ICTY, however the descriptions wiH equally apply to the ICTR unless otherwise
noted. Also note that the ICTY is sometimes referred to as the “International Tribunal*
because it was established before the ICTR (hence its case file numbers starting with
the prefix “IT-").
176 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, 11 February 1994, IT/32/REV.20 (entered into force 14 March 1994, last
modified 12 April 2001) [hereinafter the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence] at
Rules 7-13 inclusive. The provision is entitled ‘Part Two. Primacy of the Tribunal.”
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 29 June
1995 (entered into force 29 June 1995, last modified 31 May 2001) [hereinafter the ICTR
Rules of Procedure and Evidence] at Rules 8-13. Note that the ICTR Rules of
Procedure and Evidence is identical to those for the Special Court in Sierra Leone. Both
ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence share the same Appeals Chambers’
judges.
177 ICTY Statute, supra note 167 at Article 6 and Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article
25(1).
I7SThis assertion is a major departure from much of the secondary writing, which asserts
that the Tribunals do exert primacy over domestic courts. For example, consider the
frequently referenced: Bartram S. Brown, “Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the
Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals” (1998) 23 Yale J.
InfIL. 383 at 387 in particular, but the theme runs throughout his article. Consider also:
Leila Nadya Sadat, supra note 66 at 85 where she argues that the ICC will not operate
at the same level as the tribunals as it lacks ‘primacyr in its jurisdiction; Mahnoush H.
Arsanjani, “Reflections on the Jurisdiction and Trigger-Mechanism of the International
Court,” in Herman A.M. von Hebei, Johan G. Lammers, and Jolien Schukking, eds.,
Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour o f Adriaan Bos (The
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 1999)at 68; Louise Arbour and Morten Bergsmo,
“Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional Overreach," in Herman A.M. von Hebei, ibid. at
130 where they describe the “reversal" of the “jurisdictional primacy of the ad hoc
Tribunals’ in comparison to the ICC; and even Otto Triffterer himself in “Part 1.
Establishment of the Court,” in Otto Triffterer, supra note 171 at 64. Judge Claude
Jorda, the President of the ICTY, clarified this confusion in his Press Release of 17 May
2001: ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.S./591-e, “President Claude Jorda: The ICTY and
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (17 May 2001),
where he described the relationship between the ICTY and the domestic Bosnian legal
system (and specifically a proposed TRC) as being complementary in nature. This is
explored further in the following chapters (especially in chapter five of this thesis).
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se, but from the fact that the tribunals are subsidiary organs of the Security
Council. Since States are bound to comply with Security Council decisions under
Article 25 of the Charter, decisions of the tribunals may have a sim ilar status since
the tribunals were established under the authority of the Security Council. 179
When a State does not comply with the request for deferral, the Trial Chamber
may request the President to report the circumstances to the Security Council.180
Direct invocation of the Security Council is a measure of last resort. Thus primacy
may not actually be that of the tribunals, but rather primacy from the Security
Council.

The Tribunal has no other powers in the extreme case of non

cooperation. Closely related to primacy are the terms “concurrent jurisdiction” and
“ne bis in idem," both of which are contained in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.

Contrast this with the response that the ICTR Registrar had with the Government of
Rwanda when what had been proposed as a joint effort to investigate the maltreatment
of witnesses. The initiative turned into a Rwandese proposal to stack the ICTR staff with
Rwandese nationals, thereby compromising the independence and impartiality of the
ICTR: ‘Statement by the Registrar on the Response of the Government of Rwanda to
the Proposal to Establish a Joint Commission to Investigate the Allegations of
Mistreatment of Witnesses Coming from Rwanda,” ICTR Statement No. ICTR/INFO-9-309.EN (28 March 2002), online: ICTR <http://Www.ictr.org/> (date accessed: 12 July
2002).

179 This echoes Broomhall, supra note 175. The authors listed above (ibid.) may actually
be describing the “executive” nature of the tribunals with the term “primacy” - namely
tracing the authority of the tribunals to the Security Council under Chapter VII of the
Charter and therefore to its binding authority on Member States of the United Nations
under Article 25 of the Charter. It is the Security Council which has primacy over States
and this is the so-called primacy that the tribunals are claimed to have.
IM ICTY Rules o f Evidence and Procedure, supra note 177 at Rule 11. Morten Bergsmo
makes this point suggesting: “primaiy responsibility for enforcing criminal liability for
violations of the subject-jurisdiction of the Court rests on the States Parties.” (Morten
Bergsmo, ‘ Preamble in Otto Triffterer, ed., supra note 171 at 15) He suggests that in
the case of a Security Council referral of a situation to the Court, “the matter stands in a
different light.” (Ibid.) Surely primary responsibility still rests on the States Parties or for
that matter on all States - after all the subject matter represents a subset of international
crimes. The only difference with the role of the Security Council referral is that the
Security Council has the option of making use of the ICC as a Chapter VII tool for nonStates Parties. This is an option not a requirement. Thus it may equally establish an
international criminal tribunal along the lines of the ICTY or a “special court” along the
lines of the one in Sierra Leone.
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*Concurrent Jurisdiction'’
In terms of "concurrent jurisdiction," the term is likely borrowed from the NATO
Status o f Forces Agreements, where visiting forces come under the jurisdiction of
both the sending State and the receiving State.181

The Status o f Forces

Agreement mentions concurrent jurisdiction:182
In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the
following rules shall apply:
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member o f a force or o f
a civilian component in relation to
(0 offences solely against the property or security o f that State, or
offences solely against the person or property o f another member
o f the force or civilian component of that State or o f a dependent;
00 offences arising out of any act or omission done in the
performance o f official duty.

181 Mark R. Ruppert, "Criminal Jurisdiction Over Environmental Offenses Committed
Overseas: How to Maximize and When to Say "No"” (1996) 40 A.F. L. Rev. 1 at 4 and
5. Also consider the appearance of the term in the domestic federal context where the
separation of powers may not be absolute: W. R. Lederman, “The Concurrent Operation
of Federal and Provincial Laws in Canada," (1963) 9 McGill L. J. 185, reprinted in
Dianne Pothier and A. Wayne MacKay, Constitutional Law 2000-2001, vol.1 (Halifax:
Dalhousie University, 2000) at 3-79. Lederman suggests the "double aspect doctrine"
which is followed-up by examples provided by Professors Pothier and MacKay in the
Canadian constitutional framework. It is interesting that their attention is drawn to
sharing and conflict. In French, la competence concunente, implies a competition or
rivalry between two bodies. One French author has described this situation as “ce
probl6me de coexistence de iuridictions e d’6ventuels contentieux paralieies...” (see:
MireHle Couston, “La multiplication des juricHctions intemationales:
Sens et
dynamiques" (2002) 1 J.D.I. 5 at 32. Thus the sense is slightly different to the English in
that under the NATO SOFAs, the rivalry has been resolved by an effective distribution of
competencies of jurisdiction.
182 North Atlantic Treaty Status o f Forces, 19 June 1951, TIAS 2846 4 U.S.T. 1792; 1951
U.S.T. LEXIS 301, at Article VII (3) (Date Signed August 23,1953) [hereinafter SOFAs;
emphasis added] The importance of the NATO connection can be understood by the
nature of the peacekeepers drawn initially from NATO countries. SFOR for instance
(Stabalization Force in Bosnia) is actually a NATO force much like KFOR (in Kosovo) both have UN approval. Later on, the connection is more significant through the
intervention by NATO on behalf of the United Nations and NATO countries. Recall that
this approach invokes the Representational Principle, described in chapter two.
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(b) In the case o f any other offence the authorities of the receiving
State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise
jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities o f the other State as soon
as practicable. The authorities o f the State having the primary right
shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the
authorities of the other State fora waiver o f its right in cases where
that other State considers such waiver to be of particular
importance.
The tribunals (like the sending States) have a ‘ primary right to exercise jurisdiction*
in cases o f international crimes but, at their discretion, may defer the m atter to the
domestic courts. Thus an individual accused of the domestic crime of murder may
also be accused of an international crime against humanity. The international
criminal tribunals have the primary right to proceed with prosecution for
international crimes over the State’s right to prosecute for domestic crimes. This is
not primacy, in a supranational sense, but concurrent jurisdiction.

In such a

situation one might wonder if it is possible for an accused to be tried for two
different crimes concerning the same act in two different jurisdictions. It is here
that the principle of ne bis in idem may apply.
IC TY‘Non-bis-in-idem”
The ICTY Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, govern how primacy is exercised.183
It becomes evident in the ICTY Rules o f Procedure and Evidence that primacy
does not imply that the domestic courts are overridden.

The Prosecutor may

propose th a t the Trial Chamber make a formal request to the domestic court to
defer its jurisdiction to the Tribunal, but only if any one of three conditions is
satisfied:184

183ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 9(2) and ICTR Statute, ibid. at Article 8(2). Also
consider ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rules 7bis to 13
and ICTR Statute, ibid. at Rules 8 to 13. Keep in mind that both sets of Rules of
Procedure and Evidence have the status of a constitutional document for the tribunals at
a par with the Statute.
184ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 9; and ICTR Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, ibid. at Rule 9. The ‘or” used in the provision is likely meant in
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(i)

The act being investigated or which is the subject o f those
proceedings is characterized as an ordinary crime;

(ii)

There is a lack o f impartiality or independence, or the
investigations or proceedings are designed to shield the
accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case
is not diligently prosecuted; or

(iiij

What is in issue is dosety related to, or otherwise involves,
significant factual or legal questions which may have
implications for investigations or prosecutions before the
Tribunal,

The first condition listed is reflective of the concurrent jurisdiction of the tribunals in
that they may exercise a primary right to exercise jurisdiction if the crime has been
mischaracterized as an ordinary crime by the domestic courts - for example
murder as opposed to murder committed as a crime against humanity.185 The
second condition requires that there must be evidence that domestic courts are not
carrying out a bona fide investigation or prosecution of the accused, before the
Trial Chamber may request the deferral of the case to the ICTY.186 The third
condition amounts to reinforcement of the discretionary right of the tribunal to
the ‘exclusive or" sense. The heading in both sets of documents is confusing, entitled
‘Primacy of the Tribunal.” The Secretary-General’s Report (see Report of the SecretaryGeneral Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (3 May 1993) at Paragraph 64, reproduced in Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and
Olivia Swaak-Goldman, eds., Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International
Criminal Law: The Experience o f International and National Courts, vol. 2 (The Hague,
The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2000) at 293) has the heading ‘Concurrent
Jurisdiction and the Principle of Non-bis-in-idem.’
The Statute has headings
‘Concurrent Jurisdiction’ (ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 9; and ICTR Statute,
supra note 176 at Article 8) and “Non-bis-in-idem’ (ICTY Statute, ibid. at Article 10; and
ICTR Statute, ibid. at Article 9). The ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (supra note
177) title is probably an artefact from what may have been at one time, development in a
supranational direction.
185It is this subtle difference that may be overlooked by Aaron Schwabach when querying
why the court martial of American Staff Sergeant Frank Ronghi for raping an Albanian
Kosovar in January 2000 was not turned over to the ICTY. See Aaron Schwabach,
‘NATO’s War in Kosovo and the Final Report to the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” (2001) 9 Tul. J. of Int’l & Comp. L. 167 at
183. The alleged act amounted to rape as ‘ordinary crime.*
116 Bona fide is not used in the tribunal basic documents or in those of the International
Criminal Court. A more ‘correct” term is ‘unwillingness and inability to genuinely
prosecute.” For a discussion on this see John T. Holmes, "The Principle of
Complementarity” in Roy S. Lee, ed., supra note 66 at 75-76.
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assert its primary right to exercise jurisdiction. The label confusingly attached to
this process is “ne bis in idem ,' in the Statutes of the tribunals (and Rome
Statute).187
The concept o f ne bis in idem is common in international legal documents and
generally well accepted as a legal principle.188 The European Convention on
Human Rights describes the concept:189
187 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 10(2); ICTR Statute, ibid. at Article 9(2); and
Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17(2).
188 The ICTY and ICTR Statutes use the term non-bis-in-idem rather than ne bis in idem.
The difference is not considered to be important. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 19 December 1966, G.A.Res. 2200(XXI), 21 U N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1996) [hereinafter ICCPR; also available online: UNHCR <
http://Www.unhchr.ch/> (date accessed: 2 November 2001)] at Article 14(7) states:
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has
already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal
procedure of each country;m
Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental
Liberties, 22 November 1984, E.T.S. No.117 at Article 4.1:
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under
the jurisdiction o f the same State for an offence for which he has already been
finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that
State;
European Convention on the International Validity o f Criminal Judgments The Hague,
28.V.1970 online: Council of Europe < http://conventions.coe.int/ >(date accessed: 6
May 2002) at Titre III - Section 1 - Ne bis in idem; Treaty on European Union at Article
31:
Common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include: a)
facilitating and accelerating cooperation between competent ministries and judicial
or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation to proceedings and the
enforcement of decisions; (...) c) ensuring compatibility in rules applicable in the
Member States, as may be necessary to improve such cooperation; (...);"
and Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, 19 June 1990 (Articles 54 to
58 : Ne bis in idem). See also online: EU Parliament < http://Www.europart.eu.int/
>(date accessed: 6 May 2002). The last two provisions (from the European Union) are
now integrated into the Consolidated Version o f the Treaty Establishing the European
Community O.J.C. 340, 10.11.1997, pp. 145-172 at Article 249 [hereinafter The Treaty
of Amsterdam].
189 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 86 at Article 50; also see: Jaime
de Lamo Rubio, "Non bis in idem’ y Prindpio de Buena Fe Procesal: efectos de la
invocadbn tardia de la vulneraddn del Ne bis In Idem,” (September 2001) Articulos
Doctrinales, online: Noticias Juridicas < http://Www.juridicas.com>(date accessed: 6
May 2002). Abuse of process and a lack of good faith in international law are generally
recognized as being unacceptable. Consider Judge Read’s Dissenting Opinion in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal
proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been
finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with
the law.
The actual procedure described in the tribunal Statutes, their Rules o f Procedure
and Evidence (and even in the Rome Statute), is not exactly ne bis in idem as
described by the European Convention on Human Rights. It is much broader than
autrefois acquit or double jeopardy. Ne bis in idem incorporates the three-pronged
test by which the Tribunal determines: 1) if the crime has been mischaracterized
as an ordinary crime; 2) the domestic criminal prosecution (or lack thereof) is held
to be valid/invalid by an international court or tribunal on the basis of good faith;190
and 3) if there are other overriding reasons why the Tribunal should assert its
primary right to exercise jurisdiction. Thus ne bis in idem is being used in the
Statutes of the two tribunals in a particular sense with a specific meaning of its
own. Confusion is inevitable in attempting to apply a pre-existing legal term to a
rather different legal concept in differing legal contexts.
Their Origins: Legislative History o f the Tribunal Statutes
The history behind the drafting of the Statutes is revealing. The Statutes were
adopted as emergency measures by the Security Council to deal with
extraordinary events. China voted in favour o f the Resolution adopting the ICTY
Statute in 1993.191 It asserted that a stronger legal foundation might have been
created, through a negotiated treaty.192 The Chinese were extremely uneasy
Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), I.C.J. Rep. 1955 4 at 37 cited in at J.F. O’Connor,
Good Faith in International Law (Aldershot, Hants, England: Dartmouth Publishing
Company Ltd., 1991) at 86.
190 Consider European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments,
supra note 189 [contained in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, supra note 189].
191Resolution 827 (1993), SC Res. 827 1993, UN Doc S/RES/827 (25 May 1993).
192 In the case of the ICTY: Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two
Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 25
May 1993, at 9 p.m., UN Doc. No. S/PV. 3217 (25 May 1993), reprinted in Virginia
Morris and Michael P. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis, vol. 2 (Irvington-on-
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though, about the Statute empowering the Tribunal with ‘both preferential and
exclusive jurisdiction [which] is not in compliance with the principle of State judicial
sovereignty.”193 This is a curious comment because the Tribunal never had
‘exclusive jurisdiction” nor did it have ‘preferential jurisdiction.” The Chinese may
have thought that there was a supranational element to the Statute, in that it was
being adopted without a representative from the former Yugoslavia present at the
preceding debate.194
In the case o f the Security Council Resolution adopting the ICTR Statute, Rwanda
was represented at the Security Council debate.195

Rather than unanimous

acceptance, Rwanda voted against the Statute and China abstained.

The

Rwandese vote is important but in the current context, the Chinese one is even
more so.196 The Chinese maintained that the full cooperation from the Rwandese
government was essential for the Tribunal to be able to carry out its mandate.197
While Brazil voted in favour of the Resolution, it too echoed the Chinese concerns
Hudson, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1995) at 179-208 (especially at 199)
[hereinafter ICTY: Provisional Verbatim Record o f the Security Council], and in the case
of the ICTR: Provisional Verbatim Record o f the Security Council, Forty-Ninth Year,
3453d Meeting, Tuesday, 8 November 1994, 3:35 P.M., New York, UN Doc. No. S/PV.
3453 (8 November 1994), reprinted in Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, vol. 2 (Irvington-on-Hudson, New York:
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1998) at 298-310 [hereinafter ICTR: Provisional Verbatim
Record o f the Security Council].
193ICTY: Provisional Verbatim Record of the Security Council, ibid.
m Ibid.
193ICTR: Provisional Verbatim Record o f the Security Council, supra note 193 at 298. The
debate concerned the Resolution that adopted the ICTR Statute: ICTR Statute, supra
note 176. For a comprehensive overview see: Payam Akhavan, ‘Justice and
Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda* 7 Duke J. of Comp. & Int'l L. 325.
196ICTR: Provisional Verbatim Record of the Security Council, supra note 193 at 308. The
Rwandese voted against acceptance for several reasons including: the desire to have
the rabonae temporis earlier than 1 January 1994; the integration of the Appeals
Chambers with that of the ICTY; the desire to have the ICTR focus exclusively on the
crime of genocide; the likelihood of the participation of judges selected from States that
took ‘a very active part in the civil war,” those condemned will be imprisoned outside of
Rwanda; that the Tribunal win not invoke the death penalty whereas it exists in Rwanda;
and finally that the seat of the Tribunal was not to be inside Rwanda.
197Ibid. at 305. The Chinese however were swayed not to vote against it.
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that a more solid legal basis should have been sought, but that the urgency of the
matter required immediate action.196 Brazil was concerned the Statute had not
been reviewed by a panel of jurists, representative of the main world legal
systems.

Consequentially there were important lacunae concerning the

relationship between the local courts and the Tribunal - what it referred to as
“concurrence of jurisdiction” between the Tribunal and the domestic courts.199
Such a critique is sound, for as we have seen, the wording of the Statutes is
confusing with regard to the relationships that exist between the tribunals and the
domestic courts.
The intention of the Secretary-General, in drafting the Statutes, was not to override
the domestic judicial systems but to encourage the “exercise of their jurisdiction in
accordance with their relevant national laws and procedures.’’200 With regard to
primacy, the Secretary-General stated:201
This concurrent jurisdiction, however, should be subject to the
primacy of the International Tribunal. At any stage o f the
procedure, the International Tribunal may formally request the
national courts to defer to the competence o f the International
Tribunal...

199Ibid. at 304. It repeated its concerns voiced previously over the ICTY.
199 Ibid. Brazil therefore did not give an overall endorsement to the approach. It also had
reservations about the Security Council carrying out activities not specifically prescribed
in the Charter of the United Nations. Ambassador Sardenberg stated at 303-304:
The authority of the Security Council is not selfconstituted. It originates from the
delegation of powers conferred upon it by the whole membership of the
Organization under Article 24(1) of the Charter. For that very reason, the
Council’s powers and responsibilities under the Charter should be strictly
construed, and cannot be created, recreated or reinterpreted by decisions of the
Council itself.
The Security Council is not a court or tribunal. It is an extension of the States that sit on
its seats, with a permanent representation by those States that were victorious in 1945.
It is not representative of the international community.
200 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993) U.N. Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993), supra note 185 at Paragraph
64.
201 Ibid. at Paragraph 65.
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The wording is substantially lower key than in the Statute,202 tempering primacy
with concurrent jurisdiction and "requests for deferral.”
The New Conceptualizations
A Regime o f Duality
While the usage of the terms ‘concurrent jurisdiction” and "primacy” are seemingly
contradictory, one must remember that they are used together to describe one
thing - the relationship between the tribunals and the domestic courts. Echoing
Professor Koskenniemi, one might assert that there is a false dialectic inherent in
"primacy” and "concurrent jurisdiction.’203 Neither captures the essence of the
relationship on its own and the Secretary-General’s subordination of one
(concurrent jurisdiction) to the other (primacy) still maintains the dichotomy. Yet
each represents aspects of the same abstraction, which together they are trying to
describe.

There is a duality.

Had the Statutes undergone scrutiny by legal

experts, these problems of expression might have been addressed.
The regime established for the tribunals is a novel one, but the statutes and the
Rules o f Procedure and Evidence have failed to capture their description. The
functionality has been fully expressed, but by resort to terms based upon a wholly
different abstraction of international law - the exclusive jurisdiction by domestic
courts. This became (and still is) a major source of confusion. New labels were
needed urgently. The Rome Statute is outstanding in this regard, for it introduces
a new vocabulary. The use of words such as "complementary,” "deferral* and
"admissibility” represent dimensions of the relationship, which are labels attached
to the functional aspects of ‘complementarity.'
202The wording in the Statute may reflect the influence of certain interest groups other than
States or organizations comprising States. For a list of those comments, which the
Secretary-General received, see ibid. at Paragraph 14. It is suggested that their
comments in particular may have resulted in a leaning of the Statute toward “primacy”
which in turn has overtones of a tribunal that is supranational in character.
203 Martti Koskenniemi, “Theory: Implications for the Practitioner,” in Philip Allot and
others, supra note 10 at 27.
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“Complementarity"
The word “complementarity’ (or in French, m
compl6mentarit6") appears nowhere in
the Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court or the Statutes of the
Tribunals, 204 yet it refers to the fundamental principle o f their essence of being.205
It does appear in the Rome Statute travaux preparatoires, but remains devoid of
any meaningful definition.206

The

Oxford English

Dictionary describes

complementarity through the metaphor of the duality o f lig h t207
A complementary relationship or situation; spec, in Physics, the
capacity o f the wave and particle theories o f light together to
204 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 1. A check of the entire text was carried out in
succession, using the word-searching feature of Word, Adobe Reader and Internet
Explorer.
205 John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity," in Lee, supra note 66 at 75. Its
importance is reflected by the fact that Holmes’ chapter appears right after the
introduction. Hans-Peter Kaul has called the concept the ‘dominating principle’ of the
relationship of the Court to the national jurisdiction (see: Hans-Peter Kaul, The
International Criminal Court: Jurisdiction, Trigger Mechanism and Relationship to
National Jurisdictions,’ in Mauro Pditi and Giuseppe Nesi, eds.. The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity (Aldershot: Dartmouth
Publishing Company Limited and Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001) at 59. Morten
Bergsmo describes complementarity as ’an essential quality of the Court’s jurisdictional
system.* (Bergsmo, ’ Preface,* in Otto Triflterer, supra note 171 at 15) Other authors
equate the concept as a ‘pillar” to the Court, trying to apply the three-pillar analogy of the
legal regime of the European Union. Sir Franklin Berman (see: Sir Franklin Berman,
‘The Relationship Between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council,” in
Herman A.M. von Hebei, supra note 206 at 173-178) attempts to apply such an analogy
suggesting that complementarity resides along with the idea of the most serious of
crimes of international concern and (rather unconvincingly) crimes that fall under the
subject matter of the Statute as being in the realm of customary law. This last category
seems problematic, since the crimes that fall within the subject matter of the Rome
Statute are generally conventional crimes defined in treaties already and redefined yet
again in the Rome Statute - which is also a treaty. They are conventional crimes
regardless of whether they are customary. Perhaps the other two pillars might be
territoriality/nationality bases of jurisdiction (Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 12)
and the referral mechanism of the Security Council (Rome Statute, ibid. note 2 at Article
13(b)).
206 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Volume 1, (Proceedings o f the Preparatory Committee During Marvh-April and
August 1996), UN GAOR, 51” Sess., Supp. No. 22, UN Doc. A/51/22 (1996) at 36-41,
reprinted in M.Cherif Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Documentary History (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1998) at 408412.
The use of travaux preparatoires in English common law is well accepted:
consider Pepper v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593 (H.L.).
207The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nded., s.v. ‘complementarity.”
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explain aH phenomena o f a certain type, although each separately
accounts for only some of the phenomena.
To determine what the term connotes, one must look at the root word,
“complementary.”
“Com plementary- The Root Word
The Oxford English Dictionary definition of “complementary” implies a conjunctive
relationship, where the two objects under comparison are mutually dependent
upon one another. If one were to consider the metaphor of geometry, the sum of
the complementary angles of a right-angled triangle, by definition, must add up to
90 degrees:208

x+y=90°

x+y>90°

x+y<90°

Figure 2 - Complementary Angles in a Right Triangle

The two angles (“x” and “y“) are mutually dependent or functions of one another.
Their sum must be 90 degrees otherwise a triangle is impossible (see Figure 2).

208

Ibid.
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u
A '= { x \ x e

A D x e U }

Figure 3 - Venn Diagram and Corresponding Algebraic Equation of the
Disjunctive Meaning for Complementary

In finite mathematics however, the complement of a set has a disjunctive meaning
too. For example, the complement of all pennies in a pocket of change (A at
Figure 3) would comprise the set of all other change, exclusive o f all pennies (A’ at
Figure 3).209 The complement of the set of all other change (exclusive of all
pennies) is the set of all pennies. The function works both ways - there is a bi
directional aspect to it Unlike the triangles’ example however, the two sets under
comparison are mutually exclusive.210 The term “complementary" connotes two
seemingly opposite, yet simultaneous meanings - mutual exclusivity and mutual
inclusivity (interdependence).

209 Curiously the disjunctive meaning is not present in the Oxford English Dictionary
definition of “complementary.’ For more on set theory, see at Margaret L. Lial, Raymond
N. GreenweH and Charles D. Miller, Finite Mathematics and Calculus with Applications,
5mEd. (Reading, MA, United States: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1998)
at 231 and 248.
210In other words the intersection of A and A’ is the empty set (which is what the equation
accompanying the Figure says) and their union is the universal set (U).
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Mapping these meanings onto the international legal jurisdiction equates to: a
complete separation of powers (disjunctive) or some sort of overlapping jurisdiction
or partnership (conjunctive).

Disjunctive complementarity may entail the

separation of powers (akin to federalism), mutual exclusivity of the international
and domestic jurisdictions, opposition and hostility. Yet the validity of the other
jurisdictions (including the national) is tolerated, provided that they remain limited
to their “spheres'' of influence. The relationship with conjunctivity is neutral. The
identification of “opposition” is typical of the parallelist approach,211 for example as
expressed by the former President of the International Criminal Court, Stephen
Schwebel:212
In so far as their jurisdiction does not duplicate that of pre-existing
courts, the creation o f specialized and regional international courts
is to be welcomed. It reflects the vitality and complexity of
international life. It evidences the understanding that the
effectiveness of international law can be increased by equipping
legal obligations with means of their determination and
enforcement.
Disjunction presupposes divisions of power that are distinct, independent and
mutually exclusive.

Opposition and hostility arise when one jurisdiction

“trespasses” into the other. The NATO SOFA agreements' provision of ‘ primary
right to exercise jurisdiction” by the receiving and sending States, also represents
2" Echoing Schabas, supra note 2 at 92 and Shane Spelliscy, ‘The Proliferation of
International Tribunals: A Chink in the Armor” (2001) 40 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 143.
212 Stephen Schwebel, supra note 47. Contrast this outlook to that of Judge SchwebeTs
successor to the American ICJ seat, Thomas Buergenthal (Thomas Buergenthal,
“Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad?" (2001) 14 LJIL
268 at 274), who has a much more conjunctive (rather than disjunctive) vision of the
interactions between proliferating international courts and tribunals:
...Here it is important for all international tribunals, the ICJ as well as the other
specialized and regional courts, to recognize that they are all part of the same legal
system and that this fact imposes certain obligations. Of these, the most basic one is
the obligation to accept the methodological and doctrinal unity o f the international
legal system. This means, among other things, that each tribunal has an obligation to
respect the general and special competence o f the other judicial and quasi-judicial
institutions which comprise the system, to recognize that H has an obligation, when
rendering judgements, to take account of the case-law and, most importantly, to
promote and be open to jurisprudential interaction or cross-fertilization.
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a separation of powers based on the type of offence committed, in what capacity
and by whom.213 It too, is a form of disjunction.
Primacy suggests an extreme disjunction, in the ordinary meaning o f the term. It
implies supremacy and therefore lacks conjunctivity. Primacy may however not be
reflective of the Tribunals per se, but rather of the binding nature of Security
Council decisions and its authority permeating through its subsidiary organs. In
the case of the Tribunals, the provisions of the Statutes referring to "concurrent
jurisdiction” appear to adopt the mostly conjunctive approach, but the provisions
referring to mandatory "primacy” give a distinct disjunctive or even anti-conjunctive
character.214 The ICTY and ICTR Rules o f Procedure and Evidence water down
the disjunctive character in favour of a more conjunctive one. Cooperation with the
domestic jurisdiction is im portant in the sharing of information,215 the execution of
warrants of arrest and the implementation of transfer orders for a witness.216
Nevertheless there remains a disjunctive element in that under the ne bis in idem
principle, the Tribunal may assert its primary right to exercise jurisdiction when:
213 Namely the target of the offence (or victim) being the sending State or its agents,
warranting the sending State to have primary right to exercise jurisdiction. NATO SOFA,
supra note 183 at Article Vll(3)(a). There may be a graduated scale in existence
between purely disjunctive and purely conjunctive, with examples falling somewhere
between these two extremes.
214 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 9. The term "concurrent” is also problematic.
The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. ”concurrent" defines this adjective in terms
of the running of parallel lines in space - a definite allusion to parallelism and the
separation of powers, reinforced by giving it a conflicting jurisdictional quality (definitions
A.1 and A.4). Yet at the same time it defines the term as ‘acting in conjunction;
cooperating; contributing to the same effect.” Thus “concurrent” as a word has a similar
double meaning, like "complementary” - disjunctive and conjunctive. Hans Kelsen even
had trouble with the description of the disjunctive and conjunctive and attempted to call
the conjunctive relationship "supplementary.” (see Kelsen, supra 16 at 80 and 84).
"Supplementary” is defined (The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v ‘supplementary^
as being an addition (implying disjunction) or a completion (implying conjunction) - thus
it is also as problematic.
213 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 8 and Rule 11bis(B)(ii)
- the flow may be bi-directional. Also ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 177 at Rules 8 through 13.
216 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 56 and ICTY Statute,
supra note 176 at Article 29.
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the act has been mischaracterized as an ordinary crime; there is evidence of a bad
faith prosecution (or lack thereof); or there are overriding reasons for the Tribunal
to deal with a case instead o f the domestic courts.217
The conjunctive definition o f complementarity is what is meant when one refers to
the concept in the context o f the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
The concept is clearly stated in the Preamble of the Rome Statute: “[ejmphasizing
that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions;"218 and in the first Article of the
Statute:219
An International Criminal Court (the Court’) is hereby established.
It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction
and functioning o f the Court shall be governed by the provisions of
this Statute.
The Tribunal term of mandatory “primacy" has been dropped, in favour of a power
to request the deferral of a case to the Tribunal. This is partly because the ICTY
and ICTR have the authority of a Security Council resolution behind them, rather
than an international convention (as in the case of the ICC). The tribunals are
more disjunctive than the ICC.

217 Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 185. See discussion earlier in chapter three
under heading of “Ne bis in idem.’
218 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Preamble. Contrast with ICTY Statute, supra note 176
at Article 9.
2,9 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 1.
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4 Complementarity

A -E C J
Ideal Cooperation
1
Slope approaches infinity
(Contemporaneous Engagement)

B -E C H R
C - ICTR Statute
D -IC T Y Statute
E - ICTR in Practice
F -IC T Y in Practice
G - ICC in Statute
H - Special Court for Sierra Leone
Supra-national
Disjunction

Federal
Disjunction

Disjunction
Conjunction
Exclusive Jurisdiction
Slope approaches
infinity

Primacy o f Jurisdiction

H?

Figure 4 - Complementarity as a Function of Conjunction

Figure 4 provides an illustration of the general solution to what could be a
continuum of complementarity with regard to international criminal law. One can
visualize the variety o f possible complementary relationships between the
international and domestic jurisdictions.
degree of conjunction.

The relationship is a function o f the

In an ideally conjunctive situation, the relationship

(represented by the curve) would approach an absolute limit of conjunction - full
cooperation, represented by the right-most asymptote. This is a particular solution
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to the curve. Similarly, where either the international or the domestic jurisdiction
would deny the existence o f the other - a form o f primacy or exclusivity of
jurisdiction - an absolute lim it o f disjunction would be approached, as shown by
the left-most asymptote. In the case of the middle-range, bounded on each side
by the supra-nationalist or federal relationship, a milder form of disjunction may be
present where the respective jurisdictions do not actively deny the other. An ideal
balance between disjunction and conjunction occurs at the point of inflexion of the
sigmoid (at the origin). A number of courts/tribunals have been plotted on the
curve taking into account their relative complementary characters.220
“Deferral’
The system of “deferral’ represents how the ICC w ill implement complementarity
procedurally.

By contrasting the procedures of the ICTY and the ICC, it will

become evident just how discretionary powers are lim ited and regulated in both. In
the case of the ICC the regulation is more sophisticated and more comprehensive.
When it appears to the ICTY Prosecutor that any one of the conditions for the
three-pronged ne bis in idem test is met,221 she may propose to the Trial Chamber
that a formal request be made to the domestic court to defer a case to the
Tribunal.222 If it decides such action is appropriate, the Trial Chamber may in turn
formally request deferral from the State concerned.223 A state’s non-compliance

The European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have similarly
been plotted, but not actually on the curve. This is because they are not normally
considered to be international criminal courts. Both incorporate primacy of law
applicable to their respective member states. Consider Luzius Wlldhaber, supra note 13
at 50 and Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, supra note 86. Primacy is actually contained as a
stipulation within the relevant treaties and so interpreted by the respective courts.
221Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 185 and accompanying discussion.
222ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 9.
223Ibid. at Rule 10 but especially at Rule 10(A).
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after a period of 60 days from the form al request, may result in the Trial Chamber
requesting the President to report the matter to the Security Council.224
There is a fair amount of judicial discretion permitted to the Prosecutor, Trial
Chamber and President of the Tribunal. 225 Although there is no hierarchy of courts
(they are equals), the ne bis in idem principle and associated tests represent a
form of incentive on the part of the relevant domestic courts to ensure that crimes
are property categorized as international when appropriate and that the
prosecution of alleged offenders is carried out in good faith.
In the case of the Rome Statute, there is a stronger leaning toward the ideal
conjunctive lim it Neither ‘‘primacy’' nor “concurrent jurisdiction* is mentioned at all
in the document226 While the mechanism of the Court “asserting” its jurisdiction is
sim ilar to that of the Tribunals, it is nevertheless different due to the incorporation
of “checks and balances* to the discretionary powers allocated to the organs of the
Court.227 Relative to the tribunals, the level of conjunction in the regime of
complementarity is much higher.226

224Ibid. at Rule 11.
225 Recall that the Prosecutor is effectively a judge ^instruction - and therefore has a
judicial quality in the hybrid character between civil and common law. See William
Schabas, supra note 32 at 287-307. The use of “Tribunal” refers to either the ICTY or
ICTR or both in a general sense.
226Verified through the use of a word search of the document.
227Philippe Kirsch, supra note 45 at xvii.
226 This is probably the difference between the tribunals and the International Criminal
Court that Philippe Kirsch alluded to in his recent publication in the McGill Law Journal
(“which have priority jurisdiction over domestic systems'): Philippe Kirsch, Q.C., Valerie
OostervekJ, ‘ Negotiating an Institution for the Twenty-First Century: Multilateral
Diplomacy and the International Criminal Court,” (2001) 46 McGill L.J. 1141 at 1159.
Note that as mentioned in Chapter Two, the nationality and territorial principles are very
well established in international law. Universality is not a basis of jurisdiction in the
Rome Statute for the Court

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77
State consent to the Court’s jurisdiction exists in the act o f becoming a Party to the
Rome Statute.239 Jurisdiction may be exercised in a case provided that there
exists a link to a State Party based on the territoriality principle or the nationality
principle.230 This is unlike the case of the ICTY and ICTR where consent derives
from the United Nations Charter and the 'absolute' obligations to comply with
Security Council Resolutions. The absolutist approach has its problems. Only in
1995 did the former Yugoslavia formally accede to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
through the Dayton Accords.231 Rwanda voted against the establishment of the
ICTR and there remain tensions between the two jurisdictions.232
229 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 12(1) but also note Article 120 prohibiting
reservations.
230Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 12(2). Consider. B. Brown supra note 179 at 392 and the
discussion in Chapter 2 of the Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. Territoriality and
nationality are the most accepted bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction by States. That
said, some commentators have suggested that the delegation of territorial and
nationality principles to an international court may not necessarily be in conformity with
international law (see: Madeline Morris, supra note 43 at 44). Michael P. Sharf refutes
this assertion from the standpoint of public international law (along with most of
Professor Morris’ arguments) in Michael P. Sharf, supra note 43 at 99-114 especially.
The roots of one of the major objections of the United States can be found in this issue the possibility that American nationals (citizens of a non-State Party) could conceivably
be brought before the Court. For American points of opposition, see: Marc Grossman,
‘American Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court: Remarks to the Center
for Strategic and International Studies* (Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, D.C., 6 May 2002), online: United States Department of State
<http://www.state.gov/>(date accessed: 6 May 2002).
231 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Croatia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
14 December 1995, 351.L.M. 75 [hereinafter the Dayton Peace Agreement at Article IX.
For an overview of the provisions see: Paola Gaeta, 'The Dayton Agreements and
International Law” (1996) 7 E.J.I.L. 147. The entire issue, of this particular journal, is
devoted to a discussion on the Dayton Agreements by various other authors.
232 Consider ICTR, ‘Statement by the Registrar on the Response of the Government of
Rwanda to the Proposal to Establish a Joint Commission to Investigate the Allegations
of Mistreatment of Witnesses Coming from Rwanda,” supra note 179. There is a curious
report that the ICTR will now allow the domestic courts to try accused individuals. There
are suggestions that this too may have been a result of pressure applied on the ICTR by
the Rwandese government. The ICTR web site does not reflect any such changes to
the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence as claimed (addition of an Article 10brs). If
the report is true, then this could amount to a major shift of the complementary
relationship established under the ICTR Statute in favour of a more conjunctive
relationship in line with the Rome Statute. See: ‘Plenary Changes Allow National
Jurisdictions to Try Suspects,” Hirondelle News Agency (8 July 2002), online:
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200207100442.html> (date accessed: 13 July 2002).
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■Adm issibility”
The term "adm issibility” refers to how the Court arrives at the decision as to
whether a case should be considered, following either initiation by the Prosecutor
or approval o f such initiation by the Pre-Trial Chambers. There are two tests that
require application in the Rome Statute: one called "ne bis in idem” and one called
‘ unwillingness and inability.” Should these tests succeed then the case may be
admissible.
IC C "Ne bis in idem”
The ne bis in idem test only applies in determining if a case is inadmissible
where:233
The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is
the subject o f the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not
permitted under article 20, paragraph 3.
The wording o f Article 20 of the Rome Statute describes a slightly modified version
of ne bis in idem over the previous variation in the ICTY Statute:23*
1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried
before the Court with respect to conduct which formed the
basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or
acquitted by the Court.
2. No person shall be tried before another court for a crime
referred to in article 5 for which that person has already
been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct
also proscribed under articles 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the
Court with respect to the same conduct unless the
proceedings in the other court:

233 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17(1 )(c). Remembering that there is a
presumption that the State is always considered having investigated/prosecuted
properly, unless evidence to the contrary can be proven.
Ibid. at Article 20.
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a. Were for the purpose o f shielding the person
concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
b. Otherwise were not conducted independently or
impartially in accordance with the norms o f due
process recognized by international law and were
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances,
was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice.
The first paragraph establishes the prohibition of trying an accused, if previously
convicted or acquitted by the ICC, for the same crime again by the ICC. The
second paragraph establishes the prohibition of trying an accused by another
court if previously convicted or acquitted by the ICC for the same crime. This
second paragraph seems to include other international tribunals in addition to
domestic courts.235 The third paragraph amounts to a test of abuse of process or a
bad faith legal investigation/prosecution in the other court (domestic or
international).

If such evidence exists, then the double jeopardy rule may be

overridden.
The wording of the rule and its placement in the Rome Statute is curious. It is
placed under the section heading “Part 2 -

Jurisdiction, Admissibility and

Applicable Law” rather than in “Part 3 General Principles of Criminal Law.” This
suggests that rather than being a general principle o f criminal law upon which the
accused may rely, it is a ground for challenging the admissibility of a case,
primarily by a State.236 This seems to be supported by the explicit referral to Article

235Could this amount to a restriction imposed on the ICTY Statute’s version of non-bis-inidem, where only national courts and the International Tribunal are mentioned? (ICTY
Statute, supra note 176 at Article 10) It is certainly wider than the corresponding
provision in the ICTY Statute.
236 If one looks at Article 19(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, supra note 2, it becomes apparent
that a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case can only be
launched by the accused for whom a warrant of arrest or summons to appear has been
issued under Article 58. If no such warrant or summons has been issued, she cannot
challenge the admissibility of a case at all - although the certain States may (Article
19(1 )(b) and (c).
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20(3) in the provisions concerning issues of adm issibility.237 Thus the context of
the ne bis in idem rule is being changed yet again, to something entirely different
to what it meant in the context of the ICTY. Confusingly it still has the same label
as both double jeopardy as a general principle of crim inal law and within the ICTY
context. The ne bis in idem now refers to three different legal concepts in three
different legal contexts.
Unwillingness and Inability Test
The ne bis in idem test for admissibility of case coexists with a second test,
“unwillingness and inability.” There are only two scenarios where it can be applied
in an issue of admissibility:238
a. The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or
unable genuinely to cany out the investigation or
prosecution;
b. The case has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to
prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State
genuinely to prosecute;
There exists the presumption that the State is carrying out its duties to investigate
or prosecute (or not to prosecute) properly, unless evidence to the contrary exists.
Unwillingness is determined by evidence of shielding an accused, unjustifiably
delaying proceedings or carrying out proceedings that lack independence or
impartiality.239 Thus evidence of a lack of good faith or an abuse of process is
crucial in determining unwillingness. In the case o f inability, the condition of the

237Rome Statute, supra note 2 at 17(1)(c).
238Ibid. at Article 17(1)(a) and Article 17(1)(b)
239Ibid. at Article 17(2).
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domestic legal system is to be considered.240 Thus inability may be indicated by a
“substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system."241
Both the ne bis in idem test and the unwillingness and inability test presume that
the State is disposing of or has disposed of a situation in fu ll propriety. Both tests
are used in the Rome Statute to establish how the Court determines if a case is
admissible - those exceptional cases where the State has not disposed of a
situation in full propriety. While ne bis in idem still protects the individual from
double jeopardy, it is also being used primarily as grounds for a State to raise an
issue of admissibility. This is in stark contrast to the ICTY, where the it could
request deferral even if the State prosecuted in propriety and if a crime had been
mischaracterized as an ordinary crime or if significant factual or legal questions
existed which required the case to be brought within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
While the State is not on trial in the jurisdiction of the ICC, there exists almost a
presumption o f innocence on its part This may be what Arbour and Bergsmo,
mean (although they still use the word "primacy"):242
The jurisdictional primacy of the ad hoc Tribunals has been
reversed: the ICC may only supplement national criminal justice
systems when there is inadequate domestic will o r inability to
prosecute.
Through this "reversal,” the ICC takes on a substantially more conjunctive
character than do the Iwo tribunals.

Regulation of Prosecutorial Discretion
The regulation of prosecutorial discretionary powers in the Rome Statute
represents reinforcement to the underlying concept o f complementarity.

240Ibid. at Article 17(3).
241 Ibid.
242Arbour and Bergsmo, supra note 179 at 130.
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International Criminal Court may initiate proceedings concerning a "situation,” upon
the actions o f three different players - a procedure, labelled as “referrals:”243
1. When an allegation is made by a State Party to the Prosecutor;
2. When an allegation is made by the Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter, to the Prosecutor; and
3. When the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation of her own accord
(proprio motu).
The third condition may be indicative of an enormous discretionary power invested
in the Prosecutor of the C ourt although to be fair there is also power vested in the
States Parties and the Security Council. In the travaux preparatoires o f the Rome
Statute, it was observed that the discretionary power of the Prosecutor was
essential in order to ensure an independent and credible C ourt244 There were
other negotiators however who considered that the discretionary powers of the
Prosecutor

had

the

potential

to

undermine

the

intended

regime

of

complementarity.245

It was unrealistic to dismiss the pressure of States,

organizations and

individuals seeking an investigation, prosecution, or the

refraining from any such process.246 There was the fear of an:247
...overzeatous or politically motivated prosecutor targeting, unfairly
or in bad faith, highly sensitive political situations. Sometimes
feared as a ‘tone ranger running wild’ around the world with
excessive
powers, the independent Prosecutor was also
243Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 13.
244 Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, "The Role of the International Prosecutor” in Roy S.
Lee, supra note 66 at 177. Gurmendi refers to Report o f the Preparatory Committee on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Volume I, reprinted in Bassiouni,
supra note 45 at Paragraphs 149-151.
245Report o f the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, ibid. at Paragraph 156.
246Fernandez de Gurmendi, supra note 246 at 181.
247Ibid.
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sometimes depicted in the discussions as an overwhelmed man or
woman, constrained by limited human and financial resources but
overloaded with information provided daily to him or her by
thousands o f victims and organizations from all over the world.
Unable to deal with every complaint, he or she would have to
decide on priorities, which would inevitably result in disappointment
and challenges to his or her decisions...
A tension exists between the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the
conjunctive concept of complementarity.
The problem is not a unique one.

The Prosecutor of the ICTY initiated an

indictment of President S. Milosevic in 1999 at the height of the conflict between
NATO and Serbia over Kosovo.24* The comments made by the British Foreign
Secretary illustrate the unenthusiastic reaction to the indictm ent249
The International Tribunal is an independent court set up on the
authority o f the United Nations. Their decision to indict Milosevic as
a war criminal must command respect because it is their
independent judgement free o f any political interference.
Throughout this conflict I have repeatedly brought into the public
arena the scale of the brutality and evil which we are fighting in
Kosovo. I have highlighted the massacre o f unarmed men, the rape
of defenceless women, and the violent ethnic cleansing of a whole
people. It is right that those who ordered these crimes should be
brought to account...
But NATO must have channels to the authority in Belgrade that has
the power to implement its objectives. So long as Milosevic retains
that power in Belgrade it would be irresponsible of us not to talk to
him about the implementation of our objectives in Kosovo.

248Prosecutor v. S. Milosevic and others, IT-02-54, Indictment, 22 May 1999, online: ICTY
web site <http://Www.un.org/icty/indictinent/english/miMi990524e.htm> (date accessed:
30 December 2001).
249 ‘Cook’s Response to Indictment of President Milosevic,’ Statement by the Foreign
Secretary Robin Cook London 27 May 1999 Foreign and Commonwealth Office <
http://Www.fco.gov.uk/ >(date accessed: 8 May 2002). The Secretary-General described
the indictment as ‘complicating the peace process.’ See: ‘United Nations Daily
Highlights, 99-05-28” online: Hellenic Resources Network < http://www.hri.org/news/
>(date accessed: 8 May 2002).
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At the time, NATO was on the verge of mobilizing its armed forces for a sustained
ground-based intervention in the Province.250 The indictment of the President
Milosevic could easily have sabotaged diplomatic efforts to end the war.
Louise Arbour, the Prosecutor at the time, has stood by her decision and considers
it to have been one “driven purely by a juristic prima facie case and evidence” and
not by political considerations.251 She considers her decision to have been
supported by the Security Council; and if it had disapproved, it could have changed
her mandate or revoked her appointment at any time.252 She has conceded
however that there was a political aspect to her role as Prosecutor and that toward
the end of her term, a new position for a political advisor was established.253
To accommodate the tension between the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and
the complementary

relationship between the

international and domestic

jurisdictions, the Rome Statute incorporates various mechanisms. In the words of
Philippe Kirsch, there exists a system of “checks and balances.”254 The phrase is
230 From the author’s own experience, the British Territorial Army (Royal Army Medical
Corps) was within four days of receiving mobilization orders in May 1999.
231 Louise Arbour, supra note 34.
232 Ibid. Article 16(2) of the ICTY Statute, supra note 176 sets forth the Prosecutor as an
independent organ of the Tribunal and that her office does not receive instructions from
any source - including the Security Council. The only “hold” that the Security Council
has is through the Secretary-General on the reappointment of the Prosecutor (at Article
16(4)). There are no provisions for her removal either in the Statute or the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. It is submitted that the only sanction available to the Security
Council was in fact exercised against Judge Arbour. There is a hint of this in a recent
report in The National Post, which suggests that her appointment as Prosecutor of the
ICTY was “cut short”; Janice Tibbetts, ‘Arbour Resists War Court Bid: A Canadian Seat
on the 18-Member International Criminal Court is Considered a Sure Bet - Likes Busy
Supreme Court” The National Post (5 July 2002), online:
National Post <
http://www.nationalpost.com/>(date accessed: 5 July 2002). Could Louise Arbour have
been a ‘lone ranger running wild?”
233Louise Arbour, supra note 34.
234 Kirsch, supra note 45. One might contrast this view with the official American
opposition, Marc Grossman, supra note 231. Also contrast with: Alfred P. Rubin, ‘The
International Criminal Court: Possibilities for Prosecutorial Abuse,” (2001) 64 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 153; and John Bolton, ‘The Risks and Weaknesses of the International
Court from America’s Perspective,” (2001) 64 Law & Contemp. Probs. 167. It should be
noted that John Bolton is the Under Secretary, Arms Control and International Security
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problematic, fo r it evokes images of federalism.

The phrase is probably an

inappropriate description o f a safeguard mechanism in a system that cannot be
analogized exactly with a domestic legal system.

Instead, terms such as

“discretional diversity” and ‘ controlled discretionary measures* might be preferred.
“Discretional diversity” describes the manner in which discretionary power has
been allocated to many different toe/, as a means of avoiding its concentration and
hence it potential as a threat to the regime of complementarity - namely the
danger of centralization.255
Discretionary Diversity
Summary o f the Procedure fo r the Processing o f a Case (Post-Referral)
Following the referral, if the Prosecutor concludes that a prima facie case exists,
she shall submit a request to authorize an investigation to the Pre-Trial Chamber,
with supporting materials.256 She may consider the evidence provided by the PreTrial Chamber, including evidence provided by victims. Provided that there is a
prima facie case within the Court’s jurisdiction, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall
authorize the start of an investigation.257 The remaining roles of the Pre-Trial
Chamber are administrative - such as appointing counsel and the issuing of arrest
warrants.258

Upon deciding that a prima facie case exists, the charges are

confirmed and the President shall constitute a Trial Chamber.259 There exists a

and therefore voices the views of the Bush administration. Rubin has ties to the
Heritage Foundation (see Casey and Rivkin, supra note 42), an “NGO” dosely aligned
with the Bush administration. This raises a question of whether an NGO such as the
Heritage Foundation really is an NGO or simply another manifestation of the government
executive outside of the constraints of government - bordering very dose to the
‘shadow State.”
255See the next Chapter for the concentration of discretionary powers and how it ultimately
leads to a centralizing tendency.
236Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 15(3).
257 Ibid. at Article 15(4). This is without prejudice to a subsequent determination with
regard to the ‘jurisdiction and admissibility of a case.*
258Ibid. at Article 57.
259Ibid. at Article 61 (10) and 61 (11).
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general obligation of cooperation by all States Parties.260 In the event of a State
Paity failing to cooperate and thereby hindering the Court from performing its
statutory functions, the Court has a discretionary power to refer the matter to the
Assembly of States Parties or to the Security Council (where a case had been
referred by the Security Council to the Court).261
Internal Regulation o f Discretionary Powers o f the Prosecutor
Prosecutorial discretion is heavily regulated in the initial stages of a case.262 When
a case has been referred to the Court and the Prosecutor believes that there is a
reasonable basis to proceed or if the Prosecutor initiates an investigation o f her
own accord; she is obligated to notify all States Parties and those States, which
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes at issue.263 She has a
discretionary power to limit the "scope* of information provided that she believes it
is necessary to protect persons, prevent destruction of evidence or prevent the
flight of persons.264 There exist sim ilar provisions in Rules o f Procedure and
Evidence for the Tribunals, although rather than being a discretionary power o f the
Prosecutor, such non-disclosure is only permitted in exceptional circumstances
and must be approved by a Judge or Trial Chamber in consultation with the
Prosecutor.265 Such limitations on prosecutorial discretion, in the Rome Statute,
constitute a reinforcement of complementarity, as they incorporate a role fo r the
States Parties.

260Ibid. at Article 86.
261 Ibid. at Article 87(7).
262 Fernandez de Gurmendi, supra note 246 at 180 notes the use of ‘situation* in place of
"case” for Article 13 and 14 of the Rome Statute, supra note 2. She suggests that the
drafters at he 1996 Preparatory Committee feared that if "case” were used this could
lead to the politicization of the complaint procedure.
263 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 18(1). "Those States” might not necessarily be
States Parties.
264Ibid.
265For example: ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure, supra note 177 at Rule 53.
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The Prosecutor has not been entirely stripped of discretionary powers. When
deciding to initiate an investigation, she is required to consider whether a
"reasonable belief may be established to suggest that a core crime has been
committed.266 She must consider if the case is admissible under the Statute.267
She is required to consider, in addition to the seriousness of the allegation and the
interests o f victims, whether "there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe
that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice."266 If her discretionary
powers are exercised in this last manner to not proceed with an investigation, she
is required to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.269 If she decides: that there is
insufficient basis to issue a summons or warrant, that the case is inadmissible, or
that a prosecution is not ‘ in the interests of justice;" she is obliged to inform both
the Pre-Trial Chamber and the referring party.270 The Pre-Trial Chamber has a
power to review a prosecutorial decision not to proceed at the request of a
referring party.271 The Pre-Trial Chamber also possesses a power to review a

266Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 53(1)(a)
267Ibid. at Article 53(1 Kb) referring to Article 17 (Issues of Admissibility).
261 Ibid. at Article 53(1)(c ). This point is addressed by Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, supra note
179 at 75. She argues that "in the interests of justice’ stipulates sufficient discretionary
power not to prosecute, to allow the toleration of truth and reconciliation commissions.
This subject will be considered in greater detail in chapter five. Arsanjani considers the
granting of an amnesty to be a political act, not a judicial one. Her argument is premised
upon a court that performs only a judicial function. It will be argued that the ICC has
been designed as a court that fulfils not only a judicial function but an executive role
(through the States Parties, the Security council and the Prosecutor) but also a
legislative role (through the Assembly of States Parties). The relationship between all of
these different entities simultaneous seized of interests in the same domains of power
(or discretion) represents a more sophisticated form of complementarity based on these
three focal points (judiciary, legislature and executive). This may be the system of
checks and balances that Philippe Kirsch alluded to earlier - not between the ICC and
domestic jurisdictions, but between all interested parties having concurrent interests in
each of these focal points.
269Ibid.
270 By referring party, one means the State or the Security Council as appropriate. See
Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 15(2).
271 Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 15(3Ka). The Pre-Trial Chamber may request the
Prosecutor to reconsider a decision. Note that the Office of the Prosecutor remains
independent from the Chambers.
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prosecutorial decision not to prosecute that is based "solely” on her discretionary
power.272
Prosecutorial discretion, especially to drop a case, is subject to qualifications that
do not exist for the two Tribunals. The Rome Statute ensures that the exercise of
discretion is transparent subject to mandatory notification of the referring party
and scrutinized to some degree by the Pre-Trial Chamber and States Parties. The
consequence o f such qualification is to shift the conjunctive character of the
International Criminal Court far to the right of the complementarity curve described
at Figure 4 (above at page 74).273 In a more practical way, the potential for abuse
(intentional or innocent) either by the Prosecutor or the assertion o f external
pressure on her, is minimized.274 The entire system of checks, reflects the hybrid
nature of the Court between: a civil law system, where prosecutorial discretion is
generally limited and a duty to prosecute exists: and the common law system,
where discretion is wide and a duty to prosecute is not nearly as absolute.275

272Ibid. at Article 15(3)(b)
273 In all fairness, there is a limit to this view of the International Criminal Court. Without
the presence of a domestic jurisdiction, one is only looking at "half of the picture.”
274Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, supra note 246 at 181-184.
273 Schabas, supra note 32. Also consider Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice in
Europe and America (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1976) at 16-60, which
provides an overview of the situation vis-a-vis the German prosecutor. While the ICC
Prosecutor may be heavily controlled under the Rome Statute, there is still a certain
degree of discretion possible with regard to prosecution on the part of the State particularly for less serious crimes. Davis notes that this is the case in Germany too.
One might also consider William T. Pizzi and Luca Marafioti, "The New Italian code of
Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil
Law Foundation” (1992) 17 Yale J. of InfI. L. 1-40. Pizzi describes the origins of the lack
of discretionary power vested in the Prosecutor due to the lessons of arbitrary
prosecutions under the fascists. This rigidity is common to civil law systems where there
exists a distrust of the judiciary - probably a result of their suspected complicity with the
ancien regime after the French Revolution. Thus plea-bargaining (marchandage in
Rwanda) is normally considered to be abhorrent in the dvfl law system. Consider
Damaska who sees the tension between common law and civil law as "centrifugal
decision making” and ‘centripetal striving” - the latter, which allows fix a case by case
approach (contextual?). Mirjan Damaska, “Structures of Authority and Comparative
Criminal Procedure” (1975) 84 Yale L.J. 480. It may be interesting to note that while
Schabas, supra note 32 argues that a civil law system and inquisitorial approach is best
for an international criminal court due to the likelihood of intransigence by one of the
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W ithin one month after notification by the Court to the State concerned, that State
may inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated the nationals with
respect to the core crimes alleged.276 The State may request that the Prosecutor
defer the case to the State, which she is compelled to do unless the Pre-Trial
Chamber (on application by her) authorizes an investigation.277 Deferral to the
State can be reviewed by the Prosecutor six months later or at any time if there
has been a significant change resulting in a State’s “unwillingness or inability
genuinely to carry out the investigation.”278 The State or the Prosecutor may
appeal to the Appeals Chamber against a ruling by the Pre-Trial Chamber.279
Thus the system of discretionary negotiation built into the Tribunals has been
removed from the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and formalized
into a system where: the State has primary right to exercise jurisdiction; with
checks by the Prosecutor to ensure that the State is investigating/prosecuting in
good faith; and counter-checks for the State to challenge an overly zealous
Prosecutor - eventually involving the Appeals Chamber (judges) in the event of
irreconcilable conflict This is not concurrent jurisdiction as described in the NATO
SOFAs. The regulation of prosecutorial discretion by the Pre-Trial and Appeal
Chambers reinforces the complementarity between the jurisdiction of the ICC and
the domestic courts.

Ultimately what powers the Prosecutor can exercise are

parties and therefore the impossibility of a folly functional adversarial system.
Notwithstanding that the tribunals and the ICC represent mixed systems (inquisitorial
and adversarial), it is curious to note that the last effective war crimes court in the United
Kingdom was also a dvit law jurisdiction - the Curia MarescaHi or High Court of Chivalry
under James I. While largely a court of honour, its origins stem from the Court of the
Lord High Constable and Earl Marshall of England (see: J.H. Baker, An Introduction to
English Legal History (London: Butterworths, 1990) at 141-142; and especially Maurice
Keen, The Laws o f War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge and K. Paul,
1965)).
276Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 18(2). The Core Crimes are contained in Article 5
of the Statute.
277Ibid.
278Ibid. at Article 18(3).
279Ibid. at Article 18(4).
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overseen by both the judiciary o f the Court and by the States themselves, involved
in the case.2”
External Regulation o f Discretionary Powers o f the Prosecutor
State Challenge to Adm issibility
The Court is required to satisfy itself of the admissibility o f a case in accordance
with the Statute.281 The following entities may challenge the admissibility of a case
or the jurisdiction of the Court:282
1. An accused or person for whom an arrest warrant or summons to appear
has been issued;
2. A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the grounds that it is
investigating or prosecuting the case or already has done so; and
3. A State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required (i.e. a non-State
Party to the Statute).
The right of the accused to challenge admissibility is only to when the Court, under
Article 58 of the Statute, has issued a warrant for arrest or a summons to appear.
This means that an individual cannot challenge an investigation, until it has been
completed. The right of the accused always takes second place to the right of the
State in issues of admissibility.
The right of a State to challenge admissibility is an extremely innovative step in the
Rome Statute', there is nothing like it in the governing instruments of the tribunals.

280 In a struggle between the ICC and a State, the “winner* would depend on just how far
either objected. Ultimately, the State could cany the issue all the way to the Assembly
of States Parties or the Security Council (depending upon who referred the case to the
ICC) for a decision. In this manner what is considered to be a legal issue could be
deferred to the Security Council (or Assembly) for consideration as a political issue.
281Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 19(1). Admissibility criteria are at Article 17.
282Ibid. at Article 19(2).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91
It can be made only once283 and when made, requires the Prosecutor to suspend
provisionally the investigation.284 The Prosecutor may however seek a Court order
to continue the investigation, collect evidence and testimony, and prevent the flight
of those for whom an arrest warrant has already been requested (in cooperation
with the State(s) concerned).285 The challenge can only be made prior to or at the
start of the trial.286 If the challenge is successful, the Prosecutor may submit a
request fo r review of the decision, if convinced that new facts have arisen that
have rendered the earlier decision per incuriam.2*7
The provisions governing

issues of admissibility

and State challenges,

demonstrate both the disjunctive and conjunctive natures of the Court

The

provision for challenge to admissibility amounts to a provision for questioning
whether the test for unwillingness and inability to investigate or prosecute has
been satisfied. It also provides an opportunity for a State to challenge evidence of
a bad faith prosecution or abuse of process under the ne bis in idem provisions
contained at Article 20 of the Rome Statute. It allows a State to respond to the
charges made against it by the Prosecutor or Pre-Trial Chambers. The challenge
cannot be made before the regular Chambers, once the case is underway. In this
way the regular Chambers are isolated from what might be a moral or political
question, thus protecting the impartiality of Court’s judiciary. The Prosecutor and
to some degree, the Pre-Trial Chambers are not so insulated.
Deferral Powers o f the Security Council
The Security Council may act through a Resolution adopted under Chapter VII of
the Charter ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,

283Ibid.
284Ibid.
285Ibid.
286Ibid.
287Ibid.

at Article 19(4).
at Article 19(7).
at Article 19(8).
at Article 19(4).
at Article 19(10).
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and Acts of Aggression”) to request that the Court “defer” an investigation or
prosecution either impending or ongoing.288 The Court must comply. While the
deferral may only last for a period of 12 months, the Security Council may request
the Court to continue the deferral under another Resolution adopted in the same
circumstances.289 This provision was severely criticized in the negotiations leading
to the Rome Statute - particularly by India, who thought that the power of the
Security Council to block prosecutions was a blemish on the independence and
impartiality of the C ourt290 The deferral power of the Security Council amounts to
an additional check on the discretionary powers o f the Prosecutor (and on the
judges) - not so much on her discontinuance of a case, but rather her prosecution
of one. The provision would likely address a situation such as that described
above, with the “apolitical” indictment by ICTY Prosecutor Judge Louise Arbour of
President Milosevic, in the midst of the Kosovo conflict in 1999. There may be
very good reasons not to prosecute immediately, even if there is sufficient
evidence to initiate a case. The Rome Statute states that the reason would have
to be a Chapter VII issue adopted by the Security Council with unanimity. The ICC
and the Security Council could be said to exercise a form of concurrent jurisdiction,
if that is possible between a judicial and non-judicial (legislative/executive) body.
The Security Council does not exercise the ICC's jurisdiction, but rather exercises
its own jurisdiction in matters of aggression and threats to the peace. This is why
their respective jurisdictions remain distinct The Security Council only exercises
jurisdiction when a State is prepared to maintain that a potential prosecution
should not occur, because it may threaten both its and the community o f States’
2“ Ibid. at Article 16. Note the use of terminology to imply mutual admiration and equality
pari passu of the two bodies.
289Schabas, supra note 2 at 65. This is known as the ‘Singapore compromise.”
290Ibid. at 66 citing Lionel Yee, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Security Council:
Articles 13(b) and 16’ in Lee The International Criminal Court, supra note 66 at 143-152;
and Dilip Lahiri, supra note 42. Mr. Lahiri felt that the power amounted to the ability of
certain members of the Security Council, who refused to ratify the Rome Statute, to be
able to invoke it without having to be obligated by it. His remarks were probably directed
at the United States and China in particular.
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peace and security. In such a case the jurisdiction of the ICC can be deferred to
the jurisdiction of the Security Council. Thus the ICC has a form of primary right to
exercise of jurisdiction.

Another way of describing this concurrent jurisdiction

would be to suggest that the rule of law has primary jurisdiction unless there are
substantial reasons for a "political” pre-emption to apply.
Judiciary and Assembly o f States Parties
Generally the judiciary and Assembly of States Parties only become involved in
instances of impropriety on the part of a judge, the Registrar, the Prosecutor or
their subordinates.

The Presidency of the Court w ill receive all complaints of

"serious breaches of duty” and "misconduct of a less serious nature.”291 In the
case of a judge, the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar, removal from office must be
put to a vote at a plenary session.292 In the case of the Deputy Prosecutor, the
Prosecutor is charged to notify the President of the Bureau of the Assembly of
States Parties in writing of any decision made by her.293 In the case of the
Prosecutor, the complaint would be received by the President of the Court and
transmitted to the President of the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties; it
would be up to the Bureau to decide any disciplinary measure in absolute
majority.294
The Rome Statute does not allow the Assembly of States Parties to interfere in the
operations of the Court. It can however establish subsidiary bodies including an
oversights commission. These bodies are for enhancement of the efficiency and
291 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 2 at Rule 24 for "serious breach of
duty;’ Rule 25 for "misconduct of a less serious nature;” and Rule 26(2) for the Receipt
of Complaints.
292 Ibid. at Rule 29(1) and (2). The plenary session is composed of the judges from the
Chambers Division, chaired by the President of the Court. The plenary is an
administrative body that has the power to propose amendments to the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (to the Assembly of States Parties) in absolute majority and
also the power to amend the Regulations of Court (which do not yet exist). Rome
Statute, supra note 2 at Articles 51 and 52.
293ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ibid., at Rule 29(3).
294Ibid. at Rule 30(2).
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economy of the Court - not to review the discretionary powers o f the Prosecutor or
judges.295 The Assembly of States Parties also has the power to amend the Rules
o f Procedure of Evidence and the Rome Statute itself.296 While not specifically
targeting the discretionary powers of the Prosecutor, such powers allow the
Assembly to react to any arbitrary decisions that may amount to financial
irregularity. They also allow it to amend the governing documents of the Court to
further curtail any

excessive

discretionary

powers that

undermine the

complementary relationship between the Court and domestic jurisdiction.

It must

be remembered however that the Assembly w ill not actually possess this effective
amending power until 2009 although it is now in its early stages of operation.297
There exists a temporary legislative deficit
The Role o f NGOs
In chapter two the concept o f reflexive law was discussed. While some groups
have taken advantage of the concept to advocate a more participatory form of
democratic interaction to counter the centralizing and undemocratic nature of the
regulatory State, others have exploited it to reinforce their positions, enhance the
efficiency of transnational organized crime, and undermine the authority of the
State. It is possible to consider these groups as NGOs, but they are oriented
toward undermining or even usurping the power of the State for their own criminal
or non-criminal ends. One must distinguish these malevolent “NGOs’’ from benign
NGOs that operate to reinforce the efficacy of the State in all o f its manifestations
(judiciary, executive and legislature). Rather than usurping the State, they tend to
295Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 112(4).
296Ibid. at Articles 51 and 121 respectively.
297 Ibid. at Articles 5(2), 121 and 123. By the same token the Assembly could alter the
Court’s mandate or even the subject matter. Under Article 121 for instance, at the first
Review Conference, it will decide upon a definition for aggression and whether nuclear
weapons use is also a crime (see chapter six). The Assembly therefore could expand
the Court’s jurisdiction and powers of the Prosecutor. Generally the Assembly is an
institution that parallels the Security Council. It only becomes directly involved in an
instance of non-compliance by a State or misbehaviour within the Court by a judge or
the Prosecutor.
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work within its confines, to perform either a monitoring function or a
representational function, on behalf of the population (or segments of it) and
therefore in the best interests o f the State. They tend to bring to light abuses of
executive, legislative or judicial power to any or all of these bodies.

They

constitute a feedback loop to the system of the exercise of power by the State including the judiciary. In a sense they represent a check on the exercise of such
power. When feedback starts to break down, the conditions for the State to go
awry are partially established.
The role of NGOs is enshrined in the Rome Statute, in that they are eligible to
provide information to the Prosecutor in order for her to determine if an
investigation should be made proprio motu.29# This is not the case for either the
ICJ or the ICTY, although it may be in practice rather than in statute. Some critics
have suggested that this may compromise the im partiality of NGOs.299 Some
critics have suggested that the institutionalization of NGOs w ill inevitably mean that
the Court w ill end up relying upon them - a form of privatized provision of
evidence.300 The Prosecutor may rely upon NGOs for some evidence, but it is
doubtful the Court would rely exclusively upon them for all evidence. The critics’
arguments reflect those that one might have against reflexive law in operation on
its own.301 Regardless, the ICC Prosecutor w ill have the role o f filtering for
293Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 15(2). Information may be obtained from: “States, organs
of the United Nations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, or other
reliable sources as he or she deems appropriate...” Also consider the role of the legal
academic community as evidenced by the division of the judiciary between criminal law
experts and international law experts (Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 36(3)). Note
that NGOs do not have the power to refer a case to the Court, although they can bring a
situation to the attention of the Prosecutor (or even a State Party or the Security
Council).
299Betina Kuzmarov, ‘An Uneasy Synergy: The Relationship Between Non-Governmental
Organizations and the Criminal Court” (2001) 11 W.R.L.S.1.7 at 36.
300Ibid.
301 This is discussed in much more detail in chapter six and concerns the question of the
stability of a reflexive system - namely that certain interests do not commandeer the
feedback mechanism in order to obtain outputs as they desire. Obviously this cannot
happen since there is a filtration going on here - at the very least the rules of evidence.
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reliability. There exist rules of evidence and procedural guidelines concerning how
evidence is gathered and from where.302 Reflexive law is in operation alongside
regulatory and form alistic law.303 Recourse to NGOs w ill not be as significant as
some might suggest, otherwise it might actually violate some of the discretionary
limitations on the judiciary and the system of complementarity - namely accepted
international and domestic standards for the continuity of evidence.
Apart from benign NGOs, such as Amnesty International, MGdecins sans frontiers
or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), one must not forget the
role of the media. Freedom of the press is regarded as a fundamental guarantee
to human rights.304 The free media would play a crucial role in exposing abuses of
power (arbitrariness) to the executive, legislature or judiciary.305 Thus it too acts as
a feedback system to the State. Like NGOs, it can be used or abused however.
Conclusion
In this Chapter, a comprehensive analysis has been undertaken of the abstraction
that is used to describe the relationship between the jurisdictions of the
International Criminal Court and the domestic courts - complementarity. Labels
302 Generally the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 2 at Rule 104. But
note that she is only to seek additional information sources from NGOs in analyzing the
seriousness of information received, not to actually argue a case with it (Rule 104(2)).
Also Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 69.
303As suggested by Orts, supra note 52.
304 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms describes freedom of the press as a
“fundamental right:' Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 at Article 2(b);
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 86, being Schedule 1 of the Human
Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), supra note 86 at Article 10(1) [but note that unlike the Canadian
Charter, this is not a fundamental freedom, but rather qualified by Article 10(2)]; and U.S.
Const, amend I.
303 In Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia, supra note 27, there
was mention that the status of media (including television stations) was unique under
customary international law. Regardless of whether a media installation was being used
for propaganda, it still could not be considered a legitimate target for attack unless being
used for other purposes (such as military communications in mis case). The enhanced
status is consistent with the vital importance of the media as a bulwark to
supplementsrity.
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such as “primacy” and “concurrent jurisdiction’ do not capture the concept and
their usage tends to confuse rather than clarify. The relationship is a function of
conjunctivity - the level of cooperation between the two jurisdictions.

The

procedures limiting prosecutorial discretion, described in the Rome Statute,
represent bulwarks to ensuring the high degree of conjunction between the two
jurisdictions.

Discretionary powers are spread-out in order to avoid their

concentration in an omnipotent prosecutor or even judge. By so doing, the drafters
of the Rome Statute tried to skew the leaning of the Court away from any tendency
to become a supranational or centralized court; and thereby reinforced the
complementary relationship. The increased role of the State in challenging the
ICC and the deferral process (effective veto of Article 16 of the Rome Statute) is
salient in this regard.

The two ad hoc tribunals represent prototypes of the

approach; and while lacking the conjunctive safeguards contained in the Rome
Statute, the functionality has some degree of similarity to that of the ICC. The
Rome Statute itself represents a major evolutionary leap in terms of visualization of
a new abstraction in international criminal law - the deferential regime and
complementarity. With it, there is a new vocabulary (“deferral,” “referral,” “request
for deferral,” “complementary,” “State challenge to admissibility” and “issue of
admissibility”). There are additional safeguards incorporated into the Statute to
ensure that complementarity is achieved - through controls on discretionary
powers and the diffusion of such powers amongst many key players.
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Chapter 4

Chapter Four Structural Constraints on the Exercise of Judicial Authority
within the ICC
Introduction
Complementarity represents the backbone of the Rome Statute.

The concept

incorporates a new vision of how international criminal courts (the ICC in
particular) work in partnership with the domestic criminal courts to encourage
prosecutions of international crime, yet to also act where the domestic courts are
either unwilling or unable or in instances where their domestic judicial systems, like
the State, have gone awry.

The ICC is not a supranational court, asserting its

jurisdiction over a State’s. A new vocabulary reflects this new idea, using such
terms as “deferral,” “admissibility,” and “complementary.”

The essence of

complementarity is the diversification of discretionary powers amongst many of the
players: the accused (to a limited extent), the States, the Assembly of States
Parties, the Security Council and even NGOs. In this manner discretionary power
is not centralized but decentralized. The “rule of law” becomes almost deliberative,
characterized by negotiation and consensus rather than imposition and rigidity of
control. Imposition and rigidity of control is the nature of the domestic criminal
legal system, not the international criminal legal system.

The Rome Statute

incorporates a reflexive vision of complementarity.
Yet there is another focal point of control that must be considered in the context of
the international criminal legal system. It is the judge. Within the hands of the
judge there still remains a great deal of discretionary authority. This is because of
the requirement for an independent judiciary. If unregulated discretionary power
exists, it could conceivably thwart the deliberative approach that so characterizes
complementarity. It could also result in the centralization of decision-making at
98
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one place, again undermining complementarity. The regulation of judicial power
must originate from somewhere other than political decision-makers in order to
preserve the integrity of judicial independence. In such a system, a self-regulation
of the judiciary is necessary at the international level. Like complementarity such
an approach is steeped in reflexive law, but unlike complementarity it is not
described in any Statute. It is a form of inherent control.
This chapter explores how the judiciary of international courts regulates itself.
Before any in-depth exploration, one first must understand the nature o f the
international legal environment.

The nature o f jurisdiction in the international

sense differs from the domestic one. The State still figures prominently, even with
the presence o f the ICC. The State remains the primary entity in international law.
A decentralized legal order is the result

There is a distinct aversion to

centralization o f international legal authority, which can be traced at least to
Kelsen. The proliferation of international courts and tribunals represents a facet of
the disparate nature of the international legal system. Inherent judicial regulation
in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the ad hoc tribunals (ICTY/ICTR)
represent standards, against which one can compare those present in the Rome
Statute.306 To whom are the judges responsible and how does that lim it their
freedom of action?

Are there indications of indirect accountability of judicial

decisions through the appointment removal and renewal of tenure of judges?
What sources o f law are permitted? What sources of law are used in practice?
Answers to these questions could provide insight to the scope of the relevant
court’s jurisdiction and the corresponding freedom the judges might have, or
alternatively, think that they might have. The addition or removal of sources o f law
and/or judicial procedures within a court is normally accomplished through
amendments to the courts’ statutes. The nature of the amendment process o f the
statutes of the courts could be another indicator of limitations to judicial power.
306The comparison is limited since the ICC is not yet in operation.
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International courts must operate with constraints, because there is a limitation on
the judicial decision-making, in favour of maintaining the decentralized nature of
the international legal system. This is a form of internal regulation of international
courts that supplements complementarity.

The International Legal Environment
The Concept o f Jurisdiction
In the domestic legal system, the concept of "jurisdiction” may delimit the State’s
right to interfere with the individual, its subject.307 Limitations exist the sources of
law; territoriality; the nature of the subject matter, including divisions of power the
nature of the subjects (for example children or the insane); procedure through
natural justice (such as a fair trial or autrefois acquit); and the issue o f remedies
(right of appeal and administrative remedies).308

In the international criminal

system, while the individual is the subject of the proceedings, so too is the State in
a manner of speaking. The concept of ‘jurisdiction’ in international criminal law
may delim it the right o f an international court to interfere with the individual, yet the
individual still is a State’s subject This is not to mean that the State is being
brought to account as the ICC, ICTY and ICTR do not have jurisdiction over
States but over individuals.309 Rather, the State not only has a vested right in the
individual, but also over its right to interfere with her rights instead of the
international community.

307Stuart James Whitley, "Preface,” The Concept o f Jurisdiction in Canadian Criminal Law
(LL.M. Thesis, Dalhousie Law School, 1983) at vi. In an earlier draft of this thesis the
author described this more diffuse form of complementarity as "supplementarity.” While
an appropriate label, given that the vocabulary of the Rome Statute remains generally
unused at this time, the last thing that this field requires is a new label for a new concept.
For this reason it is labelled as complementarity, although its nature is quite distinct from
the statutory regulation of discretionary powers described in the previous chapter.
308Ibid. This is an overview of the Stuart Whitley's Table of Contents.
309 Contrast with Madeline Morris, supra note 43. The "primacy” described in the ICTY
Statute over domestic courts or the ICC Statute’s "threat” to defer a case to the Security
Council or Assembly of States Parties may amount to an indictment of the legal system
within the subject State, however it is not an indictment with legal effect as such.
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This is a sensitive topic, for ultimately one is challenging the jurisdiction of the
State as being either unwilling or incapable of prosecuting an individual. The
credibility of a state’s sovereign prerogative may be at stake. The legal creeps
close to the political. The delimitation has to exist in a decentralized legal system,
where the international courts do not represent any one State and their application
of the law must not be seen to be supranational.

Decentralized though the

international criminal legal system may be, there is a commonality and coherence
in the judicial approach to international legal issues, including criminal. It is this
commonality and coherence that imposes limitations on just how far a judge can
act.
Decentralized Character o f International Law
The international legal system has been described as a primitive legal system.310
Primitive law lacks the necessary division of labour to allow the centralization of
legal legislative and legal coercive power to occur.311

Kelsen’s views on the

international legal system rest precariously upon the idea of centralization. They
reflect influence from Marx (the division of labour), Hegel (progress), Weber
(bureaucracy) and even Darwin (evolution). They are also conspicuously oriented
toward the exclusive consideration of the relationship between States and the
Permanent Court of International Justice. This is understandable, considering that
Kelsen may not have seen the proliferation of international courts and tribunals in

310 Hans Kelsen, supra note 16 at 40 and 60. ‘Primitive'' is a technical term and it is
suggested that it is not an anthropological one for societies that lack the technology of
the industrialized societies. It relates more to centralization. The term does evoke the
Hegelian presumption of progress; for that reason ‘decentralized” is preferred. There is
a common acceptance the Hegelian evolutionary approach - namely that societies and
legal systems develop in stages. Recall Teubner, supra note 52. Is it possible that
rather than evolution, a legal system just is? The need for stages of evolution seems
restrictive.
311 Kelsen, supra note 16 at 5.
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his day. He did not dismiss the possibility of ‘a diametrically opposite evolution of
international relations.”312
Hans Kelsen believed in an eventual evolution to a world federalist State through
the centralization of judicial and legislative authority.313 Kelsen was probably a
supranationalist, however he saw such an international system as utopian idealism
and its achievement not immediately realizable.314 Centralization of coercive
power alone was not sufficient to advance from a primitive state of law to a more
advanced form.315 W riting in 1942, in the shadow of the failure of the League of
Nations, Kelsen saw the Permanent Court of International Justice (predecessor to
the International Court o f Justice) as a potentially significant body in centralizing
the international judiciary: “[ajccording to the patterns of evolution o f natural law,
centralization of the judiciary must precede centralization of legislative and
executive power.” 316
Kelsen recognized that there were two key criteria in common to all international
legal orders: coercion and voluntary obedience. He was critical of a legal order
312 Ibid. at 55. Kelsen also dismisses the liberal approach to international law. He does
make allowance for the Soviet and fascist systems as legal systems that were valid and
efficacious. He suggests that political ideals may influence how we define what is law.
Liberals would apply a moral or political judgment on a system of social organization by
arguing that only a democratic regime or a regime with a completely free-market
economy is ‘legitimate.’ Such judgments do not follow from the “scientific character” of
law; Kelsen would not make such judgments - a view of cultural relativism and
tolerance. The liberal approach is alive and well: see William W. Burke-White, supra
note 30 and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ibid.
3,3 Kelsen, supra note 16 at 144.
314 In the long term this may be true. Kelsen also spoke of ‘spheres of interest” of States.
If these spheres were interfered with, that could constitute a delict in international law
(with the exception of the ‘just war”). See ibid. at 52. In the short term or present, he
seems to accept the parallelist outlook.
315Ibid. at 52.
316 Ibid. at 150. His conception of the role of the ICJ may reflect the school of dualism
(Malcolm Shaw, supra note 25). It is submitted that dualism is simply a particular case
of the more general concept of parallelism. Rather than a multiplicity of international
judicial bodies, dualism simply holds that there are two - the ICJ and the domestic
courts.
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based upon coercion.

Nevertheless, it may be this vision that he had of an

international legal order dominated by a coercive United Nations, waging a war in
1942, and perhaps of a reinvigorated Permanent Court of International Justice.
Kelsen argued that a major evolutionary leap to centralization could be achieved
through the old Roman law doctrine of betlum justum - “the just war.”317 He
believed the rendering of binding decisions upon states by the Court. He also
believed in the ability of the Council of the League of Nations (forerunner of the
Security Council) to impose binding majority decisions upon states.318 The task of
deciding which was the ju st war could be delegated to the Permanent Court of
International Justice.
Kelsen also regarded voluntary obedience as a much sounder foundation on which
to build a legal order. Reasons, explaining the "appropriateness’' of a rule and
"respect or love” were all ways in which obedience could be achieved, but the
most effective means of achieving compliance to legal rules was through the
setting of an example.319 Kelsen illustrated his theory with the role of the teacher
or saint.320
While Kelsen’s vision of the international legal order is not exactly what exists
today. States have regulated themselves through international cooperation.321 A
great many international organizations exist founded upon the consensus of
States, negotiation and not upon coercion.322 Coercion exits, but it is restricted to
matters involving the inherent right of self-defence of States and threats or
317Kelsen, ibid. at 54. Writing in 1942 could it have been any different?
318Ibid.
319Ibid. at 6.
320Ibid.
321 For example the Palermo Convention, supra note 70 mentioned in chapter two.
322 For example OSCE or even the UN. See: Organization on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, OSCE Final Act: 25, 1975-2000 Handbook (Vienna: OSCE, 2001), available
online: <http://www.osce.org/publications/handbook/handbook.pdf> (date accessed: 27
August 2002) at 12-16.
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breaches to international peace and security.323 In this manner, the international
legal system continues to be decentralized.

Entities with legal personality are

primarily States, but a m ultiplicity o f international organizations and NGOs also
have standing.

Some o f these organizations are “regional arrangements,”

recognized in the Charter,324 while others such as the Comit6 de la croix rouge
represent NGOs with recognition by States and through conventional international
law.325

If one adds to this the multiplication of States through post-war

decolonisation,

the

international

legal system

has become

even

more

decentralized than it was in 1945.
Proliferation o f International Courts and Tribunals
One o f the features of the decentralized nature of the international legal system is
the proliferation of international courts and tribunals. The Project on International
Courts and Tribunals (PiCT) ambitiously tried to identify all international courts and
tribunals, including those concerned with international criminal law.326

PiCT

suggests that327

323This is Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26.
324Ibid. at Chapter VIII.
325 The standing of the ICRC in the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols is mentioned
by Schabas, supra note 2 at 52 (citing Protocol II and also Article 8(e) of the Statute namely the deliberate targeting of armed attack against humanitarian relief including that
run by the ICRC or its associated Islamic analogue, the Red Crescent Society). Other
organizations may have a lesser standing. One might also consider the extensive list of
organizations and other entities represented at the Rome Conference with observer
status at Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, PCNICC, Annex III reprinted
in Bassiouni, The Statute of die International Criminal Court: A Documentary History, at
106.
326 For a detailed on-line survey of the hundreds of international courts and tribunals one
should visit the web site of the Project of International Courts and Tribunals (PiCT),
being run jointly as a research project from New York University and the University of
London. See: Cesare Romano, “The International Judiciary in Context: A Synoptic
Chart” (Ver. 2.0, August 2001), online: The Project on International Courts and
Tribunals (NYU) < http://www.pict-pcti.org/index2.html> (date accessed: 12 July 2002).
“The matrix” is of great interest in this regard. Both Shane Spelliscy, supra note 212,
and Cesare Romano, supra note 328 are of the opinion that the interactions between
these courts are minimal and therefore consistency of decision-making is lacking. This
argument amounts to a rejection of the conjunctive nature of complementarity - either in
favour of parallelism or alternatively in favour of a supranational court (Spelliscy
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...ft]he institutions and mechanisms listed...have very few legal or
functional links among one another, either within or across each
major grouping or cluster...
Other writers argue a lack of coherence through a lack of intercommunication:328
...the real proliferation problem is not derivative o f the fact that
many international tribunals exist, but rather o f the fact that they
have proliferated in an environment without any formal relations
between them. The development of tribunals in the absence of
structured relationships has led to the characterization of the
international legal system as a disordered melody, though perhaps
one not so optimistic might be more inclined to call it a cacophony
rather than a melody.
Such an outlook preconceives that centralization (“formal relations’ or “structured
relationships”) is essential to coherence.

While these arguments may appear

convincing at one level, the reality is that they amount to a projection of one’s legal
expectations of the domestic system onto the international. A hierarchy of law is
not necessarily needed at the international level.

The international judiciary

renders decisions in a consistent form and there are relations between the various
courts and tribunals. Many of their sources of law are identical. They also tend to
look at one another’s case law as persuasive authority. Judges often sit in other
international tribunals.329 In a decentralized legal system, the nationalization of
concludes the need for primacy of judicial decisions by the ICJ - it as a supranational
court). Thomas Buergenthal's comments earlier seem to refute this idea (supra note
213). Similarly see Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Relationship Between the International
Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice,” in Herman A. M. von Hebei, supra
note 66 at 166.
327Romano, ibid. at obverse.
328Spelliscy, supra note 212 at 155.
329 For example the biography of Judge Guillaume, the current serving ICJ President
indicates him as haying been a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Member
of the Court of Arbitration of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and designated arbitrator by the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT), the International Chamber of Commerce and the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Judge Buergenthal is a
former judge and vice-president of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Judge,
Vice-President, President, Administrative Tribunal, Inter-American Development Bank;
Member, United Nations Human Rights Committee; Member, United Nations Truth
Commission for El Salvador Member, Panels of Conciliators and of Arbitrators,
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international law is avoided.330

Instead law becomes more communal,

exponentially increasing the "sources of legal dialogue:"331
...Decisions are less conclusive, other sources may later prevail,
and broader forms o f agreement become possible, tolerant of
differences now seen as minor and transient. The use of
persuasive authority is thus essential to law itself and uniformity of
law conies not through imposition but persuasion, in the daily world
o f legal practice...Law is so challeniged, however, only in those
jurisdictions which have taken the risk of leading, and forming, the
Western legal tradition. They have given law to the rest o f the
world, and it is only fitting that the rest of the worid give law back to
them, and that each give law back to the others.
Before considering the "sources of legal dialogue" in the Rome Statute, it might be
fruitful to illustrate them in the context of two referent jurisdictions - the ICJ and
ICTY. The reason for this is to illustrate the significance of judicial limitation in the
Rome Statute.

Referential Courts: The ICJ and ICTY
Judicial Lim itation at the ICJ
Inherent Conservativeness o f Decisions
While States are obliged to follow ICJ rulings by authority of the Charter,332 in the
event of non-compliance by a State, there are two approaches possible. Because

International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, World Bank; and ViceChairman, Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland (19992000). See: Biographies of Members of the Court, ICJ website <http://Www.iqdj.org\idwww\igeneralinformation.htm> (date accessed: 5 March 2002). Similarly
Louise Arbour was a Justice in the Ontario Court of Appeal prior to her appointment as
Prosecutor of the ICTY and is now a justice at the Supreme Court of Canada. This
represents only a small sampling of these three individuals’ backgrounds. It is dear that
there is a very significant inter-relationship or "cross-fertilization" between the
international courts and tribunals (including national ones) even without formalized
structured relations. Therefore the argument to the contrary is contested.
330H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Persuasive Authority," (1987) 32 McGill L.J. 261 at 298.
331 Ibid. This should evoke memories of Teubner, supra note 52 and Habermas, supra
note 138. Thus the incoherence that Spelliscy identifies may in fed represent the
misidentification of ‘broader forms of agreement.” Could this truly be the
‘ internationalization of law?”
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the jurisdiction of the ICJ is predicated upon the consent of States, a State may
render a case inadmissible simply by refusing to consent to the Court’s
jurisdiction.333 In the event that the two States before the Court do consent but the
ruling is unacceptable to one or both, the ruling could be ignored and the Court
may forward the matter to the Security Council. The Security Council in turn, has
full discretionary powers as to how to deal with the issue.334 In the event that the
ICJ rendered a decision that was unacceptable to the Security Council too, the
Security Council could simply let the non-compliance by the offending State
continue.

Such an act would seriously erode the prestige of the Court.

This

continuing threat may temper the Court’s approach in boldly exercising its powers
- and explain its general conservatism in dealing with controversial issues.
Limited Scrutiny o f the Security Council
Generally the judges of the ICJ have been reluctant to question legal decisions
emanating from the Security Council.335 The Security Council possesses the
power to simply ignore a decision by the Court with which it does not agree. If
such a situation were to arise, the damage to the Court’s legitimacy and credibility
would be extreme.

332 Charter o f the United Nations, supra note 26 at Article 94(1) - provided that the State is
itself a party to the case before the Court.
333 ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Articles 34 and 35. For example, consider Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States o f America),
[1986] ICJ Rep. 14.
334 Charter o f the United Nations, supra note 26 at Article 94(2). This regulatory effect is
created by the balance, between the provisions of Article 93(1) and Article 93(2). (Ibid.)
335 Rosalyn Higgins describes this as the ICJ giving "consideration only to legal factors
when exercising its jurisdiction, not withstanding the important political role of the
Security Council." (Rosalyn Higgins, "The Relationship Between the International
Criminal Court and the International court of Justice," in Herman A. M. von Hebei, supra
note 66). As will be shown, international criminal courts cannot adopt this approach
without adopting a supranational character. They must take into account political factors
in addition to legal ones.
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There is really only one case where the ICJ might conceivably question a legal
decision from the Security Council. Judge de Castro in Namibia summarized the
scenario:336
The principle of ‘legal-ness’ - the Court, as a legal organ, cannot
co-operate with a resolution which is dearly void, contrary to the
rules o f the Charter, or contrary to the principles of law.
There is an extremely high threshold to be m et

Such a decision would

undoubtedly launch a severe constitutional crisis within the United Nations and the
international community, if one were not already in existence. The ICJ would be
entangled in it whether it acted or n o t The scenario is exceptional and most
unlikely.337
Currently, before the International Court of Justice, is the Lockerbie case.338 At
issue is whether the ICJ has the power to scrutinize the Security Council in a
manner akin to a supreme court scrutinizing the executive for activities that may be
ultra vires. The Court has been very cautious in approaching this question, but in
its landmark decision of 28 February 1998, it probably ruled that it did could assert
its competence to rule on the issue.339 This is certainly within its powers.340 The
336 Judge Castro in Namibia, ibid. cited in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1,
"Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction," supra note 33 at Paragraph 30.
337 It probably applies to the ICTY and ICC. If faced with an outrageously illegal act by the
Security Council or the Assembly of States Parties that threatened to compromise their
judicial functions, they would probably act.
338 Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamhiriya v.
United Kingdom), ‘Preliminary Otwections" 28 February 1998, [1998] I.C.J. Reports 1, at
Paragraphs 37 and 38, online: ICJ <http:/Awww.iq-cij.org/>(date accessed: 16 March
2002).
339 Ibid. The Court was far from unanimous concerning its capability to review Security
Council decisions. The judgement is also ambiguous. A broad interpretation of it
suggests that the Court may review the legality of the acts of the Security Council, while
a narrower one suggests that the ICJ jurisdiction may only apply to interpretation of the
Montreal Convention and not to the Security Council. Guillaume (the current President)
and Fleischhauer voiced such a narrow interpretration. Their outlook can be contrasted
with those of Judges Bediaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma - all of whom supported the idea of
the ICJ being capable of reviewing the legality of actions by the Security Council in a
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decision is not without its opponents, including from within the judiciary of the
ICJ.341

The actions of the Security Council in this case may have been

questionable, but they hardly satisfy the stringent requirements outlined in the
Namibia case. Lockerbie has yet to be resolved at this level.
Narrow Jurisdiction - Preponderance o f Parallelism
In the Ndombasi case,342 there were significant differences o f opinion, on the part
of the judges, who generally felt that immunity of State could not be invoked under
any circumstances in alleged cases of: genocide, crimes against humanity or
serious war crimes. The International Court of Justice condemned Belgium for its
issue of an arrest warrant for the Minister o f Foreign Affairs of the Congo, on the
grounds that the Minister enjoyed immunity from criminal jurisdiction, inviolable
under international law (it being a customary legal principle). To many observers
this appeared as a legal retreat from the “campaign for universal justice* and a
return to the use of immunity of office as a legal shield for commission of

manner akin to a domestic court. Judges Schwebel (President at the time), Oda and the
ad hoc judge Robert Y. Jennings (also a former President of the ICJ) voted against the
Court having jurisdiction. See Andreas L. Paulus, ‘Jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice Lockerbie Cases: Preliminary Objections” (1998) 9 E.J.I.L. 550.
340ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Article 36(6).
341 Judges Schwebel, Oda and Jennings (ad hoc judge for the UK) were the most vocal
opponents. Consider Judge Rezek’s statement as representative of some of the
dissenting opinions (arguing for the ultra vires review), supra note 340:
Ce serait bien une source dbtonnement si le Consei de s6curit6 des Nations Unies
devait jouir dun pouvoir absoiu et incontestable d I'bgard de la r&gle de droit,
privilege dork ne jouissent pas, en droit interne, les organes politiques de la plupart
des fondateurs et des autres membres de Organisation, d commencer par les deux
Etats dOfendeurs.
342Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic o f the Congo v. Belgium), ‘Press
Release 2002/04: The Court finds that the issue and international circulation by Belgium
of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi failed to
respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo enjoyed under international law; and that
Belgium must cancel the arrest warrant,” (14 February 2002) online: ICJ <
http://www.iq-cij.org/>(date accessed: 15 March 2002).
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international crimes and impunity.343 To some observers this would be an example
of the lack o f coherence of the law, in a decentralized legal system.344
It must be remembered that the ICJ is a jurisdiction where States are the sole
holders of legal personality.

Immunity as a state function was at issue, not

immunity as a matter of avoidance of individual criminal responsibility.

As

President Guillaume stated, “...immunity from jurisdiction and individual criminal
responsibility are two separate concepts."345 Thus the ICJ decision did not amount
3 The Court ruled that Belgium had violated customary law that allows the Minister to
enjoy full immunity from criminal jurisdiction while occupying that office. To some this
ruling appears to contradict the Statutes of the Tribunals (see ICTY Statute, supra note
176 at Article 7(2) and ICTR Statute, supra note 176 at Article 6(2). For an account of
the outrage see John Kamau, “Uproar as Foreign Ministers get Legal Immunity’ The
East African Daily Nation (28 February 2002), online Daily Nation on the Web
<http//www.nationaudio.com/ >(date accessed: 27 February 2002). This argument
cannot be, for the jurisdictions are different. The subjects of legal personality in the ICJ
are States whereas in the ICTY (or other international criminal courts and tribunals) they
are individuals.
344 For example: Shane Spelliscy, supra note 212. This argument harks back to Kelsen,
supra note 16 and the need for a centralized global judicial system (mentioned in A.
Cassese, “Reflections on International Criminal Justice (1998) 61 M.L.R. 1 at 6). There
is a presumption that multiple jurisdictions ignore the persuasive value of their fellow
courts and may develop law in a different direction (Glenn, supra note 332). Spelliscy in
particular assumes that there is inadequate lateral contact between judges (formal or
informal) which is a theme also echoed by Professor Romano of PiCT (supra note 328).
Respectfully this is not the case as most judges within these jurisdictions were judges
either in their domestic jurisdiction or some other parallel court. Coherence in law does
not require a centralized court. Most federal legal systems and that of the European
Union are testimonials to coherence in a decentralized milieu. Spelliscy appears to
forward an argument in favour of a centralized world court. The limitation on judicial
discretionary powers being discussed in this chapter, represent the imposition of
consistency and certainty in judicial decision-making. It is a complex system but it is
operational.
343Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), “Press
Statement of Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International court of Justice,”
online: ICJ < http://www.iq-cij.Ofg/>(date accessed: 15 March 2002). Many
commentators have suggested a retreat from the demise of immunity as a pretext for
avoiding individual criminal accountability, including the President of the European Court
of Human Rights (Kamu, supra note 345). With respect, they may foil to appreciate the
uniqueness of the jurisdiction of the ICJ. That said there were many dissenting opinions
regarding this case by the judges of the ICJ, arguing that immunity could not be upheld
in cases of serious human rights abuses such as genocide or crimes against humanity
and for that reason they felt that the arrest warrant should not have been annulled. See
especially the joint separate opinions of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Burgenthal or
the dissenting opinion of Judge Oda, at the ICJ website <http://www.icj-cji.org>(date
accessed: 10 May 2002). See also: Rosalyn Higgins, “The Relationship Between the
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to a legal retreat from the rejection o f the use immunity of State as a means of
shielding one from individual criminal responsibility. However, immunity relating to
a necessary function of State is (now) a recognized principle of customary law.
This displays a prevalent view on the part of the judges, that the jurisdiction of the
ICJ is extremely narrow. It is self-contained or insular, in that the majority of
judges are not willing to import principles of law from other jurisdictions - such as
the general invalidity of State immunity over an individual as a shield from
prosecution for international crimes.

This is a manifestation of the parallelist

outlook.346 Like Lockerbie, the judiciary was divided, with some judges of the view
that the case law of the ICTY and the Rome Statute were sufficient indicators that
such a customary law did not exist They were in the minority however.
Sources o f Law
The sources of law for the ICJ are outlined in its Statute:347
1. International conventions which establish rules explicitly recognized by the
States brining the case before the C ourt
2. International customary law (“general practice as accepted by law”);
3. “The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;”
4. Judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.”
While the ICJ applies these sources, there is a contradiction in its narrow
jurisdiction and the application of ‘ general principles of law recognized by civilized
International Court and The International Court of Justice,” in Herman A.M. von Hebei,
supra note 66 at 163.
346 For example the comments by Stephen Schwebel, supra note 47.
347 ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Article 38-1.
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nations.” The Democratic Republic o f the Congo case illustrates the paradox.
How can an individual’s immunity be questioned before a jurisdiction where States
are the only entities that have legal personality? The nature of the ICJ requires
that it have a narrow and parallelist conception of its own jurisdiction.348
Furthermore the ICJ Statute explicitly denies the ICJ as a criminal jurisdiction.349
Case Precedents
According to the ICJ Statute, the ICJ’s own decisions have “no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”350 Therefore the
ICJ is not even constrained by its own precedents. In practice the judges have
skirted around this provision, rationalizing that the Court is bound by the legal
principles rather than the particulars of any one case.351 Regardless of whether
ICJ judges are bound by precedent or legal principles, they have opted to lim it their
discretionary power in favour of certainty and consistency of their decisions in
practice.
Amendments
Amendments to the ICJ Statute may be proposed by the Court to the SecretaryGeneral, however all proposals must be submitted to the General Assembly upon

348 Considering its history it may even have been the court envisioned in the development
of the parallelist (or more appropriately dualist) school of thought.
349 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Relationship Between the International Court and The
International Court of Justice,’ in Herman A.M. von Hebei, supra note 66 at 163. Her
views are reflections of Article 34(1), Ofthe ICJ Statute, supra note 26.
330ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Article 59.
351 In the domestic situation, it has been argued that precedent is necessary to ensure that
law is certain. Persuasive authority on the other hand (which is probably how the ICJ
views its prior decisions) allows more flexibility in application of the law (and the exercise
of judicial discretion). In the case of the ICJ however, its refusal to incorporate any
persuasive authority other than its own may further restrict judicial discretionary power,
limiting it to its particular jurisdiction. See: H. Patrick Glenn, supra note 332 at 297.
President Guillaume's statement regarding the Democratic Republic o f the Congo case
may be important in this regard. The opposition from within the judiciary however may
be an indicator of a desire to exercise more discretionary power.
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recommendation by the Security Council.352

In other words, the ICJ is first

accountable to the Security Council and then to the General Assembly in matters
where it decides to change its Statute. While this may not necessarily reflect
judicial discretionary limitations over cases before the Court, it does reflect
imposed limitations on the judicial authority to govern the Court.
Judicial Appointments
The judges of the ICJ are nominated by: parties to the Statute of the International
Court o f Justice, members of the Permanent Court o f Arbitration or national groups
(in the case of non-parties).353 There is a consultation requirement with domestic
courts, faculties o f law and national academies.354 The Secretary-General performs
the role of coordinator.355 Both the General Assembly and the Security Council are
furnished with separate lists of nominations and elect members of the Court (by
majority of both organs) based on qualifications and the requirement of
representation of the "main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems
of the wortd."356 Judges are elected for nine-year terms and may be re-elected.357
Dismissal of a judge may only occur on the unanimous opinion of the other
members.358 There are prohibitions on employment but also the conferral of
diplomatic privileges in order to avoid the compromise (apparent or real) of
impartiality.359

352 ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Articles 69 and 70; and also for UN Amendment
procedure see Charter of the United Nations, ibid. at Articles 108 and 109.
353ICJ Statute, ibid. at Article 5-1.
354Ibid. at Artide 6.
355Ibid. at Article 7.
356Ibid. at Article 8 and 9.
357Ibid. at Artide 13-1.
358 Ibid. at Article 18-1.
359 Ibid. at Articles 16 (prohibition on extraneous employment), 17 (prohibition of acting as
counsel), 19 (diplomatic privileges) and 20 (pledge).
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While accountability of the judges rests mainly within the judiciary itself (through
the provisions referring to dismissal), one might consider the incentive of reelection to amount to an inducement for a judge to lim it her discretionary power in
favour of those who vote for her (representatives of the State). The sheer length of
a term of nine-years, coupled with the fact that the Security Council and General
Assembly independently carry out the vote, may obviate this influence.360
The ICJ, as a court with a close working relationship to the United Nations, is well
established. There are constraints on the discretionary powers o f its judiciary. An
inherent conservativeness of decision rendering exists in order to protect the
Court’s prestige and legitimacy (fear of decisions being ignored).

The ICJ is

reluctant to scrutinize the quasi-legislative/quasi-executive role of the Security
Council, except perhaps in a case that is outrageously improper. This requires a
very high threshold and as such, it is highly unlikely ever to happen, if ever. The
Court has a narrow view o f its jurisdiction - probably with good reason due to the
restrictions on legal personality that constitute its jurisdiction. This may explain its
reluctance to adhere to the “general principles o f law of all civilized nations” source
of law, at times - whatever such laws and nations might be. The judiciary of the
ICJ is largely independent of external influence, with the possible exception of the
promise of a renewal of the term of office. This threat has been obviated by the
mechanism of recruitment, which balances the legislative imperfections of the
General Assembly and Security Council.

It should be noted that despite the

positivist and parallelist preoccupation of the ICJ, there are members of the
judiciary that see the ICJ’s jurisdiction in a much broader light, “enmeshed” into the
legal expectations o f general international law and open to the persuasive authority
of other international courts and tribunals. They remain however in the minority for now.

360 Recall what was mentioned above: the General Assembly is representative but has
little legal effect and the Security Council is not representative but has legal effect.
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Judicial Lim itation a t the ICTY
La competence de la competence
Originally, the ICTY perceived a broad judicial discretionary power {la competence
de la competence).36' The President of the ICTY, Judge Cassese, described it:362
A narrow concept o f jurisdiction may, perhaps, be warranted in a
national context but not in international law. International law,
because it lacks a centralized structure, does not provide for an
integrated judicial system operating an orderly division of labour
among a number of tribunals, where certain aspects or
components of jurisdiction as a power could be centralized or
vested in one o f them but not the others. In international law, every
tribunal is a self-contained system (unless otherwise provided).
This is incompatible with a narrow conception ofjurisdiction, which
presupposes a certain division of labour.
O f course, the
constitutive instrument of an international tribunal can lim it some o f
its jurisdictional powers, but only to the extent to which such
limitation does not jeopardize its ‘judicial character’, as shall be
discussed later on.
Such limitations cannot, however, be
presumed and, in any case, they cannot be deduced form the
concept o fjurisdiction itself.
Such a broad conception of judicial discretionary power (and jurisdiction) may find
its domestic analogue in “inherent jurisdiction" of certain courts.

There are

problems with this reasoning. How far can the exercise of judicial discretionary
power go? In the Quebec Secession Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada
indicated that it could counteract a decision made through a popular vote
(referendum), on the grounds that it was contrary to international law and
potentially, to the Canadian constitution.363 This is a rather undemocratic position.

361 Or alternatively Kompetenz-Kompetenz. See Tadic, supra note 33 at Paragraphs 11
and 18.
362Ibid. at Paragraph 11.
363 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. It should be noted that while
this decision was within the jurisdiction of Canada, the decision has a significant
international facet. Many of the experts who testified before the Supreme Court were
international lawyers of standing, including Luzius Wikfhaber (currently the President of
the European Court of Human Rights) and James Crawford. See: “Government of
Canada Files Reply to Arguments in the Quebec Secession Reference," Canadian
Department of Justice (15 January 1998), online: Canadian Department of Justice Web
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In the international context, could this freedom accorded to judges steer an
international court into undermining the decentralized nature the jurisdiction of
states and the promotion o f a supranational character? This is the very same
problem facing the ICJ. The ICJ’s solution has been to adopt a narrow concept of
jurisdiction. The ICTY too has been struggling, since its foundation, to narrow its
concept of jurisdiction - an extremely difficult task given the broad wording in its
Statute and Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.3**
Sources o f Law
An examination of the sources of law for the ICTY reveals how it has overcome the
problem of wide judicial discretionary power. In exercising its wide discretionary
powers, the judiciary of the ICTY paradoxically has limited its powers by deciding
to be bound by a plethora of sources of law.
The Secretary-General, in his 1993 Report, described its sources of law:365
...the international tribunal should apply rules of international
humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part o f customary
law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to
specific conventions does not arise...
The Secretary-General outlined an exhaustive list of conventional international
humanitarian law instruments that he felt had become part of customary law in

Site < http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/1998/repiy.html> (date accessed 14 April
2002).
364 Consider ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 9(2) in particular - “primacy over
national courts.” Also consider the ICTR Statute, ibid. at Article 8(2) which is even wider
in that it accords ‘ primacy over the national courts of all States.” In the case of the ICTY
Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177, the provisions of Rule 9(i) and
especially Rule 9(iii), endow an enormous discretionary power to the ICTY to request a
deferral.
365 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 o f Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993) U.N. Doc. S/25704, supra note 185 at Paragraph 34 [emphasis
added]. “Should” may imply that there exists some degree of discretion accorded to the
judges in deciding upon sources of law.
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armed conflict.36* In addition, the Tribunal "should apply domestic law in so far as
it incorporates customary international humanitarian law,” with the exception of the
death penalty.367
In practice the Tribunal has invoked international legal instruments well beyond the
exhaustive list suggested by the Secretary-General.

In examining the Tadic

Appeals Chamber decision one can find references to: the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rightsi368 advisory and contentious case law of the
International Court o f Justice; the United Nations Charter, previous decisions of the
Tribunal;369 the European Convention on Human Rights,370 the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights;371 numerous General Assembly Resolutions;372
case law of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;373 Israeli and

366 Specifically: Geneva Conventions and Protocols thereto, supra note 36; the Hague
Rules supra note 162; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, 9 December 1948, U.N.T.S. 78:1021[hereinafter the Genocide
ConventionJ; and The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals o f die European Axis, 8 August 1945, U.N.T.S. 82:251. Why the SecretaryGeneral referred to customary law above conventional is curious. Surely conventional
law represents a superior form of international law in that it is more certain than
customary international law. Perhaps he was trying to use customary international law
as a means of applying conventional law universally to states, which may not
necessarily have ratified the appropriate conventions (i.e. the successor Yugoslavian
republics). The ICTY was established through an executive action by the Security
Council, rather than by treaty. Only after the Dayton Agreement were the legal
foundations of the ICTY based upon state consent contained in a multilateral treaty.
Therefore the reference to customary law may reflect the dubious legal foundations of
the ICTY prior to its confirmation in the Dayton Agreement.
367 Report o f the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 o f Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993) U.N. Doc. S/25704, supra note 185 at Paragraph 36 and 111.
361International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra 189.
369 Report o f the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 o f Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993) U.N. Doc. S/25704, supra note 185 at Paragraph 34
370Ibid. at Paragraph 41
371 Ibid. at Paragraph 43.
372 Ibid. at Article 44. This suggests that the General Assembly may in fact have some
legal authority, albeit persuasive rather than imperative.
373Ibid. at Paragraph 45
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American case law;374 French and Italian case law;375 the British Hansard,376 and
numerous secondary sources.377 The list of actual sources of law is immense.
The judges have significantly encompassed a greater variety of sources of law
than what the Secretary-General envisioned.

These sources however may

represent interpretative aids to the judiciary in applying the formal sources
enumerated by the Secretary-General.
The International Tribunal does not work in isolation.378 Its decisions occur within
the context of the entire European and international judicial scenes. The former
President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, filed an application through The
Hague Regional Court alleging that his rights under the European Convention on
Human Rights had been violated.379 The Hague Regional Court, in consultation
with the European Court o f Human Rights, declared the application to have been
inadmissible on procedural grounds; Milosevic had failed to exhaust the available
domestic remedies within The Netherlands. In a previous case that did reach the
European Court of Human Rights, that Court found that the Tribunal offered
sufficient procedural guarantees and had a solid legal foundation.380

374 Ibid. at Paragraph 55
373 Ibid. at Paragraphs 58 and 57 respectively.
376Ibid. at Paragraph 100.
377Ibid. at Paragraph 110 for example.
378 The ICTY is sometimes referred to by its original name, The International Tribunal."
When it was established, there was only one international criminal tribunal. This is why
its case file numbers are prefixed by "It -" whereas those for the ICTR are prefixed by
“ICTR-."
379 Specifically he alleged contraventions of the European Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 86: Artide 5 (right to liberty and security) in relation to his detention and
abduction; Article 6 (right to fair trial); Article 10 (freedom of expression); Article 13 (right
to an effedive remedy); and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination). European Court of
Human Rights, Press Release Issued by the Registrar, "European Court of Human
Rights: Application by Slobodan Milosevic Declared Inadmissible (27 March 2002).
380 NaletHic v. Croatia (1999), decision. Application No. 51891/99, 4 May 2000, online
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int> (date accessed: 10 May 2002). This was a decision by the
European Court of Human Rights.
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It could be argued that the ICTY judiciary has bound itself by accepting diverse
sources of law.

It could also be argued that the defendants themselves have

bound the ICTY judiciary, through the insistence that these sources be considered
and adhered to.

The incorporation of these sources may even reflect the

operation of the complementary relationship between the ICTY and the domestic
legal jurisdictions of the former Yugoslavia, where both jurisdictions are bound by
the same sources o f law. Yet the domestic legal jurisdiction of former Yugoslavia,
The Netherlands and all ties to other legal obligations (such as through the ICCPR,
European Convention on Human Rights or even the Treaty of Amsterdam) are
integral parts of the domestic legal order. Therefore complementarity cannot be
restricted to the relations between the Tribunal and the domestic courts alone, but
encompasses the entire domestic and international legal array of international,
regional and national legal arrangements and associated courts. The ICTY is
enmeshed into this “matrix” as is the ICTR, with appropriate adjustments to legal
obligations listed. Regardless of how these limitations came about, they represent
substantial lim itations on judicial discretionary power. Judge Cassese’s remarks in
1994 may not accurately depict the ICTY of 2002.
Amendments
Unfortunately the existing system of self-governance of the Tribunal has resulted in
a counter to the attempts to narrow its wide discretionary powers. The internal
governance of the ICTY consists of two bodies composed of the judges - the
Bureau and the Plenary. The Bureau consists of the President Vice-President
and the Presiding Judges of the Trial Chambers.381 The Prosecutor (effectively an
agent of the Secretary-General and Security Council) is excluded. Regular judges
may draw to the attention of Bureau members; matters, which they feel, should be
discussed by the Bureau and/or Plenary.382 Thus the President Vice-President
3,1 ICTY Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 23. At this point focus
will centre on the ICTY, however the same can be said for its cousin, the ICTR.
382Ibid at Rule 23(C).
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and Presiding Judges of the Appeal/Trial Chambers perform a secondary role in
governance.383 The Plenary meetings of the Tribunal provide an opportunity to
accomplish the following tasks:384
/.

Elect the President and Vice-President;

ii.

Adopt and amend the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence;

Hi.

Adopt the Annual Report provided fo r in Article 34 o f the Statute;

iv.

Decide upon matters relating to the internal functioning o f the
Chambers and Tribunal;

v.

Determine o r supervise the conditions o f detention; and

vi.

Exercise any other function provided for in the Statute o r in the
Rules.

Domestic courts exercise some of these functions, such as "matters relating to the
internal functioning.”

This might be considered to be an aspect of inherent

jurisdiction in the domestic analogue. Yet the Plenary functions are significantly
more substantial, incorporating functions that in the domestic model would
normally be within the domain of the executive (for instance supervision of
conditions of detention or adoption of an Annual Report to provide public
transparency of activities).385
One might contest this last assertion, but the ICTY Rules o f Procedure and
Evidence is a misleading document

Its status is not subsidiary to the ICTY

Statute. Considering it contains detailed "elaborations” of the relationship between
the Tribunal and the domestic jurisdictions (mislabelled "primacy” but functionally,

383This is reflected in their order of precedence. See ibid. at Rule 17(B) in particular.
3MIbid. at Rule 24.
385 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 34 (for the Annual Report) and ICTY Rules
Governing the Detention o f those Persons Awaiting Trial or Appeal before the Tribunal
or Otherwise Detained on the Authority of the Tribunal, ICTY Document No. T-38Rev8con (The Hague: ICTY, 29 November 1999).
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complementarity) and the specification of powers of the Plenary, the ICTY Rules o f
Procedure and Evidence takes on the character of a constitutional document, in its
own rig h t388 For the ICTY, the amendment procedure is completely within the
control of the judges.387 There is not even a notification requirement to the
Security Council.

In January 2002 a slight modification to this amendment

procedure was implemented. There is now a consultative role in the preparation of
amendments for the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence: although possessing no
voting power, the Registrar, Office of the Prosecutor and Defence Counsel are
allowed to participate in an advisory role.388 Input from other players within the
Tribunal may represent a slight easing of the tight grip that the judiciary maintains
over the amendment procedure.

The judiciary of the Tribunal still retains a

significant legislative capability.
The Rules o f Procedure and Evidence has been amended 22 times, whereas the
ICTY Statute only twice.389 Amendments to the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence
are probably preferable to the Statute, since the Statute requires adoption of an
amendment through a Security Council Resolution, as it is itself based upon a
Security Council Resolution.390 The judiciary has in effect by-passed controls on

386 Consider the elaboration (or is it expansion?) of the discretionary powers from Article
10 of the ICTY Statute, supra note 176 to Rule 9 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, supra note 177. . Note also that in the case of the ICC, the ICC Rules o f
Procedure and Evidence is explicitly subordinated to the Rome Statute, supra note 2 at
Article 51(5)).
387ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 6.
388 ICTY Practice Direction on the Procedure for the Proposal, Consideration of and
Publication of Amendments to The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International
Tribunal, Rev. 2 (24 January 2002), online: < http://www.un.org/icty/basic.htm>(date
accessed: 18 June 2002) at Paragraph 2. Contrast to the previous versions: Rev. 1
dated 4 May 2001 and the original dated 18 December 1998.
389 "Basic Legal Documents," online: ICTY web site < http://Www.un.org/icty/ >(date
accessed: 16 June 2002).
390 Originally based on Security Council Resolution 827(1993), UN Doc. No. S/RES/827
(1993). The Statute was attached as an appendix to Report o f the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) U.N. Doc. S/25704,
supra note 185.
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the exercise of the discretion in directing the Tribunal. The reason for doing so
may be in part, convenience. If this is so, rather than a flaw with the running of the
Tribunal, there may be an indication o f a flaw with the Security Council - in that it is
deficient in its ability as a legislative overseer, for amendments to the Statute are
too cumbersome.
Judicial Appointments
W hile the Prosecutor is appointed by the Security Council, (and ultimately reports
to the Secretary-General),391 the judges are elected by the General Assembly, from
a list o f nominations submitted to the Secretary-General by States (with permanent
representation before the United Nations and Members States), but only after
being reviewed by the Security Council.392 The approach is generally the same as
in the election of judges to the ICJ, despite minor modifications.

There is a

balance struck between the roles o f both quasi-legislative bodies (the General
Assembly and the Security Council) - although the Security Council maintains a
pre-eminent role.
There is no provision for the removal of a judge from the ICTY, however it would
likely follow the ICJ pattern - a unanimous decision by the Plenary.393 The term of
office is for only four years and judges are eligible for re-election.394 The potential
inducement by the promise of re-election may have a greater influence in the ICTY
than in the ICJ because of the shorter term.
A quick reading of the ICTY Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence
suggests wide discretionary powers attributed to the judiciary.

In practice

however, the ICTY judiciary has tried to narrow its discretionary powers primarily
391 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 16. Consider the comments by Louise Arbour,
supra note 34.
392 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 13b/s.
393 ICJ Statute, supra note 26 at Article 18.
394 ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article Wbis(3).
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through its paradoxical expansive approach to the sources of law. While some
success has been achieved through this route, the nature of the internal system of
the ICTY’s system of governance, the nature o f the ICTY Statute and the ICTY
Rules o f Procedure and Evidence have limited the extent o f the narrowing of
judicial discretionary powers. A disjunctive ICTY continues to exist.

Judicial Limitation in the Rome Statute of the ICC
The ICC w ill incorporate various methods o f keeping judicial discretionary power
narrow. It has to do this in order to maintain complementarity. Like the ICJ and
ICTY before it it uses many of the same means to accomplish this narrow vision of
its powers. The manner in which it achieves this is however quite different at
times.
Complementarity or Deferral
In the previous chapter the complementary aspect of the International Criminal
Court (as defined in the Rome Statute) was examined in detail. The ICC judiciary
is under an obligation to exercise its discretion in a manner compatible with the
complementary relationship between the ICC and the domestic courts.395
There always exists the threat of a State not cooperating with the decisions
rendered by the Court, just as in the case o f the ICJ and ICTY. In such an event a
matter is eventually deferred to the Security Council or the Assembly of States
Parties (depending upon who referred it to the Court).396 This may represent a
check on the powers of the judiciary, particularly as a system of appeal to the
appropriate international organ by the recalcitrant State.

Since the Security

Council and Assembly of States Parties represent quasi-legislative/quasi-executive
bodies, the rule of law is subordinated to them once procedure has been

395This is a basic tenet of the Statute - see Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Articles 1 and
51(5).
396Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 87(7).
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exhausted.397 Thus while the Court itself may be seized of a matter firs t in the
event of non-compliance, the matter is eventually deferred to political, non-judicial
bodies.
Yet the Security Council also possesses a more immediate deferral power (Article
16 of the Rome Statute). This may allow the Security Council, a political and non
judicial body, to exercise some sort of pre-emptive exercise of prerogative power
to stop an investigation/prosecution under a Chapter VII justification. Such a pre
emption does not exist in either the ICJ or ICTY system.

It is a restriction on

judicial powers to authorize an investigation/prosecution.
Sources o f Law
Explicitly itemized, the sources of law available to the judiciary, in exercising its
powers, constrain the discretionary powers of the ICC judges.

Like the ICJ

Statute, the Rome Statute enumerates the sources of applicable law that the ICC
w ill apply:398
1. Foremost the Rome Statute, then the Elements o f Crimes and the ICC
Rules o f Procedure and Evidence apply;
2. Second, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law,
including international humanitarian law apply;
3. Failing the first two sources,399
.. .general principles o f law derived by the Court from national laws
o f legal systems of the world fwould apply].. provided that those
principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with
international law and internationally recognized norms and
standards.
397As mentioned above in the discussion of the ICJ, there is an exception to this rule - the
case of outrageously illegal behaviour.
398Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 21(1).
399Ibid.
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The Court may apply principles and rules as interpreted in its precedents.400 The
Court is obliged to apply the ‘general principles o f criminal law.”401 The primacy of
the Rome Statute is not really surprising as it is itself a multilateral convention
(unlike the ICTY Statute but like the ICJ Statute, which is an integral part of the

United Nations Charter).*02 The Elements o f Crimes and Rules of Procedure and
Evidence are subsidiary legislation, interpreting the Statute.403 Thus from the
outset, judicial discretionary power is significantly constrained in comparison to
that of the ICTY, where the judiciary was able to modify the ICTY Rules o f

Procedure and Evidence.
The third category is a source of last resort. While it may involve a certain amount
of judicial discretionary power, it is only to be used in the absence of the first two
sources.

W hile some commentators have suggested that this source will

engender an enhanced role for comparative criminal law,404 considering the status
400 Ibid. at Artide 21(2)
401 Ibid. at Articles 22 - 33. These principles are in application by the ICTY too, although
not necessarily expressed formally in its basic documents. If they were not applied, the
ICTY would not be considered to be operating in accordance with the European
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 86 at Article 6.
402One might argue that the ICTY Statute is now accepted in all former Yugoslav republics
through accession to the Dayton Agreement and various national implementing
legislation. See: Ivo Josipovic, “Implementing Legislation for the Application of the Law
on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Criteria for its
Evaluation” (1998) Y.I.H.L. 35. This does not change the fact that its legal basis is
founded in Security Council Resolution 827 and therefore has the force of a Security
Council Resolution rather than a treaty.
403 For instance, see the explanatory note preceding the ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, supra note 2; and also Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 51(5). There is
no chance that this document could ever have the same status as its ICTY equivalent.
404 This issue was discussed in the course of the preparation of this thesis with the co
supervisor Interview Professor H. Kindred and Ian Rennie (17 August 2002). Professor
Kindred was of the view that this third option would be unlikely to ever be the basis of a
criminal prosecution, although it might be useful in a contested case where the first two
sources required greater interpretation. There is divergence in this view. Professor J.
Verhoeven was of the opposite outlook, arguing that it was an important source of law
for the ICC (mentioned in his lectures at I'Acadbmie de droit international de La Haye
during the public international law course from 22 July 2002 to 9 August 2002
[publication expected in 2003]. Professor Schabas seems to be much of the same view
(Schabas, supra note 2 at 73). He dtes that this is already the practice before the ICTY
and ICTR. He may not realize that the limitations on the exercise of discretionary power
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of this source, such a contention might be debatable. It is conceivable that this
argument may also apply to the second source of law. The laborious elaboration of
the particularities o f each core crime is described to the smallest detail in the
documents under the first category (Rome Statute, Elements o f Crimes and Rules

of Procedure and Evidence). The potential exercise of discretion is minimized.
Restrictions on Diversity o f Interpretation
Some academics suggest that there exists an absolute requirement that States
prosecute serious offenders of human rights, especially if explicitly so required in
treaties such as the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 1984 Torture Convention, the
1949 Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute.40* There may exist some doubt
as to whether such obligations represent absolute international legal obligations.406
While this may be true, the Rome Statute does not allow reservations.407 It also
limits the scope fo r diversity of interpretation.408 Therefore the Member States
of the judiciary may vary between the ICTY and the ICC. It may be that this third source
is simply foe informal source of law to be used only as persuasive authority where foe
first two formal sources do not suffice. In this sense the sources may be clarified over
those of the ICTY and foe possibility of the judiciary enlarging its scope of law actually
curtailed by the Rome Statute.
405 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Amnesty and the International Criminal Court” in Dinah Shelton,
ed. International Crimes, Peace, and Human Rights: The Role of the International
Criminal Court (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2000) at 77; also
Garth Meintjes, ‘ Domestic Amnesties and International Accountability,” ibid. For foe
treaties: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
supra note 368; the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, supra note 36; the Hague
Rules, supra note 162; and Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46 (Annex),
U.N. GAOR 39*’ Sess., supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/51 (1985), reprinted in
231.L.M. 1027 (1984).
406 John Dugard also makes this point: John Dugard, ‘Reconciliation and Justice: The
South African Experience” (1998) 8 Transnafl L. and Contemp. Probs. 277 at 281. He
feels that state practice is too unsettled to suggest that there exists a customary
obligation to prosecute, and in the case of South Africa, it had not been party to the
various conventions which may (or may not) indicate a requirement to prosecute alleged
perpetrators of international crimes (apartheid).
407Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Artide 120.
404This is the point o f the detailed listings of the core crimes within the Rome Statute, ibid.
at Articles 6 and 7 and 8; but also their elaboration in foe Elements o f Crimes, supra
note 2. Also consider Sandra L. Bunn-Livingstone, supra note 12 at 173-301
(reservations) and 77-126 (diversity of interpretation).
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have consented to its description of offences and are under an obligation to apply
the Statute.409 Some States Parties’ legislatures have already begun the process
of harmonizing their laws to accommodate the Rome Statute410 The Rome
Statute therefore represents the emergence of a universal interpretation of its
provisions and a codification o f some aspects of international criminal law.4,f This
is quite a different approach to the ICTY, where its judges relied upon European
and international legal instruments to which it was assumed that the successor
States o f the former Yugoslavia had acceded.412 Rather than presuming that such
409 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 12(1) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 23 May 1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331 at Article 18.
410 See: Constitutional Law No. 99-568 of 8 July 1999, France. Other countries have
followed including Luxembourg and the Czech Republic. See: Venice Commission,
Report on Constitutional Issues Raised by the Ratification of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court Adopted by the Commission at Hs lSh Plenary Meeting,
(Venice, 15-16 December 2000), Document No. CDL-INF (2001) 1 (Strasbourg: Council
of Europe,15 January 2001), online: <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDLINF(2001)001-e.html>(date accessed: 10 January 2002);
also Rudolf Beate,
“International Decisions: Statute of the International Criminal Court, Decision No. 98-408
DC, 1999 J.O. 1317,“ (2000) 94 A.J.I.L. 391 [actual decision: Decision No. 98-408 DC,
du 22 janvier 1999, J.O., 22 January 1999, 1317, online: <http://www.consertconstitutionnel.ff/decision/1998/98408/98408dc.htm> (date accessed: 14 November
2001). For a summary see: Helen Duffy, National Constitutional Compatibility and the
International Criminal Court (2001) 11 Diuke J. Comp. & Infl L. 5 and M. Andfe Dulait,
Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires etrangdres, de la defense et des
forces armdes sur le projet de for adoptd par I’assembld nationale, autorisant la
ratification de la convention portant statut de la Cour pdnale Internationale,(116me
ldgisl.):2065, 2141 et T.A. 443 [French Senate No. 259 Session ordinare 1999-2000
dated 8 March 2000 Annexe au procds verbal de la sdance du 8 mars 2000].
411 There is a provision in the Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 98, which holds that
the Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance that would require
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with
respect to a third State without that third State’s cooperation. This was the provision that
the drafters of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act 2002 (supra note 6) were
trying to rely upon - through the planned re-negotiation of Status of Forces Agreements
to ensure that extradition of American service personnel to the ICC would not happen in
any host State. Regardless, this provision does not have an impact on the harmonizing
effect that the Statute wiH have on the Member States and various international
provisions concerning human rights and international humanitarian law.
412 European Union Council of Ministers, “Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union” (16 December
1991) reprinted in Danilo TQrk, ‘Annex 1: Declaration on the ‘Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’” (1993) 4 E.J.I.L.
72 [also referred to as European Political Cooperation, Press Release, P. 128/91] and
also ibid., Annex 2: ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia” at 73 [also referred to as European
Political Cooperation, Press Release, P. 129/91]. In both of these documents respect
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international instruments are universal, the Rome Statute makes them so by
prohibiting reservations by States Parties. Coupled with the reservations is the
detailed description of offences both in the Rome Statute but also in the Elements
o f Crimes. There is less room for diversity of interpretation at the domestic or the
international level - a significant limitation in discretionary power at both levels
within their respective judiciaries and within their respective political bodies.
Relationship with the United Nations
The relationship between the ICC and the United Nations may represent a further
form of constraint on judicial decision-making. The Court is required to recognize
and respect the status and mandate of the United Nations.413 The relationship
between the two is cooperative.414

Incorporated into the Rome Statute is a

provision, which allows the Assembly o f States Parties to request an advisory
opinion from the ICJ through the General Assembly.415

This may represent

recognition of the jurisdiction of the ICJ - along the lines of a separation of powers.
The relationship with the ICJ is therefore parallelist (or dualist) and not

for human rights, ethnic minorities and subscription to the commitments to the
framework of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) - and
hence the European Court of Human Rights. These statements are reflected in the
Secretary-General's report that introduced the ICTY Statute to the Security Council
(supra note 185). Note that CSCE is referred to; its institutional title was changed to the
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1994 after it had become a
regional organization for the purposes of Chapter VIII of the Charter, supra note 26.
See: Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE Final Act: 25, 19752000
Handbook
(Vienna:
OSCE,
2001),
available
online:
<http://www.osce.org/publications/handbookyhandbook.pdf> (date accessed: 27 August
2002) at 12-16.
413 Draft Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations and the International
Criminal Court: Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator, Preparatory
commission
for
the
International
Criminal
Court,
UN
Doc.
No.
PCNICC/2001/L.1/Rev.1/Add. 1 (14 March 2001) at Articles 2(2) and 2(3). This
document is online: ICC website < http://Www.un.org/law/icc/index.html> (date
accessed: 5 March 2002).
414 Ibid. at Articles 4,5 and 6.
415 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 119 and A Draft Relationship Agreement
Between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, supra note 415 at
Article 13b.
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complementary. This may be indicative of a major delim itation between the two
courts, further regulating the exercise of judicial discretionary power.

Qualifications
The required qualification for admission to the judiciary is revealing. While the
required background is sim ilar to that required for the ICJ and ICTY,416 the ICC
judges are selected from persons who,417
.. .have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and
the necessary relevant experience...
(as judge, prosecutor or advocate) and those who,418
...have established competence in relevant areas o f international
law such as international humanitarian law and the law of human
rights, and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity
which is of relevance to the judicial work o f the Court.
The proportion of judges qualified in criminal law to those qualified in international
law has been fixed at nine to five.419 Unlike the ICTY this represents a major
416 For instance ‘persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess
the qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest
judicial offices.” (Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 36(3)(a))
417 Ibid. at Article 36(3)(b)(i).
418 Ibid. at Artide 36(3)(b)(ii). This raises a curious question about the recent efforts to
establish an international criminal bar association for the ICC (see Stephanie Maupas,
‘The Third Pillar Creation of the International Criminal Bar” (17 June 2002), online:
dipiomatiejudiciaire.com
<http:/Awww.dipkxnatiejudiciaire.com/UMCCUK9.htm>(date
accessed: 6 July 2002)). Could this initiative be based upon an incorrect analogy of the
ICC to a domestic criminal court? The idea of pillars comes from European Law (see
Klaus-Oieter Borchardt, The ABC of Community Law, supra note 86). Presumably the
pillars of the ICC are the judidaiy and the prosecution - the third would be the
international criminal bar. The initiative has been met with varying degrees of hostility
from various groups, induding lawyers themselves. Yet on the other hand a control over
those lawyers who appear pleading cases, might avoid some of the problems
associated with counsel in the two tribunals - especially attempts to use it a (brum for
political grand standing (for example ICTY Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, supra note
177 at Rule 77 and Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (2000), Case No. IT-94-1, (International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber), ‘Judgement in
Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel Milan Vujin,” online:
ICTY
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appealMjjin-e/index.htm >(date accessed: 6 July 2002).
[Judgement dated 31 January 2000; Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Presiding].
419 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 36(5).
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expansion of the scope of judicial enlightenment from beyond criminal law. It may
also represent a counterweight to the separation of powers between the ICJ and
the ICC in that there w ill be judges with expertise in the subject m atter of the ICJ public international law. Rather than a relationship of absolute parallelism, the
relationship may be capable of being complementary. Such an approach should
seem logical, since international crime is both international and criminal. It must
however be remembered that individuals have no standing before the ICJ,
therefore the relationship between the two courts w ill always be independent and
parallel. The ICC judiciary w ill however now possess sensitivity toward issues of
public international law.
Judicial Appointments
The nomination o f candidates for judicial office begins with their nomination in
accordance with the procedure for appointment to high judicial office in their own
States or alternatively by the nomination procedure sim ilar to that of the ICJ.420
The State Party w ill forward the nomination to the Assembly of States Parties.421
The Assembly of States Parties elects the judges through a two-thirds majority of
the States Parties present and voting.422 States Parties may take into account the
need for equitable representation of global legal systems, geographical
representation, gender and specific expertise (such as violence against women
and children).423 The term of office lasts for nine years and is not renewable424
Judges are not to engage in any activity likely to affect their independence (such
as employment)425 A judge may be removed from office for serious misconduct

420Rome Statute, ibid. at Article 36(4)(a).
421 Ibid. at Artide 36(4)(b)
422Ibid. at Article 36(6Xa).
423 Ibid. at Article 36(8). Unlike the ICJ or ICTY, gender and specific area of expertise
considerations are novel.
424Ibid. at Article 36<9)(a).
425Ibid. at Article 40. Their immunities are similar to the ICJ under Article 48.
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only by a two-thirds majority vote by the Assembly of States Parties, after being so
recommended by a two-thirds majority vote of the other judges.426 The President
o f the Court may take disciplinary measures against a judge (reprimand or fine).427
Reprimands are forwarded and recorded by the President of the Bureau of the
Assembly o f States Parties.428
The nature of judicial appointments is therefore quite different to that o f the ICJ
and the ICTY.

While nomination may involve the Security Council (if the ICJ

approach is adopted), it will more likely involve the States Parties themselves since
those States that do not sit on the Security Council w ill be able to avoid the Council
vetting their nominations for candidature.

The role of the Assembly of States

Parties gives the entire system a much greater “democratic” character in that there
is no filtration possible by the Security Council and that the elections are based
upon a two-thirds majority, rather than a majority of a college of states (of which 5
States have a permanent vote). The duration of a nine-year term is reminiscent of
the ICJ, but the prohibition of renewal undermines any residual influence, related
to the incentive for re-election, that might exist from either the nominating State
Party or the Assembly of States Parties. Removal from office is determined by the
other judges (Plenary) but is subject to approval by the Assembly of States Parties.
Thus the discretionary powers of the President are limited (in comparison to the
ICTY) largely to the imposition of disciplinary measures against delinquent judges
and to an advisory role to the Assembly o f States Parties. There is a substantial
lim itation of discretionary power. This may be expected, given the existence o f the
quasi-legislative Assembly of States Parties.

426 Ibid. at Article 46(2)(a).
427 Ibid. at Artide 47. Also ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 2 at Rule
30(1) and Rule 32.
426ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 2 at Rule 30(4).
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Amendments
The power of amending the basic documents of the ICC also reveals severe
limitations imposed upon the exercise o f judicial discretion, although not
immediately. For the first seven years of the Court’s operation, the Assembly of
States Parties w ill possess no power to amend the Rome Statute.429 In the interim,
the ICC w ill operate much as the ICTY did in its formative years with the judges
exercising their discretionary powers to direct the decisions of the Court Their
decisions w ill have to be in conformity with the limitations on their powers.
After the expiry of the seven years, any State Party may propose amendments to
the Statute through the Secretary-General, who is obligated to pass these on to
the States Parties.430 The role of the Secretary-General is restricted to simply
disseminator, as she simply notifies the States Parties. The Assembly of States
Parties only meets once a year.431 Three months later the Assembly of States
Parties w ill consider any proposal and may adopt it on a two-thirds majority vote.432
Alternatively the proposal may be handed over to a Review Conference and
eventually adopted through a two-thirds majority vote433 The Secretary-General of
the United Nations also acts as facilitator, for it is through her, on behalf of the
Assembly of States Parties (after a majority approval), that the Review
Conferences are convened.434
Amendments to the subsidiary legislative documents, like the Statute, downplay
involvement by the judiciary in favour of the Assembly of States Parties.
429Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 121(1).
430Ibid.
431 Ibid. at Article 112(6) although it may also meet as required in special session. The
infrequent meetings may give the Assembly a quasi-legislative character from the start.
This could change though if the special sessions are used frequently.
432Ibid. at Artide 121(2) and 121(3).
433Ibid.
434Ibid. at Article 123.
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Amendments to the Elements of Crimes may be proposed by any State Party, the
judges acting in absolute majority or the Prosecutor.435 They must be adopted by a
two-thirds majority o f the Assembly of States Parties.436 Amendments to the Rules

o f Procedure and Evidence may similarly be proposed and require a two-thirds
absolute majority for adoption by the Assembly of States Parties.437
The lim itations imposed upon the judiciary are quite significant, in its powers to
carry out amendments to the constitutional documents o f the ICC. The judiciary
does not have the power to suggest amendments to the Statute, although it can
have input in changing the secondary instruments of the Court. It is probable that
the judiciary may have an informal consultative role through the Bureau. The role
of the Assembly of States Parties, coupled with a role by States Parties represent
the sole means by which amendments to the Statute are accomplished.
Amendments are adopted democratically through a majority vote. This process is
quite different to that of the United Nations C harter- perhaps even streamlined.438
There is no qualified voting procedure and no veto under any condition. Judicial
discretionary power is not entirely eliminated in the secondary legislation, but the
Assembly scrutinizes it
The Rome Statute therefore sets out some rather significant limitations on judicial
discretionary power. Complementarity itself requires that the Court steer clear of
any tendency toward supranationalism - a limitation.

The qualifications of the

judges suggest a broadening of the scope o f jurisdiction to include international

435Ibid. at Article 9(2).
436 Ibid. at Artide 9(3).
437 Ibid. at Article 51(2). There is provision for urgent cases where the judges may, on a
two-thirds majority, draw up provisional rules or amendments (or reject existing ones).
There is however a requirement that these changes be proposed to the Assembly at its
next ordinary or special meeting. See Article 51(3). The ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, supra note 2 at Rule 3 deals with Amendments but simply refers to the
provisions of Article 51 of the Rome Statute (an indication of the primacy of the Statute).
438 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26 at Articles 108-109.
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law along with criminal law. This apparent increase in discretionary power is offset
by the narrow selection o f sources of law available and in particular, the primacy of
the Rome Statute above all other legal sources, followed by its own detailed,
subsidiary documents. It is also offset by the explicit recognition of the status of
the UN and the jurisdiction of the ICJ. An examination o f the manner in which
judges are appointed reveals the increasing importance o f the Assembly of States
Parties in electing them through a majority vote. This can be contrasted to the
manner in which both ICJ and ICTY judges are elected. The accountability of
judges for serious misbehaviour rests with the Assembly o f States Parties rather
than with the judiciary itself. Only in cases of disciplinary action w ill the President
act, although with the supervision of the Assembly of States Parties. Amendments
to the Rome Statute rely primarily upon the Assembly of States Parties. The role
of the judiciary has been reduced in governing the Court. In the case of the ICTY
this power to amend the quasi-constitutional Rules o f Procedure and Evidence,
amounted to a legislative power being exercised by the judiciary. This power has
passed to the Assembly of States Parties in the framework of the Rome Statute.
Overall, the Rome Statute limits the exercise of judicial discretionary power and
vests it with the Assembly of States Parties.

Conclusion
In describing further limitations on judicial power uniquely at the level of
international courts, insight has been gleamed regarding the interaction of
complementarity on the international courts themselves. The international legal
environment is adverse to the concept of centralization or supranationalism. In
exercising judicial discretionary power within such a framework, the ICJ has opted
for a very narrow conception of its jurisdiction but one that is also very
conservative. By so doing the centralization that Kelsen envisioned has never
been realized. The proliferation o f international courts and tribunals, the rising
influence o f NGOs and an increase in the number of States in the wake of
decolonisation has increased the decentralization of the international legal order.
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In such an environment, international courts have regulated themselves in order to
preserve this decentralized character. This was evident in the extremely narrow
concept of jurisdiction within the ICJ. There are however judges who want to
adopt a much broader concept In the case of the ICTY, initially a wide concept of
jurisdiction was adopted with broad discretionary powers. The result of such an
approach has been the acquisition of a supranational character on the part of the
ICTY. This character flows from the ICTY being a subsidiary organ of the Security
Council, established under a Chapter VII Security Council Resolution.

The

judiciary has tried to narrow the ICTY’s wide discretionary powers by expanding
the available sources of law, but the narrowing is incomplete due to the nature of
the ICTY Statute and the way in which it governs itself.

It still retains a

supranational character in the way in which it asserts its jurisdiction and therefore
is disjunctive.
The Rome Statute sets up a somewhat different structure of judicial limitation. It
describes its jurisdiction as both criminal and international. The judicial limitations
are in place through complementarity, the primacy of the Statute as a source of
law, and its statutory comity to the United Nations. By submitting requests for
advisory opinions through the General Assembly to the ICJ, the ICC will have to
recognize and respect the jurisdiction of the ICJ - what might be a parallelist
approach in recognizing other international jurisdictions.

The accountability of

judges rests primarily with the Assembly of States Parties rather than with the
judges themselves (except in less serious disciplinary matters). The appointment
of judges is mostly in the hands of the Assembly of States Parties. After seven
years, the Amendment procedure for the Statute w ill be in the hands of the
Assembly.

In the initial “formative’' seven years, the judiciary w ill have some

degree of freedom in rendering the precedents, but only in conformity with the
restrictions imposed upon its discretionary power. Amendments to the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence are also entirely subject to the approval o f the Assembly
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of States Parties.

Thus governance o f the ICC by the judiciary is far more

restrictive than in the situation o f the ICTY.
The Rome Statute entails a fully participative approach, investing roles for
numerous domestic and international entities in helping to direct the Court’s
decision-making. Complementarity ensures that such a deliberative approach is
possible. Yet in addition to complementarity as described in the Rome Statute, a
secondary mechanism is operative.

It is a subtle mechanism but relates to

inherent restrictions on judicial power at the international level.

Whether the

sources of such limitation comes from the nature of the decentralized international
legal system, the sources of law or the nuances of the internal organization of the
various international courts, in the case of the ICC the result is a supplemental
means of regulation, reinforcing complementarity.

In the next chapter an

illustration of both complementarity and its interstitial analogue will be
accomplished by considering the truth and reconciliation commission.
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Chapter 5

Chapter Five: A Case Study of Complementarity - Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions and Amnesties
introduction
While it is difficult forecast how the ICC w ill operate in the near future, the image of
the Court portrayed in the last three chapters makes such predictions feasible at
least in terms of how it ought to function. There are many examples where its
restricted subject matter, the complementary relationship between it and the
domestic courts (lim its on the Prosecutor and judiciary as stipulated in the Rome
Statute) and the lim its inherent upon the ICC judiciary outside of the Rome Statute
could be considered. One might consider these areas as potential sources of
‘‘conflict.’’ “Conflict” may not be the appropriate word to describe the interaction.
They are ‘‘challenges,” which confront this emerging and complex legal interaction.
Examples of such challenges could include:

the relationship between the

ICC/Assembly of States Parties and the United Nations;439 access to information
that might be considered classified by a subject State;440 the provision of classified
information from one State to the ICC, but without permission from the subject
State;441 extradition;442 competing requests;443 conflicts of international legal

439 Draft Agreement between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court,
supra note 415.
440Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 72
441 Ibid. at Article 73.
442 This is ultimately the Pinochet problem. Consider Roman Boed, “The Effect of a
Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators of
Serious Human Rights Violations,” (2000) 33 Cornell Infl L.J. 297; and Christine Chinkin,
M., “International Decision: United Kingdom House of Lords, (Spanish request for
extradition). Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (no.
3). [1999J 2 Wlr 827’ (1999) 93 A.J.I.L. 703.
443Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 90.

137

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

138
obligations;444 what happens when the Security Council refers a case to the ICC,
where an individual/State is not a State Party;445 whether the ICC could have
jurisdiction over individuals who may have committed international crimes under its
jurisdiction while occupying a position of responsibility for an international
organization (such as the United Nations Security Council) instead of a State; the
relationship with international organizations;446 and the truth and reconciliation
commission (TRC) coupled with amnesties. TRCs and amnesties have become a
rather popular means of redirecting States gone awry, onto the path toward
normalcy. It is for this reason that their study presents a useful opportunity to
study the mechanism o f complementarity in action alongside how judicial
discretionary power to prosecute is regulated. If the ICC were to deny amnesties
outright, or the validity of TRCs, would it be interfering with this process?447

How

should it decide?
The aim of this chapter is to answer these questions. This chapter is divided into
two parts. In Part I, a brief examination of the validity of amnesties at international
law prior to the introduction of the Rome Statute is considered.

All possible

variants of TRCs are considered, however it becomes evident quickly that one
cannot dismiss any one o f these variants as invalid and along with them any
associated amnesty. A more sophisticated assessment of the use of discretionary
power by a jurisdiction is necessary. John Dugard's assessment of the South
African TRC and associated amnesties is useful in this respect although it is only

444 In particular Ibid. at Article 98. This is the provision that ASPA tends to rely upon in
making States renegotiate their SOFAs in order to bring it into effect.
445 Madeline Morris, supra note 43. This was the basis of Mr. Lahiri’s objection for India.
Can the Security Council refer a case to the ICC under Chapter VII of the Charter - and
if so does that mean that the jurisdiction of the ICC is backed-up by the Security Council
Resolution and therefore applicable even to non-State Parties? Consider Mr. Lahiri’s
comments, supra note 42.
446This is the subject of the next chapter.
447 Consider Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 27(2). The Article is restricted to
immunities of persons in official capacity - what about all persons?
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the informed opinion of one academic.

The United Nations’ position is then

examined initially with respect to Sierra Leone and the Lom6 Peace Agreement.4**
Latest developments appear to have harmonized its position with that of the two
ad hoc tribunals - namely that amnesty is not forbidden per se. It is a matter for
the domestic jurisdiction, with the exception of those most egregious of
international crimes committed by those most responsible acting as agents of the
State.

In such exceptional cases, both the fiduciary nature of the individual’s

position and the nature of the crime necessitate international prosecution by the
international community.
In Part II, just how the ICC determines the validity of an amnesty is considered.
There exist two tests: 1) the test to determine if the domestic courts are unwilling
or incapable of dealing with a situation; and 2) the ne bis in idem test, primarily
aimed at instances of determining if a domestic investigation, prosecution or
acquittal was carried out in bad faith, an abuse of process or simply a “sham’’ to
shield the accused. The justification for asking for a deferral to the ICC from the
domestic courts (or the “issue of admissibility’’ in the words of the Rome Statute) is
significantly more restrained than was the case in the ICTY.

The State is

presumed to be acting in propriety, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Furthermore through the system of discretionary diversity contained in the Rome
Statute, there are many more entities that can either promote or challenge the
application of both tests. These entities include the States themselves, NGOs and
the Security Council.

They are non-judicial bodies.

decision-makers is built into the Rome Statute.

Thus a role for political

The section closes with a

discussion of the potential for TRCs of a very different nature to those tolerable
under the system of ad hoc tribunals. There is a wider scope for TRCs of a quasi
judicial character under the Rome Statute thanks to its increased conjunctivity than
448 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone and The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
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in the case of the ICTY. Thus the South African TRC and amnesties would likely
be tolerated under the Rome Statute, but not under the ICTY Statute. Thus the
Rome Statute may indicate a greater potential for the toleration of amnesties and a
wide variety of TRC variants by the ICC.

The Validity of Amnesty at International Law Prior to the Rome Statute
Possible Variants o f TRCs
Table - Discretionary Combinatorial Matrix of Domestic Variants of TRCs

A

1

1

1

B
C
D

1
1
0

1
0
1

0
1
1

E
F
G
H

1

0
1
0
0

0
0
1

0
0
0

0

Description/Example
Balanced TRC - foil involvement by all branches of
State (ideal)
Undemocratic TRC - Chile
Extra-Judicial TRC - Sierra Leone
Extra-Executive TRC - South Africa
Exclusively Executive TRC - Rwanda or Uganda
Exclusively Judicial TRC - ‘pure rule of law” (ideal)
Exclusively Legislative TRC - ‘ rule of mob”
Non-State TRC - rejection of formal TRC

The table above might come to mind if one thinks of all possible variants of
involvement by the three branches of the domestic jurisdiction. Any one of these
variants may be suitable for a given context. The table represents a “truth” table
based upon the presence of influences from the three branches of the State: the
executive, judiciary and legislature.449 A folly balanced TRC is probably
Leone (RUF/SL), 18 May 1999 (entry into force 25 May 1999) [hereinafter Lom6 Peace
Agreement], online: < http://www.sierra-leone.gov.sl/ncddrr/kxne_pea.htiTi >.
449 The truth table is based upon the logical construct of the executive and judiciary and
legislature. Thus since any one of these variables may be adequate or not, a total of 23
or eight possibilities exist. William Burke-White, supra note 30 at 479 for example
considers only two variables in his categorization of TRCs: legitimacy and scope. His
approach is heavily steeped in the relationship of the individual to the State to determine
legitimacy and the legislated protection (through conventional and customary law) of
individual rights authorized by individuals to the State to determine scope (a test of
proportionality). This approach presupposes the primacy of international human rights
and the rise of the individual in international criminal law. It may also presuppose a
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unrealizable, since the conditions which give rise to a need for the TRC, occur
when the apparatus of the State goes awry - or one o f the branches fails to
exercise effective control.

Perhaps a fully balanced TRC is represented by a

properly functioning domestic judicial system. Those situations where only one
branch is effective represent cases of the State gone awry:

the exclusively

executive, exclusively judicial and exclusively legislative variants. The option to
have no official TRC may amount to a collective denial of a past too difficult to
confront450 Some advocates o f universal human rights might insist that any TRC
that is judicial in nature is acceptable,451 although they might equally argue that it
must be non-judicial, in order to allow prosecution by international courts of
international crimes.452 Advocates of legal realism might argue that the State
(executive and/or legislature) has full discretion in overriding the judicial
prosecution of such cases.453 There might be compelling reasons not to prosecute
all instances of violations.454 Thus the decision to establish a specific variant of

universal form of human rights law. The existence of such a legal order has been
questioned throughout this thesis and the Rome Statute does not necessarily create
such an order. By William Burke-White’s liberal approach, the option of no TRC at all
seems to be excluded as viable. It may be that his approach is too restrictive.
450 Confronting the truth is not necessarily a guarantee of restoring harmony (Johnathan
Allen, ‘Balancing Justice and Social Unity: Political Theory and the Idea of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission,” (1999) 49 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 315 at 317).
451 Lousie Arbour, supra note 34 or A. Cassese, supra note 346 both hold that primacy of
the rule of law as sacrosanct in the operation of the ICTY in this context.
452 This will be explored shortly, but consider President Jorda’s views expressed in ICTY,
Press Release JL/P.I.S./591-e, supra note 179.
453 Marc Grossman, supra note 231 for example.
454 Alex Boraine was of this opinion in assessing the South African approach to the
granting of amnesties. Alex Boraine, A Country Unmasked: Inside South Africa's Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 384-5. He
also recommended caution in applying the South African approach to all situations.
Thus blindly applying any one to aH circumstances is inappropriate. Naomi Roht-Arriaza
suggests that collective denial was an appropriate choice for Japan in dealing with its
painful legacy in World War II (“Overview” in Naomi Roht-Arriaza, supra note 407 at
226). Also consider Tomochika Okamoto, The Distortion and the Revision of History in
Postwar Japanese Textbooks, 1945-1998 (M.A. Thesis, Sociology Department of
Queen’s College, City University of New York, 1998) [unpublished], online:
<http://member.nifty.ne.jp/romochika/> (date accessed: 2 July 2002) at Conclusion.
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TRC is very much context specific and is generally an assessment o f how the
domestic discretionary powers are exercised.

The Exercise of No Discretionary Powers to Stay Prosecution
The failure to exercise discretionary power to not prosecute equally raises
problems.

Those who often are alleged to have committed atrocities are

frequently the only individuals that are competent to enter into negotiation for
peaceful resolutions to conflict Thus the indictment of Milosevic by Louise Arbour
in 1999 was hardly beneficial to a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo conflict.455
This situation represents at least one practical reason why discretion should be
exercised in prosecuting individuals for international crimes.

There may be

pressing reasons of a non-judicial nature for an amnesty, regardless o f whether it
amounts to impunity.
The example of Rwanda provides another vivid illustration of what happens when
little or no discretionary power is exercised. In genocide o f national scale, there
were vast numbers of individuals who were complicit in some form.

Nearly

150,000 persons remain in detention since the RPF assumed power in 1994. The
Rwandese executive is of the position that all persons against whom an
accusation was made, should be held individually criminally accountable. The
Rwandese justice system has become overwhelmed. Crowded prisons put an
enormous drain on the resources o f the government and the nation, not to mention
a judiciary still recovering from being one of the first casualties of the genocide.
Many of those detained and still awaiting trial suffer deplorable conditions, which
are in contravention to their basic human rights under the ICCPR.456

Despite

efforts to diffuse the problem through the introduction of plea bargaining
455Arbour, supra, note 34 and for the Indictment itself see supra note 250.
456 ICCPR, supra note 189 at Article 9. ‘Rwanda: Elections May Speed Genocide Trials
But New System Lacks Guarantee of Rights,” Human Rights Watch News (4 October
2001),
online:
Human
Rights
Watch
<http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/10/rwanda1004.htm> (date accessed:
4 October
2001).
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(marchandage),457 restoration of the judicial system and the introduction of a
regional tribal court system (Gacaca),458 the RPF remains in a vindictive mood to
all those whom it deems even remotely connected to the genocide.459 While there
is a National Unity and Reconciliation Committee, this TRC remains dominated by
the executive, with the President at its head.

It is simply an instrument for

denunciation o f persons or entities that are suspected of complicity with the
genocide. Thus in the case of Rwanda, its TRC is essentially of the exclusively
executive variant
Discretionary Power to Grant Amnesties
Ultimately the exercise of a discretionary power by officials in one or more
branches of State is necessary in order to decide whether there are compelling
reasons not to prosecute.

Whether the decision explicitly grants an amnesty,

defers prosecution to a later date or confers immunity, does not matter in this

For a comprehensive overview see:
Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda:
A Lawyers Committee report on the ICTR and National Trials (New York: Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, July 1997) at VIII(C) [unpaginated]. Plea-bargaining is
objectionable to the civil law system as it represents a deviation from the truth and the
exercise of discretionary powers by the judiciary inconsistent with the limitations on such
discretion imposed by the legislature through statute.
458 Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30,1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for
Offences constituting the Crime o f Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed
since October 1, 1990 (Rwanda), 30 August 1996, Article 2 online: Prevent Genocide
International Homepage <http://Www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm
>(date accessed 18 October 2001). This is a translation into English. Also note that on
19 June 2002, the first Gacaca trials were held: Emmanuel Mutabazi, Ladislas
Niyongira, and Ephrem Rugiririza, The Gacaca Ballet Comes on Stage’ Judicial
Diplomacy
(19
June
2002),
online:
Judicial
Diplomacy
<
http://Www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/UK/RwandaUK11.htm> (date accessed: 4 July
2002). It should be noted that the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note
462, has suggested that the Gacaca courts likely violate the ICCPR, supra note 189 at:
Article 14(1) and Article 26 (right to equality before the law - not in the case of RPF
personnel); and Article 14(3)(b) (right to defence counsel - denied under Gacaca); and
Article 14(5) (right to appeal - denied under Gacaca). The popularity of the Gacaca
system amongst legal academics is probably a result of wanting to see reflexive law in
operation, outside of the parameters of the State - and therefore an endorsement of
modem liberal theory. Also consider Sadat, supra note 66 at 57.
459 RPF personnel are not subject to the normal judicial system but rattier to the military
system of courts.
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discussion. The decision not to prosecute may represent a major step forward on
the path to reconciliation within a divided society:460
Reconciliation in South Africa is a process which started not only
when enemies sat on opposing sides o f a table but also when
victims told their stories and perpetrators confessed their atrocities.
It is a process which must continue long alter the Commission has
completed its task.
Yet it may also be representative of a situation where the branches o f State have
been co-opted by criminal groups to shield themselves or frustrate efforts at
making them individually accountable for their acts. The international community
is therefore faced with a dilemma. Are there compelling reasons to accept the
decision or is it simply subterfuge aimed at preventing a prosecution and further
pushing the State toward the commission of international crime and going awry?
The Confused Situation Prior to the Rome Statute
South Africa
John Dugard tried to carry out an assessment of whether the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission was compatible under international law.461
Although there were numerous international conventional instruments regarding
apartheid and related crimes alleged to have occurred, South Africa was not a
party to any at the tim e in question. Yet Professor Dugard considered that in the
case of international crimes, “states do not enjoy absolute freedom o f choice in
deciding upon the measures to be taken* after a regime change.462 Despite
attempts to determine whether the South African amnesty was legally valid under
customary international law,463 the South African courts failed to address such a

460Boraine, supra note 459 at 377.
461 John Dugard, supra note 408.
462Ibid. at 280.
463 Ibid. at 299, citing Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v. President o f the Republic
o f South Africa 4 SALR, 683-5 (CC).
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question.464 Professor Dugard nevertheless concluded that it was, taking into
account the following factors:465
1. The amnesty was the result of a "political compact included in a liberal
Constitution that was given form by a statute enacted by a democratically
elected Parliament;” [legitimate]
2. The TRC and related committees were independent of the government and
broadly representative of the people; [independent and democratic]
3. The TRC was sufficiently funded and resourced to investigate fully and
thoroughly; [effective]
4. Safeguards were in place to protect the procedural rights of the "accused;”
[lawfully respectful o f human rights]
5. The TRC had the power to award compensation to victims in accordance
with the ICCPR; [lawfully respectful of human rights]
6. The TRC was obliged to submit a report o f its findings in a reasonable time
(3 years); [effective] and

464 Ibid. at 307.
465 Ibid. at 307. In the square brackets an adjective summarizing the factors has been
added. This analysis is preferred over the Joinet Report (Annex II: Set of Principles for
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity,
Appendix B: United Nations: Economic and Social Council: Distribution: General:
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, 26 June 1997: English: Original: French: Commission on Human
Rights: Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities:
Forty-ninth Session: Item 9 o f the Provisional Agenda: The Administration of Justice and
the Human Rights o f Detainees: Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human
Rights Violations (CtvH and Political) ' Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet Pursuant to
Sub-Commission Decision 1996/119, in 59 Law & Contemp. Prob. 249. at 264
[hereinafter the Joinet Report] at 262, online: LEXIS (Secondary Legal, Law Reviews
Combined) < http://www.lexis.com/researchytawschooJ>). This report is lengthy and
incorporates some 50 guidelines to what makes a TRC-related amnesty invalid. This
may be an attempt to curtail the exercise of discretionary power. It does not have any
legal force however (and neither do John Dugard’s factors for that matter).
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7. The Amnesty was not unconditional, [not disproportional]
For Dugard a TRC has to be legitimate, independent, democratic, effective and
legally respectful of human rights - only then is an amnesty valid if conferred
through such a TRC, where the amnesty is not unconditional.
The United Nations’ Position
The United Nations considers unconditional or blanket amnesties for international
crimes to be invalid at international law, no matter how pragmatic or popular their
use

might be domestically.466

The

United

Nations

Security Council’s

unenthusiastic support for the blanket amnesty of the Lom6 Peace Agreement of
May 1999,467 demonstrates how blanket amnesties may not be entirely valid under
international law, where international crimes are involved.466 This is despite the
fact that the Agreement was a precondition to the establishment of peace in Sierra
Leone. The Government of Sierra Leone eventually ignored the blanket amnesty
Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, U N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 915th mtg., U.N. Doc., S/2000/915, (2000) at Article III.
Paragraphs 22 and 23. Charles Villa-Vicencio also raises this point: Charles VillaVicencio, “Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the International
Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet,” (2000) 49 Emory L.J. 205 at 214. See
also Sadat, supra note 66 at 67, although she suggests that if blanket amnesties for
international crimes are not already prohibited at international law, they should be as
They undermine the rule of law and are, for the most part, simply self-serving
declarations by government officials exempting themselves from the reach of
law... "(/bid. at 68) This is an oversimplification of a much more difficult issue. Sadat's
outlook may be steeped in the primacy of rule of law and as such may be unrealistic.
467Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 453 at Article IX (the amnesty).
466 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, supra note 471. The RUF was also given control of the diamond mines and
cabinet positions in the government. Its position as an effective "shadow State" was
entrenched by the Agreement, yet by giving it cabinet positions it was re-integrated into
the State. See: Karen Gallagher, ‘No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities
of Amnesty in Sierra Leone" (2000) 23 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 149. Gallagher provides a
general synopsis of events leading to the repeal of the amnesty. See also: INS
Resource Information Center, supra note 117); Situation of Human Rights in Somalia:
Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms. Mona Rishmawi, Submitted in Accordance with
Commission on Human Rights Resolutfon 1997/47, ECOSOC 44* Sess., UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/96 (16 January 1998); and David Pratt, ‘Sierra Leone: Danger and
Opportunity in Regional Conflict” Report to Canada's Minister o f External Affairs, The
Honourable John Manley, PC, MP (Ottawa, 27 July 2001).
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provisions of the Accord, after the rebel leader, Foday Saybana Sankoh,
demonstrated bad faith by reattempting to usurp the State, through the capture of
thousands of UN peacekeepers and a failure to disarm his rebel forces in May
2000.469 He was subsequently arrested in violation of the Peace Agreement
Other aspects of the Agreement remained in force, including the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and a form of amnesty/rehabilitation for the abducted
child soldiers that constituted the majority of the rebel forces.470 Thus the treaty
was not entirely abrogated nor was the blanket amnesty entirely rejected. This
modified approach does recognize that in certain instances foil individual criminal
accountability may not be appropriate. In the case of Sierra Leone, the Security
Council recognized that unravelling the Agreement might not be the best route to
dealing with a Chapter VII crisis, opting instead for a Special Court to try only those
most responsible such as Sankoh. The role of the Security Council is important in
that it is a non-judicial body, along with the non-judicial elements of the
Government of Sierra Leone, exercising a discretionary prerogative not to
prosecute all instances of war crimes.
The situation with the ICTY is slightly different It must be remembered that the
ICTY is a judicial organ and therefore it possesses limited discretionary powers not
to prosecute. Such discretionary powers, at least according to the ICTY Statute,
reside in the final deferral of a matter to the Security Council in the case of an
uncooperative State.471 The indictment of Milosevic by Louise Arbour illustrates

469 For a description of the events that led to the failure of the Agreement see: Sixth
Report to the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 2000,
UN Doc. S/2000/832 (2000) at 1. This was probably in the aftermath of the
embarrassing situation that the UN peacekeepers found themselves in - namely the
taking hostage of thousands of Indian army peacekeepers. Sankoh has remained in
solitary confinement for the last year awaiting trial.
470 Security Council, Sixth Report to the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission
in Sierra Leone, ibid. at 1.
471 ICTY Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 7bis.
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that at least in 1999, the ICTY was narrowly focused solely on its judicial role.472
Given the danger posed by the indictment to international peace and security and
the subsequent appointment of a political advisor to the Prosecutor afterwards,
one might wonder if there was a realization that a purely judicial ICTY Prosecutor
was undesirable. One might also find that where the Prosecutor failed to exercise
such discretionary power not to prosecute, “on the ground” United Nations
peacekeepers and NATO intervention forces did exercise such discretion by not
always pursuing the indicted.473 Is it desirable to have such discretionary power so
informally delegated without oversight?
ICTY President Claude Jorda tried to deal with this issue when considering draft
legislation for a TRC in Bosnia.474 Although amnesties are not explicitly mentioned
in the ICTY Statute, there is a provision dealing with domestic pardons and
commutation of sentences:475
If, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the convicted
person is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or
commutation o f sentence, the State concerned shall notify the
472 Sadat, supra note 66 at 70-71 suggests that Milosevic did in fact receive a de facto
immunity through the Dayton Peace Agreement. Professor Sadat’s sources in support
of this statement are not conclusive. In addition while her report of the United States
offering immunity to Milosevic, provided he relinquished power in Serbia in 2000, does
not necessarily reflect the views of the international community, notwithstanding the
reliability of Sadat’s source (she cites Steven Ertanger, “U.S. Seeks Way Out for
Milosevic,” International Herald Tribune (19 June 2000) at 1 and certain utterances by
one Professor Williams and Bernard Kouchner at footnotes 111 to 113).
473 For example consider ‘Carla Del Ponte critique Taction de la Force de stabilisation en
Bosnie-Herz6govine”
Le
Monde
(23
August
2002),
online
<
http://www.lemonde.fr/artide/0,5987,3214-288108-l00.htinl> (date accessed:
24
August 2002). She is the current ICTY Prosecutor. She has called for a more
aggressive effort on the part of NATO forces in Bosnia to seek out and arrest Radovan
Karadzic, the political leader attributed for many of the atrocities in the Bosnian-Croatian
conflict in the early 1990s. In an interview with Agence France Presse, M"“ Del Ponte
spoke rather harshly of SFOR’s inability to capture Karadzic. This has resulted in some
tension between her and NATO. NATO denies that it has been ‘dragging its feet.”
474 ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.SV591-e, supra note 179. Remember that the judiciary of
the ICTY is completely independent of the Prosecutor (who answers to the Security
Council directly).
475ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 28.
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International Tribunal accordingly.
The President of the
International Tribunal, in consultation with the judges, shall decide
the matter on the basis o f the interests o f justice and the general
principles o f law.
Thus a discretionary authority is vested in the judiciary and the President in terms
of sentencing but there is still none with regard to whether to prosecute.
The President acknowledged th a t the Tribunal could not try a ll perpetrators of
serious violations of humanitarian law in its jurisdiction;476 it could not alone carry
out the process of ‘‘peace-making;’’ and its priority lay in trying the:477
...highest ranking military and political leaders...those who through
the great responsibilities which were theirs and the seriousness o f
the crimes ascribed to them...truly endangered international public
order.”
For the Commission, President Jorda was of the opinion that the TRC had a
necessary secondary role in: determining the fate of “lower ranking executioners;*
476As of 13 May 2002,108 individuals have been publicly indicted by the ICTY (see online:
ICTY < http://www.un.org/icty/>(date accessed: 13 May 2002). This is a far cry from all
instances of serious offences against international humanitarian law that have been
committed in the former Yugoslavia. The “Rules of the Road’ project and was intended
to expedite decision making of the Tribunal by filtering the most serious of allegations.
In 1996 40 such cases were examined and only 11 allegations followed-up with
indictment. In the spring of 1996, Bosnia and Herzegovina had submitted 1,500 alleged
instances of international crimes while Croatia had submitted 100. It is a pragmatic
approach. In a way the program reinforces complementarity in that it acknowledges the
potential of the domestic courts to prosecute the “small fry,* eventually. See
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Third Annual Report o f the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution o f Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia
Since 1991 (The Hague:
ICTY, 19%). online:
ICTY web site: <
http://www.un.org/icty/rappoftan/third-96.htm > (date accessed: 19 September 2001),
paragraphs 80-83. A similar mechanism exists in the case of the ICTR. As of 13 May
2002 there were 52 detainees in Arusha, Tanzania (see online:
ICTR <
http://www.ictr.org/>(date accessed: 13 May 2002). This is a far cry from the estimated
120,000+ persons detained domestically in Rwanda, for alleged offences relating to the
1994 genocide (see: M. Kimani, “News Analysis/ Rwanda’s Dilemma: Striking a
Balance Between Justice and Reconciliation,” in Kimani, M., ed., Four Reports on the
Film Screenings, Reconciliation, and The Gacaca Process (Arusha, Tanzania: Intemews
Arusha
Office,
30
May
2001),
online:
<
http://Www.intemews.org/activities/ICTR_Reports/ICTR_reports_may2001.htm > (date
accessed: 3 October 2001).
477ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.S./591-e, supra note 179.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

150
reparations for victims; carrying out the “pedagogical work” of analyzing the root
causes of the conflict; and providing a forum for the fashioning of a collective
“undiluted memory” for history.478 Amnesty, for those less serious of crimes,
committed by those lower ranking persons, is a matter for the domestic courts with
some advice by the Tribunal. Factors in determining seriousness of crimes include
the capacity of the accused as an agent of the State and the nature of the crime especially if an international crime. Those more serious of crimes, alleged to have
been committed by the highest-ranking officials of State, where the endangered
international public order - they are the subjects of the Tribunal. It is quite evident
that amnesty is not viable for them, although pardons and commuted sentences
maybe. They have to be prosecuted.
President Jorda’s position challenges the wording of the ICTY Statute, which
established a tribunal with “the power to prosecute person responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law” in the former Yugoslavia since 1991 as
prescribed.479 The ICTY is not tasked to deal with “the most serious violations.”
Yet this is the redefined task envisioned by President Jorda. Through a continuing
oversight of domestic prosecution of those “lesser fish,” it may be President
Jorda’s view that the statutory task of the ICTY can be met.
There is a growing view, that the domestic jurisdiction runs extra-judicial TRCs
while the international runs international criminal courts or international tribunals.
This is a separation o f powers, disjunctive and parallelist - in tension with the
concept of complementarity.

The international community often overlooks the

relationship:480

"'Ib id .
479ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 1. [underlining added]
480 This assertion may be controversial. Also consider the views of the Prosecutor, as
expressed by Louise Arbour, supra note 34. and Judge Cassese, supra note 346.
Respectfully, it is submitted that Judge Cassese’s article missed the principle of
complementarity as he described the absolute requirement of bringing individuals to trial

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151
The international community and the institutions tor accountability
that it creates too often forget this point concerning complementary
roles and adopt a somewhat condescending and dismissive
attitude toward national efforts at achieving justice.
The President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the form er Yugoslavia,
echoed the view that a complementary relationship must exist between the
Tribunal and a proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina:481
.. .1 consider it my duty to ensure that this national initiative not run
counter to the mission o f the Tribunal and that it be consonant with
the powers conferred on the Tribunal by the Security Council. I
also believe it appropriate to reflect on a system for reconciliation
which complements the work of the International Tribunal and
which allows for a more effective contribution to the reconstruction
o f national unity without which democracy and deep-rooted lasting
peace are impossible...
President Jorda could only envisage a commission functioning successfully, given
two overriding conditions:482
1. Its work must be complementary to that of the Tribunal; and
2. The mandate of the Commission must not be similar to that of the Tribunal.

and that there was no room for an amnesty of any sort. This may be understandable
given the confusion over terminology and the rapidly evolving nature of complementarity
as a doctrine.
481 ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.SV591-e, supra note 179 [underlining added]. Contrast this
with the Prosecutor’s suggestion that such a Commission would be "counter-productive
to the work of the tribunal” as described in: Jennifer Llewellyn and Sandra Raponi,
"Interview: The Protection of Human Rights Through International Criminal Law: A
Conversation with Madam Justice Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor for the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ (1999) 57 U.T. Fac. L. Rev.
83 at 94. The Prosecutor does not have a say in the governance of the Tribunal since
that is left to the Plenary, composed of judges (ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
supra note 177 at Rule 24) and she is not invited. Louise Arbour’s comments were
therefore likely personal observations, but of little value in describing the Tribunal.
President Joraa’s comments are significantly more authoritative (and recent).
482 ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.S./591-e, ibid.
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While President Jorda was generally supportive of the draft legislation, he was
critical of the Commission being imbued with judicial powers including investigative
ones.

Such powers would undermine the complementary relationship with the

Tribunal and as such should be amended accordingly.483

President Jorda

effectively established the framework in which a truth and reconciliation
commission would operate within the jurisdiction of the two ad hoc tribunals - but
only extra-judicially. The complementary relationship remains distinctly disjunctive.
President Jorda’s laudable effort to reconcile the disjunctive character of the
ICTY484 with the conjunctive character of the ICC, elaborated in the Rome Statute,
may be problematic, for they are irreconciiiable:485
The jurisdictional primacy of the ad hoc Tribunals has been
reversed: the ICC may only supplement national criminal justice
systems when there is inadequate domestic w ill or inability to
prosecute.
Thus the current trend in international law, is that any TRC under the United
Nations system, must be of the type described by President Jorda - disjunctive
and non-judicial whether in Bosnia or in Sierra Leone.486

483 ICTY, Press Release JL/P.I.S./591-e, supra note 179. Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act, 1995 (South Africa), supra note 91, would likely be considered a
significant violation of the complementarity principle in that it allocates the Commission
significant quasi-judicial and investigative powers. This does not necessarily mean that
had it been implemented after 1 July 2002 or a similar Act adopted in the former
Yugoslavia, that it would be invalid to the ICC. The ICC has allowed for a much less
positivist approach to the prosecution of international crimes through the system of
complementarity as described in the Rome Statute. This will now be examined in the
text.
484 ICTY Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 9 (especially Rules 9(i)
and 9(iii)) but also ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Article 9(2) - the provisions relating
to "primacy over national courts.”
485Arbour and Bergson, in von Hebei, supra note 66 at 130.
486 Report o f the Secretary-General on the Establishment o f a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, supra note 471 at Paragraph 39.
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An Assessment of the Validity of Amnesty under the Rome Statute
Under the Rome Statute, amnesty for international crimes is significantly more
viable than under the ICTY Statute. This is largely due to the greater conjunctive
character of the Rome Statute.m There exist two tests available to determine if an
amnesty (or decision not to prosecute) is sufficiently legitimate to render a case
inadmissible to the ICC: 1) the test for unwillingness or inability to prosecute on
the part of a State; and 2) the test for ne bis in idem.
Adm issibility
Unwillingness and Inability Test
There exists a presumption that the State is carrying out its duties to investigate or
prosecute (or not to prosecute) properly, unless evidence to the contrary exists.488
The unwillingness and inability test is used to determine if such evidence exists
and only is applied in two instances, where: the case is being investigated or
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it; or the case has been
investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not
to prosecute the person concerned.489 Unwillingness is determined by evidence of
shielding an accused, unjustifiably delaying proceedings or carrying out
proceedings that lack independence or impartiality.490 Thus evidence of a lack of

487 Recall the earlier discussion comparing these two tests to the circumstances under
which the ICTY Prosecutor could request a deferral from a State under ICTY Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 9. Specifically it appears as though
the Rome Statute drops the conditions of Rules 9(i) and 9(iii). These two provisions
gave the Tribunal its disjunctive character, making it capable of asserting its primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over the domestic courts largely at its own unchecked
discretion.
488 Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17 generally. The force of such a presumption
renders a case inadmissible automatically. Contrast this with Rule 9(0 and (ii) of the
ICTY Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177, where the ICTY could request
deferral even if the State prosecuted in propriety.
489Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17(1) and 17(2) respectively.
490 Ibid. at Article 17(2).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

154
good faith or an abuse of process is crucial in determining unwillingness. In the
case of inability, the condition o f the domestic legal system is examined.491
If confronted with assessing whether an amnesty accorded by a domestic (Staterun) TRC is legitimate, the ICC would have to presume that it was in the absence
of evidence of unwillingness or inability to genuinely investigate or prosecute.
Thus the presumption is that such an amnesty is legitimate. In determining if the
State is unwilling, lack of good faith and abuse of process are crucial elements. In
determining the inability o f a State to carry out the investigation/prosecution, the
state of the legal system is a crucial element. If such evidence is not present, the
question of legitimacy o f the TRC is inadmissible to the ICC, and therefore a
matter for the domestic courts to decide. Does inadmissibility o f a case indicate an
endorsement of legitimacy of the domestic investigation/prosecution? To answer
this question is to establish a hierarchy of law and hence violates the principle of
complementarity. It is the wrong approach. What matters is that inadmissibility
precludes the case from going before the ICC as the domestic jurisdiction is
presumed to be operating properly if no evidence suggests otherwise. This is
complementarity.
Ne bis in idem Test
The second test available in scrutinizing a domestic amnesty to the ICC is that of
ne bis in idem. The test is only applied in one instance where the Court considers
an issue of admissibility: where the person concerned has already been tried for
conduct which is the subject of the complaint and trial is precluded under the
provisions relating to ne bis in idem contained at Article 20(3) of the Rome Statute.
This test applies primarily in instances of sham prosecutions where the purpose of
the domestic trial was to shield the accused from the jurisdiction of the ICC (by

491 Ibid. at Article 17(3).
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double jeopardy) or if the trial was neither independent nor impartial and never
intended to bring the accused to justice.492
In the case of questioning a TRC granted amnesty, the first issue is whether the
TRC represents another court before which the accused was tried. In the previous
test, there was no reference to any court, just “a State, which has jurisdiction.' It
would appear that a domestic TRC must have at the very least a quasi-judicial
character in order to grant an effective amnesty. Only after such conditions have
been met can the test in Article 20(3) be applied.
Professor Schabas raises an interesting point in this regard. While the means of
determining the illegitimacy of TRC granted amnesty are focused on prosecution
or exemption from prosecution, he raises the issue of where an accused has been
prosecuted and found guilty but then her sentence is reduced or she is
pardoned.493

Citing the example of Lieutenant William Calley whom the United

States convicted o f war crimes, Richard Nixon nullified a life sentence by granting
him a pardon after a brief period of incarceration.494 The argument is that ne bis in
idem could be used as a shield not to prevent prosecution, but as a shield to
prevent an appropriate punishment Efforts by the States Parties to harmonize
their domestic laws so that they are in conformity with the Rome Statute may
represent a partial solution to this loophole.495 One might wonder whether this
really is a loophole though. If a State were to systematically grant pardons to
persons who were prosecuted for international crimes domestically, effectively
defeating the prosecution, perhaps this might be evidence of exactly those
conditions in Article 20(3) which render the claim of ne bis in idem void proceedings in the domestic court pursued to shield the person from criminal
492Ibid. at Article 20(3) but cross-referenced by Article 17(1)(c).
493Schabas, supra note 2 at 70.
494Ibid.
495Dulait, supra note 412.
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responsibility and a compromise of the independence or impartiality of the norms
of due process recognized by international law, inconsistent to bring the person to
justice. If such claims are void, then the presumption o f inadmissibility could be
set aside and the ICC become seized of the matter.496
Discretionary Diversity
The Prosecutor possesses a qualified discretionary power not to initiate an
investigation, where:497
Taking into account the gravity o f the crime and the interests of
victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that
an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.
The judiciary oversees the exercise of this power. If the Prosecutor decides not to
prosecute for whatever reason, such a decision may be reviewed by the Pre-Trial
Chamber and to some degree the referring party (the Security Council or a
State).498 It does not matter what these ‘‘interests'' are, just that a discretionary
power not to prosecute does exist.

Thus the domestic, quasi-judicial TRCs

according amnesties may represent one instance of the exercise of discretionary
power but so may "deals,” where accused provide evidence on those more
responsible and serious offenders.

This is not too distant from marchandage or

"plea bargaining” in Rwanda - except that the price is immunity from prosecution.
It should also be noted that the Rome Statute is oriented toward "the exercise of
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern,”499
and as such, has accords both the Prosecutor and the judiciary discretionary
power to not pursue cases where "sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
496Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17(1 He).
497 Ibid. at Article 53(1)(c). This power is under the supervision of the Pre-Trial Chamber
however (Article 53(3Kb» [underlining added). Arsanjani, supra not 179 at 75 also
regards this provision as allowing domestic TRCs to coexist with the ICC under the
framework of the Rome Statute - naturally in good faith and not as an abuse of process
to shield accused from prosecution.
498Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 53.
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Court” is lacking.500 This allows the ICC to possess the narrow jurisdiction so
envied by the ICTY and so necessary to avoid any drift toward a supranational
character which would detract from its complementary character to the domestic
courts.
While the judiciary supervises the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers, the
judiciary’s powers are supervised from outside of the Court, through external
checks - a diversification of discretionary powers amongst various international
personalities. Challenges to the admissibility of a case represent such a check.
The accused, a State having jurisdiction over the case (and believes it is
investigating or prosecuting or already has done so in propriety) and a State from
which acceptance of jurisdiction is required (a non-State Party),501 all have the right
to challenge admissibility and thereby meet allegations made of unwillingness and
inability on the part o f a State or the inapplicability of the ne bis in idem test.
The deferral powers of the Security Council, represent yet another check o f the
ICC Prosecutor’s discretionary powers.

Through a Security Council Resolution

under Chapter VII o f the Charter, adopted unanimously, the Security Council may
request that the Court “defer” an investigation or prosecution.502 Despite the
language of cordiality, this is probably as good as an order. The Rome Statute
therefore reserves an unfettered discretionary power for the Security Council - a
prerogative to stay proceedings should they constitute a threat to the peace.
In the worst-case scenario, the intransigence of a State may result in the Court
deferring the matter to the Security Council or Assembly of States Parties, as

499 Ibid. at Article 1.
500 Ibid. at Article 17(1 )(d).
501 Ibid. at Article 19(2). Remember that there is a presumption that the State carrying out
the investigation/prosecution has done so in good faith, unless it can be proven
otherwise.
502 Ibid at Article 16.
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appropriate.503 An additional pre-emption is possible by the Security Council, in
the event that it decides a prosecution should not be initiated (under a Chapter VII
action).504 The Security Council is permitted to override prosecution in the event
that it would help ensure international peace and security.

Conclusion
Just how TRC granted amnesties are received under the Rome Statute is a
complex issue.

The international community (through the United Nations)

generally regards amnesties granted for international crimes as being invalid,
especially where the beneficiaries are the ringleaders, the most flagrant offenders
and those who have shirked their fiduciary duty to uphold the compliance of the
State in suppressing such crimes. To this end, it has become increasingly the
practice to allow the domestic jurisdiction to deal with the "lesser fish," so long as
an international court or tribunal prosecuted "the bigger fish". This is the situation
with the ICTY, ICTR and in Sierra Leone. Domestic TRCs therefore are sapped of
any judicial character, in order to avoid any conflict of jurisdiction between the
international tribunals and the domestic courts. This is a disjunctive approach and
reflects the disjunctive character of the Security Council, operating through its
subsidiary organs (the ICTY, ICTR or Sierra Leonean Special Court).
The Rome Statute enshrines the concept of complementarity and therefore the
presumption that a domestic investigation/prosecution is valid unless there is
evidence to the contrary.
inadmissibility

test

(in

Such evidence is furnished by the unwillingness or
the

case

of a

State

with

jurisdiction

either

investigating/prosecuting or having investigated and decided to not prosecute) or
by the ne bis in idem test at Article 20(3) where evidence of a bad faith prosecution
or abuse of process exists.

The existence of such evidence can negate the

presumption that any case is inadmissible to the ICC.

A TRC is therefore

503Ibid. at Article 87(7).
504Ibid. at Article 16.
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acceptable to the ICC provided that the State running it is both willing and capable
of genuinely carrying out investigation and prosecution. This implies a TRC that is
necessarily quasi-judicial in character. What State would avoid an extra basis to
assert inadm issibility o f a case by running a non-judicial TRC? The preference for
quasi-judicial TRCs represents a major departure from the disjunctive approach
adopted by the ICTY, ICTR and Sierra Leonean Special C ourt The ICC approach
respects complementarity by presuming that the State is fully capable of dealing
with international crimes on its own.

Only in those exceptional cases where

evidence to the contrary exists, may an issue of adm issibility be raised. Yet this
issue may be challenged by the subject State or by other international entities.
This is how discretionary power is supervised in a decentralized legal order. It is a
reflexive approach to the international community exercising its decision-making.
The "big fish” are still targeted, but in a manner that respects and reinforces the
decentralized nature of the international legal order.
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Chapter 6

Chapter Six: International Complementarity
Introduction
Complementarity is the structural foundation of the International Criminal Court It
is a concept that is complex and sophisticated. It is a concept that challenges our
understanding of what law is.

In the domestic legal system one views law as

hierarchical, structured and centralized, complete with a means of enforcement.
All three branches o f State are active in all of its facets. Individual modular units,
the States, carry out the daily business of ensuring compliance with legal norms,
including the investigation and prosecution of international crimes. International
crimes are after all crimes within the State’s jurisdiction.

Yet it is when the

apparatus of State enforcement goes awry that the State fails in its duty to deal
with such crimes.

The international community steps in where the State is

unwilling or unable to a ct

How it does this without asserting a supranational

character is crucial to understanding how complementarity works.

The Rome

Statute sets up just such a system. The previous chapter showed it in action,
through the case study of how the Statute deals with TRCs. In that chapter the
issue was not whether a TRC or TRC-granted amnesty was legitimate, but rather
whether the presumption of inadmissibility of a case could be property countered to
permit the ICC to exert its jurisdiction. This may be more than simply a matter of
semantics, considering the presuppositions contained in the immanent meaning of
words, discussed in chapter three.
The aim of this chapter is to show the subtle, yet sophisticated, nature of
complementarity by discussing how the ICC is intended to operate within the
international legal system. This is the relationship between the ICC and other
international entities, not uniquely States. Thus the chapter w ill focus a much
160
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broader vision of complementarity - ‘ international complementarity." Part I o f this
chapter summarizes the manner in which the ICC ‘asserts its jurisdiction," while at
the same time respecting complementarity and reinforcing the decentralized
nature o f the international (criminal) legal system. Naturally States are the primary
international personality, but they are not the only one. While it may be true that
individuals and NGOs as having an increasing importance, this chapter draws
attention to regional organizations of States - an entity recognized under Chapter
VIII of the Charter. Consensus, negotiation and communicative deliberation are
not particularly unique in international law, for they are commonplace in such
regional arrangements.

The ICC represents just another type of regional

arrangement established by the international community. The proliferation o f such
organizations maintains decentralization within the international legal order.
Coherence is achieved through a high level of reflexivity. While this gives the
international legal order its sui generis character, at the same time many legal
thinkers and decision-makers are unable to visualize law as having any form other
than that in their domestic legal system.

To them, law must be centralized,

hierarchical and imposed. This is the common denominator of the traditional legal
schools discussed at chapter one. In Part II those problems that arise, from this
limited perspective, are examined with respect to the opposition to the Rome
Statute from India and the United States. Both positions are revealing, for they
reject a decentralized international legal system in favour of a hierarchical system
of law - a projection of municipal law into the legal arena. This chapter therefore
brings to light a problem in perception of the nature o f contemporary international
law generally and the corresponding lack of imagination in the reading of the
Rome Statute.

A New Legal Proceduralism - International Complementarity
The ICC and Admissibility
Throughout the Rome Statute, the central doctrine of complementarity establishes
a working partnership between the ICC and domestic courts.

There exists a
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presumption that the domestic approach to dealing with international crimes is
proper - almost a ‘ presumption of innocence” accorded to States in matters of
jurisdiction.

Only if there is evidence to suggest that a case is no longer

inadmissible, can the presumption be countered and the ICC become seized of the
case.

In instances where the State is investigating or prosecuting or has

investigated but decided not to prosecute, only then may the unwillingness and
inability test apply.505 This test would make a case admissible if there was
evidence o f an attempt to shield an accused from responsibility for international
crimes; an unjustified delay in proceedings inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person to justice; and a lack of independence or im partiality also inconsistent with
an intent to bring the accused to justice.506 Inability to prosecute is an alternative
test that may also be applied.507 It is determined by the state of the domestic
judicial system.
In the event that a court has already tried the person, for conduct that is the
subject of a complaint before the ICC, the principle o f ne bis in idem is assumed to
apply automatically, rendering the case inadmissible.508

If however there is

evidence of the abuse of the principle to shield the accused from criminal
responsibility or evidence that the proceedings in the other court were neither
independent nor impartial, then the principle may be suspended, rendering the
case admissible.509 A final form of inadmissibility exists, where the ICC considers
that a case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action.510
505Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 17(1)(a) and 17(1)(b).
506Ibid. at A/tide 17(2).
507 Ibid. at Article 17(1Xa) and 17(1)(b). Both use the term ‘unless the State is willing or
unable genuinely” to carry out the investigation/prosecution. Each test is then identified
in Articles 17(2) and 17(3) respectively. Therefore they are construed as being
independent of one another. If they were not, this would seriously hamper the ability of
the ICC to function.
508Ibid. at Article 17(1 Xc).
509Ibid. at Article 20 - especially Article 20(3).
510Ibid. at Article 17(1 Xd).
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In a domestic legal system the determination of these tests for admissibility would
rest in the hands of the Prosecutor o r judge.
individuals still make these decisions.

In the Rome Statute these two

Their discretionary power however is

overseen by a number of international legal personalities. States, the Assembly of
States Parties, the Security Council, the accused (to a limited extent) and NGOs
(through indirect representation before the Prosecutor) are all allocated a role.
Whether through powers of referral, deferral, staying an investigation/prosecution,
challenging admissibility, or simply refusing to cooperate with the Court - there are
numerous

mechanisms and tactics

available

to

invoke oversight

This

diversification o f discretionary power is also reflected in the manner in which the
Court governs itself - for instance in how amendments to its documents are
achieved. The Rome Statute establishes a decentralization of discretionary power
throughout the international legal system.
The Rome Statute, Complementarity and Reflexive International Law
The Rome Statute sets up a legal system that is not immediately recognizable
when compared against a domestic model or even that of the ICTY.
Complementarity not only respects the integrity of the States to domestically
prosecute international crimes by according them a presumption of capability, but it
also respects the disparate nature of the international legal system keeping it
decentralized.

The centralization o f judicial authority that Kelsen expected

continues to be absent511

International legislative and executive authorities

remain vaguely defined, if defined at all. Instead a legal order is founded upon
negotiation, consensus and communication.

This is reminiscent of Kelsen’s

voluntary character of law - what he might have identified as an extremely
511 In the case of the ad hoc tribunals (and to some degree Sierra Leone), under authority
of the Security Council, they were endowed with a broad discretionary power to
“override" the jurisdiction of a domestic court. This approach is highly disjunctive in
character and undermines the concept of complementarity. It represents the operation
of the Security Council's supranational character filtering through to the tribunals. Recall
ICTY Statute, supra note 176 at Articles 9 and 10 and more importantly ICTY Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 177 at Rule 9.
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advanced form of law. It is reminiscent of Habermas’ "deliberative democracy” and
communicative action theory.512 It is Teubner’s final evolutionary reflexive law
stage.513
The Rome Statute is a mirror, reflecting the international legal system, since the
international criminal legal system operates within its confines. The ICC is just one
o f many international organizations and regional arrangements established to
represent the collective interests of "like-minded states.”514 These organizations
are reflexive in their own right and frequently incorporate some sort o f deliberative
assembly or even a court or arbitral body. They are founded upon consensus,
negotiation and communication between the member States. Thus for example,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) makes decisions
on the basis of consensus of all participating States, each of which has an equal
status.515

The OSCE possesses a Parliamentary Assembly (based in

Copenhagen) and a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (based in Geneva).516
The drafters of the Rome Statute adopted the same approach, through the
512 Discussed in chapter one. See Rehg, supra note 52 at xii. Note the three idealizing
assumptions in conflict resolution described at xv - and in particular the need for
consensus and the presumption of rationality.
513Teubner, supra note 125.
514Authors such as Romano, supra note 328; Couston, supra note 182; and Buergenthal,
supra note 213; tend to be preoccupied by the ‘proliferation of international courts and
tribunals.” Rather than their proliferation perse it might be more appropriate to consider
the proliferation of international organizations. If one is preoccupied by the proliferation
of international courts, it is easy to reach a conclusion of a legal system dominated by
the supranational aspects of "rule of law." Proliferation would amount to a form of
centralization, albeit in a parallelist or federal conception. It is argued here that this is
not a fair reflection of the disparate nature of the international legal system. Rather, with
the rise of international organizations, the disparate nature is reinforced. The ICC is an
international organization which happens to have a court. Yet its character is
significantly different to the ICTY. In a similar vein the ICJ is a court that belongs to the
United Nations (its primary judicial organ).
515 Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, supra note 324 at 1. Other
organizations might include the Organization of American States or the Organization of
African Unity. These regional arrangements are generally independent of the United
Nations, although recognized by it under Chapter VIII of the Charter, supra note 26.
516 Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, supra note 324 at 38 [shown in
Figure 3 ‘Structures and Institutions'!.
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creation of an Assembly of States Parties (the ICC “legislature’).517 An active role
for the Security Council also is enshrined, through the attribution of referral and
deferral powers. This is not a separation of powers however. There is nothing to
prevent the ICC from investigating or prosecuting a case which has a Chapter VII
aspect (for instance an international crime of aggression would probably stem from
an act of aggression). Thus the ICC and the Security Council could be dealing
with related issues (although not identical issues) at the same time.518
The United Nations could be considered such a reflexive entity, where the
decisions of the General Assembly and Security Council are adopted on the basis
of consensus, negotiation and deliberation. Although both the General Assembly
and Security Council are reflexive, the Charter confers upon the Council the
“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.’519
The Security Council consists only of 15 States, five of which maintain their seats
permanently and possess a qualified voting power.520 This is a far cry from the 189
States, which comprise the United Nations. While Security Council decisions are
presumed to have a legal binding quality on States under the Charter,521 the

Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 112. States are equal (Article 112(1)) and voting
is preferred to be on the basis of consensus (Article 112(7)) and failing that through a
majority vote by the States Parties present. There is no qualified majority voting as in
the case of the Security Council.
518 Ibid. at Article 16 allows the Security Council to delay an ICC investigation provided that
it has voted unanimously to do so under a Chapter VII justification.
519Ibid. at Article 24(1).
520 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26 at Article 23.
521 Ibid. at Article 2(5), 25 and 48. In the case of the recent controversy over Iraq’s noncompliance with various Security Council Resolutions concerning the admission of
weapons inspectors, it seems that Iraq holds the view that even these Resolutions are
negotiable. This view seems to be reinforced by a willingness to negotiate both from
within the Security Council and from the international community in general. There are
States that do not subscribe to this approach and insist that the Resolutions be complied
with, or else Iraq could face a renewed intervention since the admission of weapons
inspectors was a condition to the ending of hostilities in 1991. On the other hand, Iraq’s
position may be justified to some degree in that to simply attack a State or carry out an
embargo or even to expel it from the UN, seems a potentially disproportionate act that
may be self-defeating to the desired end goal - compliance by the delinquent State.
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Security Council is not a representative body o f the community of states. The
Charter entrenched the global power distribution at the end of World War II,
through the granting o f permanent seats on the Security Council and a permanent
veto power over certain resolutions that might be considered, to the five victorious
States.522 This seems to undermine the Charter’s own recognition of the equality
of all States,523 imbuing it with what might be perceived as a certain hegemonic
quality.

This may detract from its ability to fully deliberate, negotiate and

communicate before reaching a decision.

This is probably reflected in the

ambiguity contained within the ICTY Statute - to be contrasted by the way in which
the Rome Statute excels in defining a new vocabulary, it having been drafted in a
comparatively more deliberated and reflexive manner. On the other hand there is
a trade-off, for by not being fully deliberative, the Security Council is capable of
acting in a relatively short time.524
The M unicipal Analogue and its Inappropriateness
International law is applied through negotiation, deliberation and consensus rather
than through imposition, positivism and the application of universal norms. The
Whether Security Council Resolutions really are binding is not as straight-forward as one
might suspect.
522 Ibid. at Article 23 (members) and Article 27 (voting). The voting arrangement is often
called the “Yalta voting formula,” although it is also known as qualified majority voting - a
distinct improvement over the League of Nations Council required unanimity on
substantive matters. Consider Statement o f the Delegations to the San Francisco
Conference of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom o f
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics, and the
Republic o f China, with which the Delegation o f France Associated Itself, San Francisco,
7 June 1945, UNCIO Doc. 852, 111/1/37(1); 11 UNCIO Documents at Articles 1-7, in
Louis B. Sohn, ed. , Basic Documents o f the United Nations, 2nd ed. (Brooklyn: The
Foundation Press, Inc., 1968) at 70-71.
523 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 26 at Article 2(1).
524 Soci6t6 des Nations, Convention pour la creation d'une cour p6nale intemationale
(Gen6ve : Soctete des Nations, 1937) [Getteve, le 16 novembre 1937; S6rie de
publications de la Soci6t6 des Nations; 1937.V.11 .; 5.Questk>ns iuridiques]. It could be
argued that negotiations toward some sort of international criminal tribunal go back even
further to World War I (Schabas, supra note 2 at 1 for example makes this point).
Schabas suggests that it really started to be drafted in earnest from about 1989 on. It
may even gofurther back to the medieval period (see supra note 277). The point here is
that it has taken a long time for the Rome Statute to be drafted.
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four traditional schools of law (legal realism, legal positivism, universalism and
parallelism) falter, for they presuppose the existence of a hierarchical and
centralized legal system. The reflexive approach provides a means of overcoming
their inherent limitations and capturing the essence o f complementarity. Yet it
must be used with caution, for even its original proponents defined the concept in
the domestic context, not the international one. Nevertheless the Rome Statute
mirrors the reflexive nature of international law in its procedures. By so doing
complementarity is used to establish an international criminal court in a
decentralized legal order without a hierarchy of law.

The Rome Statute: Roots of Opposition
Expectations o f the Domestic Model Internationally
A Crisis o f Legitimacy fo r Some
Unfortunately the fallacious projection of the domestic model into the international
legal system is engrained in these traditional schools of dominant legal thought It
is here that one may uncover the roots of opposition to the Rome Statute by the
two largest democratic States within the international system. Their opposition to
the Statute is not founded in any one school o f thought but rather in an
expectation of an international legal order that reflects some degree of hierarchy,
structure and centralization. Both positions deny the concept of complementarity
in the Rome Statute but also the decentralized nature of international law.
Ironically they recognize the ICC as having a character that the other claims it
lacks.
India - Security Council Invested With Too Much Discretionary Power
India’s objections revolved around three issues:

the Security Council referral

power, the Security Council deferral power and the failure of the Rome Statute to
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. .
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Under the Rome Statute, the Security Council may request the initiation of an
investigation by the Court through a referral.525 The Indian government felt that the
conferral of such a power to the Security Council was ultra vims and exceeded
those powers explicitly stated in the Charter. Mr. Lahiri, the Indian representative
at the Rome Conference in 1998, suggested that by according powers of referral
to the Security Council, that would either make a Security Council referral of
greater importance than other referrals; or establish a mechanism whereby sitting
members of the Security Council who were not States Parties to the Rome Statute,
could still make use of the International Criminal Court.526 Mr. Lahiri’s position
reveals distrust of the Security Council and o f those sitting members who are not
States Parties to the Rome Statute. Such distrust is probably warranted since the
Security Council by its very nature incorporates a centralization of coercive
authority - potentially the first step to a centralization of judicial or political
authority.
In terms of the power of blocking cases before the Court under Article 16 of the
Rome Statute (the second objection), India fe lt that this was a political interference
with the Court’s independence by the Security Council:527
...it is argued that the maintenance o f international peace and
security might require that those who have committed these crimes
should be permitted to escape justice, if the Council so decrees.
The moment this argument is conceded, the Conference accepts
the proposition that justice could undermine international peace
and security.
Latent in Mr. Lahiri’s argument is an underlying presumption of the primacy of the
‘ rule of law.” Yet such a ‘primacy” represents a hierarchy of law to which the
Security Council would have to submit. Thus Mr. Lahiri’s position, projects the
domestic legal model onto the international scene.
525Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 13(2).
526Dilip Lahiri, supra note 42.
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India’s third objection to the Rome Statute was that the Statute did not classify the
use of nuclear weapons as an international crime.52* The Rome Statute contains
an incomplete inventory of international crimes. An argument does exist that the
Rome Statute does in fact prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in that they
represent a form of indiscriminate attack (a war crime) and may even represent a
crime against humanity (through their effects and even more so through the
intention of the decision-makers who would authorize their use). Notwithstanding
this argument the threat of the use of nuclear weapons is a political topic that just
does not fit into the nature of international crimes covered by the Rome Statute. In
this respect it is like terrorism or drug trafficking. The issue is not purely legal.
There is a political dimension, which if ignored, could amount to the Court
undermining the concept of complementarity. This is not to say that the Indian
position is wrong, but that it is too simplistic. The approach is consistent with a
positivist “rule of law* view of international law.
United States - Security Council Invested with Not Enough Discretionary Power
American opposition to the Rome Statute is complicated and at times incoherent.
This is partly due to a change in government from the Clinton to Bush
administration.

President Clinton initially signed the Rome Statute on 31

December 2000. Yet President Clinton advised that there were still “concerns
about the significant flaws in the treaty* and that he would therefore recommend
that Congress not ratify it 529
527Ibid.
528 William Schabas (Schabas, supra note 2 at 49) suggests that India may have been
simply grandstanding for political reasons in order to upstage Pakistan’s development of
nuclear weapons in 1998. While this context may be true and perhaps even his
argument, presuming that States negotiate in bad faith is not a productive route in trying
to assess international legal development. It must be presumed that they are
negotiating in good faith unless there is evidence to the contrary. If anything, it shows
the reasons why deliberative communication takes so long and also illustrates the
“asymmetry” of a reflexive system - as States pursue their own interests in the course of
negotiation.
529Marc Grossman, supra note 231.
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Provisions o f the Rome Statute did not sit well with some American politicians,530
especially when it became apparent that under certain conditions, it was possible
for American members of the armed forces and civilian leaders to come under the
jurisdiction o f the Court Such concern was amplified by claims of the denial of
procedural protections guaranteed under the Bill o f Rights and American
Constitution (such as the right to trial by jury).531 There is a certain inconsistency in
this approach noted from within the American legal community, in that there are
numerous treaties that do deny such procedural protections and surrender some
of the sovereignty belonging to Congress.532

The potential for exposure to

prosecution fo r senior elected and appointed officials in the American government,
for "decisions involving such matters as: responding to acts of terrorism,
preventing the proliferation of weapons o f mass destruction, and deterring
aggression,” was just too much.533 This is a curious statement since all three
matters are excluded from the Rome Statute.
The unsigning o f the Rome Statute by the Bush administration marks a significant
clarification o f the American government’s stand.

By "unsigning,” the Bush

administration cleared the path for a much more hostile approach to the Statute
(and the introduction of the American Servicemembers' Protection Act o f 2002),
without fear o f violating the law on treaties.534 The "unsigning” was in effect a
530Specifically: Jesse Helms, Thomas Delay, Benjamin Gilman, Henry Hyde, John Murtha
and Chris Smith; they were the sponsors and co-sponsors of the Bill. In particular refer
to: Rome Statute, supra note 2 at Article 12.
531ASPA, supra note 6.
532 Congressional sovereignty is equivalent to parliamentary sovereignty in this sense.
Consider Audrey I. Benison, ‘International Criminal Tribunals: Is there a Limitation on
the Treaty Power?” (2001) 37 Stan. J Inti L. 75 at 112 (in particular). There are a
number of treaties in existence to which the United States has "surrendered sovereignty”
from Congress to an international tribunal. She considers extradition treaties. Status of
Forces Agreements, extradition to other international criminal tribunals (such as
Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999)), prisoner exchange, the Charter of
the United Nations, the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization.
533Ibid. at § 3002(9).
534 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 411 at Art. 18.
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denunciation.

Reasons for the “unsigning" were prepared in set of remarks

delivered by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman on 6 May
2002 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.535 Mr. Grossman’s
remarks were largely derived (verbatim) from what would eventually become the
preamble to the American Servicemembers' Protection Act o f 2002.53e While there
was much said in Mr. Grossman’s remarks, he outlined some premises, which
formed the basis for the American decision to “unsign" the Statute.
Mr. Grossman indicated the principles of international law, which the United States
believed in:537
We believe in justice and the promotion of the rule o f law.
We believe those who commit the most serious of crimes of
concern to the international community should be punished.
We believe that states, not international institutions are primarily
responsible for ensuring justice in the international system.
We believe that the best way to combat these serious offenses is
to build domestic judicial systems, strengthen political will and
promote human freedom

The remarks are important for they represent the full policy statement of the Bush
administration. They are echoed in summary by other members of the Bush cabinet:
United States Department of Defense, “Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC
Treaty,” News Release, No. 233-0 (6 May 2002), online:
Defenselink
<http7/www.defenselink.mil>(date accessed: 16 May 2002).
536ASPA, supra note 6 at § 2002 “Findings."
537 The third principle does not seem accurate. It should probably read: “We believe that
States, not international institutions (with the possible exception of the Security Council)
are primarily responsible for ensuring justice in the international system." Such a
revision seems more consistent with the second last paragraph before the subheading
“We Will Continue to Lead:’
In situations where violations are so grave as to amount to a breach of international
peace and security, and the political will to address these violations is non-existent,
the international community may, and if necessary should, intercede through the UN
Security Council as we did in Bosnia and Rwanda.
This is an endorsement of the two ad hoc tribunals and the peacekeeping missions.
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Yet Mr. Grossman outlined four reasons why the Government of the United States
felt that the Rome Statute did not advance these principles:538
We believe the ICC undermines the role o f the United Nations
Security Council in maintaining peace and security.
We believe in checks and balances. The Rome Statute creates a
prosecutorial system that is an unchecked power.
We believe that in order to be bound by a treaty, a state must be
party to that treaty. The ICC asserts jurisdiction over citizens o f
states that have not ratified the treaty. This threatens US
sovereignty.
We believe that the ICC is buHt on a flawed foundation. These
flaws leave it open for exploitation and politically motivated
prosecutions.
The only explanation as to why his government felt that the entire system of
complementarity was inadequate was because American proposals to set in place
a system of ‘proper checks and balances on the Court were rejected."539
American proposals both before and after the Rome Conference in July 1998
were:540
1. To permit a Security Council referral outside of a Chapter VII authorization;
2. That if a State Party referred a situation to the Court that was already under
deliberation by the Security Council, the authorization from the Security
Council would be required before the ICC could consider it This was hotly
contested and eventually the ‘Singapore Compromise* resulted and the

538 Although later in the same text he claims that the Rome Statute threatens these
principles, (see last sentence before subheading "We Will Continue to Lead)
539Grossman, supra note 231.
540 United States Department of State, David Scheffer, ‘Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward
the International Criminal Court,” Address at American University, Washington, DC (14
September 2000), online: United States Department of State <http://www.state.gov>
(date accessed: 15 May 2002).
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drafting of what would become the Security Council deferral power under
Article 16;
3. An “opt out" provision was proposed where a State Party could opt out of
crimes against humanity and/or war crimes, but not genocide. If a State so
opted, it would forfeit its right to refer matters to the Court. The Security
Council could override the "opt out" with a Chapter VII referral;
4. A 10-year transitional period was proposed, during which time a State Party
could opt out of crimes against humanity and/or war crimes with a possibility
for renewal under certain conditions. A modified version materialized as
Article 124 of the Treaty, with a reduction to 7 years and concerning Article
8 (war crimes only); and
5. A final proposal was that Article 12 be drafted: to require express approval
of both the territorial state of the alleged crime and the state of nationality of
the accused in the event either was not a State Party; or to exempt the
court’s jurisdiction in conduct arising from the official actions of a non-State
Party and acknowledged as such by the non-State Party. Article 12 actually
sets forth a precondition where acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction is
required from:

the territorial state of the alleged crime (or State of

registration in the case of a vessel or aircraft) or the State of nationality; or
in the case of a non-State Party, a declaration accepting the exercise of
jurisdiction.
The nature o f the proposals made at the Rome Conference clearly indicate that
the American government wanted to establish the ICC as an international
institution in a subordinate relationship to another international institution - the
Security Council. The idea of endowing the Security Council with a referral power
outside of Chapter VII represents a significant expansion of powers beyond what
was explicitly allocated in the Charter. The proposal to allow the Security Council
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a primary right to exercise jurisdiction (through "deliberation”) over a State Party
referring a situation to the Court is a reincarnation o f the wide discretionary powers
found in the ICTY Statute and Rules o f Procedure and Evidence. It allows the
Security Council to assert some form of primacy over States Party - and not even
restricted to Chapter VII issues. The proposal for an "opt out” clause and the
ability o f the Security Council to override it under a Chapter VII referral represents
yet another method of the Security Council using the ICC system at its discretion.
The last proposal represents one that is truly different.

The first part of the

proposal represents a significant limitation to how the ICC would assert its
jurisdiction. Consent from both territorial state and state of nationality is required.
Ambassador Scheffer describes this as remedying the "dangerous drift toward
universal jurisdiction over non-party states.”541 This may not be entirely accurate,
since it appears more as a means of ensuring that the two primary States involved
have given their consent

Consent and universal jurisdiction are two different

things. The approach Scheffer describes seems to be more comparable to the ICJ
requirement for consent to the Court’s jurisdiction as a precondition to even
considering a case as admissible.
The second part of the proposal, as Scheffer describes it, was to distinguish acts,
which might be incorrectly classified as crimes of aggression, when they were in
fact official actions. Scheffer suggested: humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping
actions, or pre-emptive defensive actions to eliminate weapons o f mass
destruction. This is essentially the same argument in the first part - that one of the
preconditions to the exercise o f jurisdiction by the ICC is the consent of the State
in whose name the international crimes may have been committed.
The American position therefore can be summarized as resting on two grounds for
objection.

In the first, the Security Council is regarded as being the primary

541 Ibid.
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international organization in the international legal system. American proposals for
its supervisory status over the ICC and to some degree the States Parties
amounted to a desire to establish it as a focal point fo r international criminal judicial
power. This is a hierarchical system with a certain degree of centralization. It is
the domestic model being applied to the international legal system.
The second grounds for objection is mired in the idea of State consent to the
jurisdiction of the ICC. State “consent" is one of those old terms from traditional
international law identified in chapter one.

The legal system described in the

Rome Statute truly is reflexive as described in this thesis, based upon voluntary
compliance, consensus, negotiation, deliberation and communication.

The

reflexive mode, including consensus, represents an evolutionary leap in the idea of
State consent; all of the active elements of reflexion contribute to general
agreement not merely on the part o f the State, but by all States and all
international personalities.

Article 17, concerning how the presumption that a

case is inadmissible is countered, represents the ultimate in how the reflexive
mode operates.

Consent is diversified not centralized.

The last American

proposal may therefore be in itself a residual element of drafters still thinking along
the lines of a municipal model - the idea of consent from one personality only.
Unfortunately American legislators continue to perceive the ICC as a municipal
type of court projected internationally, where discretionary powers are centralized
within its judiciary and prosecutor.

This would explain the foundations of the

American Servicemembers’ Protection A ct o f 2002 s42 Thus it is the American
542 Consider United States Department of State, David J. Scheffer, Statement Before the
House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC (26 July 2000), online:
United States Department of State <http://www.state.gov> (date accessed: 15 May
2002) where Scheffer outlines why he and the Clinton Administration opposed the
American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2000 (which was a bill at the time, hence
the year). Similarly refer to: United States Department of State, David Scheffer,
“Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward the International Criminal Court,' Address at American
University, Washington, DC” (14 September 2000), online: United States Department of
State <http://www.state.gov/> (date accessed: 15 May 2002) where he states T o argue
that our position on personal jurisdiction reflected an underlying opposition to the whole
concept of a permanent International Criminal Court or the Rome Treaty itself is a
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legislators that have projected their expectations o f a domestic legal system onto
the international criminal legal system and in so doing, distorted their perception of
how the Rome Statute sets up the ICC to operate in a decentralized system
without a hierarchy of law. There is a relation to the Security Council arguments,
in that if prosecution for international crimes is to occur, then legal authority should
be subordinated to a centralized political authority which represents the interests of
States - the Security Council.

Conclusion
It is possible that the emergence of the ICC is symptomatic of a general trend in
the context of the contemporary international law. Although Hans Kelsen saw the
international legal system evolving through centralization of international judicial
power and then international political power, he did not dismiss evolution in an
altogether different direction.543 International law has been developing in this
different direction for some time, as shown by the proliferation of regional
arrangements.

The Rome Statute establishes the ICC based on a sim ilar

approach steeped in reflexive law - consensus, equality and decentralization. Its
respect for complementarity is central. The presumption of a State being capable
of dealing with international crimes domestically represents a major advance from
the approach of the ad hoc tribunals. Centralization of legal power is averted
through a system of diversified discretionary oversight by all those international
legal personalities with an interest in the investigation/prosecution (or lack thereof)

deeply flawed argument.” This may an attempt by him to undo the damage that his
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accomplished on 23 July
1998. His original words may have been inappropriately chosen, in that they may have
spawned the false image of a supranational ICC and the vulnerability of American
service personnel and civilian leaders to groundless allegations. See: United States
Department of State, David Scheffer, ‘Developments at Rome Treaty Conference,”
Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC (23 July
1998), online: United States Department of State <http://Www.state.gov/> (date
accessed: 15 May 2002). Scheffer actually supports the ICC in principle and despite
the objections that he and the Clinton administration originally had.
543 Kelsen, supra note 16.
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of accused individuals of international crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Thus
decentralization of the international legal system is also respected. There is no
hierarchy o f law. There are just issues o f admissibility. The rule of law is achieved
through negotiation, consensus and communication. It is a very different model to
the municipal approach where the “rule of law” is achieved through imposition,
“arbitrariness* and unilateral action.
Here lies the difficulty with the acceptance of the ICC by some o f its most
vociferous opponents. India’s opposition is rooted in the failure of the Statute to
operate without interference from the Security Council.

It specifically criticizes

those members of the Security Council, who are not States Parties, yet who
possess some oversight in the exercise of the Court’s discretionary powers
(especially with respect to admissibility and challenges to it). In this respect India
expects a hierarchy of law to exist, subordinating the prerogative powers of the
Security Council and States to the discretionary powers o f the Court. It expects
centralization of judicial discretionary authority within the C ourt These are
expectations of a domestic legal system projected into the international.
The Indian objection to the failure to classify the use of nuclear weapons as an
international crime, further illustrates the lack of appreciation for the concept of
complementarity through the simplistic classification of an act having both legal
and political character, as uniquely legal.
The American position is extremely confused. There is a total dismissal of the
reflexive mechanisms incorporated throughout the Rome Statute, but without
justification.

The Americans argue that the Security Council should have full

oversight o f the Court. Yet they do more than that - they argue for a hierarchical
system of international law where the Security Council is invested with broad
discretionary powers well beyond those stipulated in the Charter under Chapter
VII; where the ICC and States Parties (to some extent) are subordinated to its
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powers. The American position may therefore express a desired centralizing role
for the Security Council in the international legal system through an expansion of
its power. If this is a correct analysis of the American position, it is a significant
rejection of the decentralized nature of the international criminal system and the
limited manner in which the Security Council operates within it 544

544 It may be consistent with the contemporary upsurge in unilateralist views toward
international law present amongst the members of the Administration in the United
States. See: Peter Beaumont and Ed Heimore, "Will Bush Go to War Against
Saddam?” The Guardian (1 September 2002), online:
The Guardian
<http7/www.observer.co.uk/iraq/Story/0,12239,784319,00.html> (date accessed: 1
September 2002).
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Chapter Seven

Chapter Seven: General Concluding Remarks
Chapter six represents something of a dimax in this thesis. International law as a
reflexive system, founded upon consensus, negotiation and equality, represents a
challenge to our preconceived view of law, rooted in the domestic model.

A

reflexive approach is evident in the international legal system through regional
arrangements like OSCE and the UN (and the multitude of other regional
arrangements). It is mirrored throughout the legal regime that the Rome Statute
establishes for the ICC.

Unfortunately this is not the same basis normally

understood for the domestic legal system. There exists a relational problem.
Yet the flaw is more significant in that one presupposes the existence of a
centralized, hierarchical and even authoritative approach to how courts exercise
their jurisdiction.

This is the antithesis of the fundamental bases of the

contemporary international legal system. International law is sui generis. Yet one
cannot change the expectations of academics or decision-makers overnight.
They expect to see domestic patterns in the international legal system.
Regardless of which school one adopts, all seem to view the ICC as a
supranational court in the manner in which it exercises its jurisdiction over States good or bad.
The traditional approach o f States in dealing with international crimes, through
cooperation and aut dedere aut judtcaire (prosecute or extradite), is undoubtedly
the predominant mode.

It remains unaffected. Only in those very rare cases

where the apparatus of the State becomes co-opted by criminal elements (the
State gone awry) does this mode fail. In such cases the ICC may be capable of
exercising its jurisdiction, provided certain conditions exist. The subject matter of
the ICC does not cover all instances of international crime or even all potential
179
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perpetrators.

In this sense it is incomplete. The subject matter is extremely

restrictive as are the subjects. Only those high public officials who are directly
responsible for a few categories o f international crime (genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes) are targeted. Even those categories of international
crime are restricted further, to occurrence within a specific context in accordance
with the ICC’s governing documents.
The concept of complementarity is intricately linked to the meaning of language.
The new vocabulary of the Rome Statute captures concepts that are original yet
difficult to comprehend, unless we cast off the usual terms associated with
international (criminal) law and their accompanying immanent presumptions. A
high degree of conjunctivity is established in the Rome Statute, where the ICC and
the domestic courts coexist and cooperate.
The Statute regulates the exercise of discretion through a series of mechanisms,
effectively diversifying checks amongst the key players in the international
community (States, Security Council, Assembly of States Parties, Judiciary, NGOs
and other lesser players). Discretionary power is monitored through deliberation
and communication.

While regulation of the discretionary powers o f the

Prosecutor is significant within the Rome Statute, a subtler but equally effective
form of regulation exists, checking the discretionary powers of the judiciary. These
structural constraints on the exercise of judicial authority exist in all international
courts, but they are particularly strong in the ICC as evidenced by a closer reading
of the Rome Statute and in the context of international criminal law.

The Statute

does not centralize legal authority in one location.
The emerging picture of the ICC is one of a very tempered court, only "asserting its
jurisdiction” in those most exceptional of cases. When so doing, it is under the
utmost of control. The case study o f the TRCs and associated amnesties reveals
how restrictive it is, including the presumption that, in any given situation, the
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domestic courts are deemed to be best suited to investigate or prosecute. This
presumption is only countered when: there is evidence that domestic courts are
unwilling and incapable (due to a collapse in whole or in part of the judicial
system), or that they have acted in bad faith or through an abuse of process. This
is a somewhat different stand to how the ICTY (and ultimately the Security Council
operating through it) regards amnesties - generally viable for those lesser
individuals accused but not viable for those who have abused their fiduciary
responsibilities both to the State and to the international community to prevent and
repress international crimes. The ICTY approach does not presume that a case is
inadmissible automatically.

A great deal of discretion is invested within the

Tribunal. This is not the case with the ICC, where the presumption that a case is
inadmissible exists and where oversight of the ICC's discretionary power is
diversified throughout the international legal system.
This divergence in approach is representative of a much broader facet of how
contemporary international law, not just international criminal law, operates. The
contemporary international legal system is decentralized and disparate yet based
upon equality, consensus, negotiation, deliberation and communication.

A

domestic legal system is based upon centralization (of judicial and political power),
a hierarchical system of laws (and possibly even institutions), separation of
powers, command and coercion. This is exactly what Kelsen describes. While
coercion does exist in international law, it is very restricted and generally allocated
to the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Because legal, coercive
power is partially centralized (although limited) in the hands of the Security
Council, it might be identified as the primary threat to the decentralized order.
International organizations and particularly regional arrangements reinforce the
decentralized nature of the international legal system by ensuring that the doctrine
of “implied powers” does not result in the United Nations’ (and in particular the
Security Council) accretion of residual powers. The accretion of power in one
location would lead to the evolution of a primary international legal and/or political
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organization. This is how trends toward centralization and hierarchy are diffused.
Thus the reflexive international legal system is self-perpetuating.
Ironically it is the reflexive nature of the Rome Statute and the international legal
order, which creates controversy. In both the Indian and American cases, there is
an inability o f legal thinkers to accept an effective international legal system as
being disparate and decentralized.

Academic criticisms, such as the lack of

coherence in a decentralized international legal order, presuppose a centralized
legal order and even a hierarchical relationship between courts.

This is a

projection of one’s expectations of the domestic legal model onto the international
legal system. It is a denial of the sui generis character of international law. India
considers that the ICC must itself be a hierarchical court capable of making
decisions without the need for oversight o f its discretionary power, let alone for its
being diversified throughout the international legal system. Its objections to the
failure to classify the use of nuclear weapons as an international crime, further
illustrates its lack of understanding or recognition of complementarity in the Rome
Statute, through a lack of understanding of its subject matter restrictions.
The American position is rooted in the argument that States should have primary
responsibility for ensuring justice in the international system. Since the Security
Council is the main body that regulates the actions of States in the international
system, it should have exclusive control over how the ICC would assert its
jurisdiction. Thus the ICC should be subordinated to the Security Council primarily
under Chapter VII of the Charter, but not necessarily exclusively so.

Again

expectations of centralized legal and political authority resurface but this time
instead of the ICC being at the top of the hierarchy, the Security Council is.
American opposition further reflects the inability to get past Article 12 of the Rome
Statute, seeing it as the only check on the way in which preconditions are
established for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction - and inadequate at that
Provisions concerning admissibility, the real manner in which the Court* exercises
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jurisdiction over States, are glossed over.

Without admissibility, how can

complementarity be achieved? It cannot
The Rome Statute is an exceptional document It outlines an extremely complex
yet sophisticated approach to prosecuting international criminals where States are
unwilling or incapable of doing so. Simultaneously, it maintains the decentralized
international legal order, without creating a court that asserts its jurisdiction in a
supranational manner. It defines concepts and uses a new vocabulary to do so. It
departs

from

the

constraints of traditional views of international law.

Complementarity is achieved through its

procedures.

The international

diversification of oversight o f its discretionary powers gives it a unique reflexive
character in the Habermasian sense. In many respects there is a reflection of the
existing structure of the contemporary international legal system. Unfortunately
the Rome Statute may be too avante garde.

Most legal thinkers and political

decision makers remain steeped in their domestic preconceptions of international
law.

The task confronting the ICC and the Assembly of States Parties is

enormous.

They w ill have to prove that the ICC can function as intended.

Whether the officials of the Court and the Assembly of States Parties themselves
folly understand the context of how the Court is supposed to operate will be crucial
to its survival. In an environment where confusion abounds, the success of these
tasks is by no means assured.
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